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## Metaphor and the Cultural Construction of Negotiation: A Paradigm for Research and Practice

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As we enter the new millennium, cross-cultural negotiations are becoming the norm, rather than the exception, involving people at all levels of the organization – from CEOs to customers alike. Yet the increasing need for practical solutions on managing cultural dynamics in negotiation is not matched by the focus on culture in the science of negotiation, which remains primarily a Western enterprise (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). The purpose of this chapter is to further advance cultural perspectives in the science of negotiation. Our aims are to review some of the existing research perspectives on the topic, to discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and to provide an alternative and complementary perspective for further research. Specifically, we introduce a metaphor perspective on culture and negotiation. Metaphor plays a dual role in that it is both a theoretical mechanism for linking research on culture and negotiation and a practical tool for managing negotiation processes. We offer its theoretical basis, examples of its manifestations in the US and Japan, and descriptions of research issues that arise from studying how negotiation is socially constructed through metaphor. Before discussing culture, we first define negotiation and provide a brief overview of its *sans*-cultural traditions.

### NEGOTIATION

Negotiation has been described as a communicative exchange (e.g., Putnam and Poole, 1987) through which participants “define or redefine the terms of their interdependence (Walton and McKersie, 1965).” It is a pervasive form of social interaction that is conducted frequently in formal arenas, such as international relations, industrial relations, and manager-subordinate relations, as well as informal arenas, such as interpersonal relations and marital decision-making (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Although these arenas are quite diverse, there are some common elements of negotiation that are

applicable across contexts. Specifically, negotiation situations have at least five core characteristics: (1) parties have, or perceive that they have, a conflict of interest; (2) parties are engaged in communication; (3) compromises are possible; (4) parties can make provisional offers and counter-offers to each other; and (5) parties are temporarily joined together voluntarily, and their outcomes are determined jointly (Chertkoff and Esser, 1976; Cross, 1965; Rubin and Brown, 1975).

Negotiation has been a research priority since the earliest days of social psychology (e.g., Deutsch and Krauss, 1962) and organizational behavior (e.g., Walton and McKersie, 1965). Negotiation research is important for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theory-driven research seeks an understanding of basic processes and outcomes of negotiation, whereas practical research attempts to find ways to help negotiators get better results. Many aspects of negotiation have received attention (see reviews by Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Bazerman et al., 2000). Although there is no single all-encompassing theory or method of negotiation, Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) concluded that a dominant paradigm underlies most behavioral research on negotiation. Most of this research places an emphasis on psychological processes. Indeed, one of the main contributions of the dominant paradigm has been the demonstration that negotiation dynamics are influenced by the manner in which negotiators are thinking and feeling.

Within the dominant paradigm there are different research emphases (see Bazerman, et al., 2000). For example, research within the cognitive tradition examines negotiation as a form of decision making and focuses on perception and information processing (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987; Bazerman and Neale, 1983; Thompson, 1990). Research within the motivational tradition examines negotiation as a response to social conflict and its focuses on the role of goals and interests (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). In both of these traditions, researchers often make a distinction between what is referred to as *distributive* negotiation structures from those that are *integrative* in nature. In the former, negotiators' interests are diametrically opposed, resulting in the fact that a gain for one party is a loss for the other. However, in integrative structures, while negotiators' interests are opposed, they also have differences in priorities on the issues, resulting in the possibility of tradeoffs. As a result, it is possible to create agreements that are of mutual advantage or win-win.<sup>1</sup> In recent years, there is also an ever-increasing interest in the social context of negotiation (Kramer and Messick, 1995). For example, recent studies analyze issues such as negotiators' relationships, negotiation teams (e.g., Thompson, Peterson, and Kray, 1995), and social norms (e.g., Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993).

Culture is the broadest social context in which negotiations occur (Carnevale, 1995). The importance of culture in negotiation has been increasingly recognized (e.g., Adler, 1986; Faure and Rubin, 1993; Fisher, 1980; Harris and Moran, 1979; Janosik, 1987; Weiss, 1993). Next, we discuss why culture is important in the science of negotiation, and review perspectives on culture and negotiation that do exist.

### THE CULTURAL MANDATE

We are living in an era of increasing global intimacy as interdependent relationships among people of different cultures are on the rise. As expressed by Clifford Geertz (*New*

*York Times Magazine*, April 9, 1995, p. 44), thanks to "the deprovincialization of the world, we're going to be in each other's faces more." Since benefits derived from interdependent relationships are greater when conflict is managed constructively (Deutsch, 1973), the practical consequences of culture for interpersonal negotiation must be understood. As such, a behavioral perspective on culture and negotiation is needed for practical reasons.

The theoretical motivation for studying culture and negotiation is also compelling. Research on negotiation should strive to build *universal* laws – those whose validity generalizes across cultural contexts. Universal claims make sense when laws are based on variables that are commonly and similarly experienced by all humans, such as biological factors (e.g., hormones), ecological pressures (e.g., need for shelter), or exposure to elementary social structures (e.g., parent-child relations) (Pepitone and Triandis, 1987).

However, as we have noted, most behavioral research on negotiation has been done in North America and Western Europe, regions of the world identified as relatively individualistic (Hofstede, 1980a). Both personal and environmental factors should be taken into account to understand negotiation behavior (Lewin, 1935). Consistent with individualism, behavioral negotiation theory typically assumes self-interested parties and downplays group aspects of the negotiation environment (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Since culture might impact both behavior of negotiators and assumptions of researchers, a better understanding of each may result from cross-cultural research.

In sum, a provocative area of inquiry lies at the intersection of culture and negotiation for both practical and theoretical reasons. Below we summarize existing research perspectives on culture and negotiation, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and offer an alternative and complementary perspective based on metaphor.

In recent years, there has been increasing attention to the study of culture and negotiation. Emerging perspectives can generally be grouped into three categories: (1) *case study approaches*, which provide in-depth analyses of specific intercultural or intracultural negotiations; (2) *cross-national comparative approaches*, which document differences and similarities in the use of negotiation tactics in different geographic locations; and more recently, (3) *cultural dimension approaches*, which analyze negotiation behavior across cultures according to dimensions of cultural variation (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). While not necessarily inclusive of all possible approaches to the topic, this represents much of the empirical approach to the study of negotiation and culture (see also reviews by Gelfand and Dyer, 2000, and Lytle, Brett, Barsness, Tinsley, and Janssens, 1995). Collectively, these approaches illustrate that culture is an important element of negotiations. As with any theoretical perspective, each gives unique insights into cultural effects in negotiation, and each has strengths and weaknesses, which are discussed below.

The *case study* approach offers a rich, culture-specific (*emic*) perspective on culture and negotiation, and includes specific advice regarding negotiation styles in different cultures. One can find information about negotiating in *China* (Blackman, 1997; Pye 1982), *Japan* (Hawrysh and Zaichkowsky, 1989; March, 1990), *Korea* (Tung, 1991a), *Mexico* (Harris and Moran, 1979), *Russia* (Schechter, 1998; Smith, 1989), *Spain* (Burton, 1994) among others (Acuff, 1997; Salacuse, 1991). Likewise, there are a number of in-depth case studies and archival studies of intercultural negotiations available (Anand, 1981; Cohen, 1991; Cohen, 1987; Faure and Rubin, 1993; Glenn, Witmeyer, and Stevenson, 1977; Kimura, 1980; Strazar, 1981).

*Strengths and weaknesses.* Case studies are useful in that they provide holistic accounts of

a specific negotiation context, and typically provide information on what to avoid when conducting negotiations in particular cultures. Yet, at the same time, because they hone in on different aspects of culture and different aspects of negotiation, they are less useful for building theory across a wide variety of contexts. Since such accounts do not have any common metric, it is difficult to understand what is cultural per se, and how culture operates in negotiation. Moreover, given that such accounts are difficult to generalize, it is difficult to prescribe advice to managers negotiating in multiple cultures. Finally, such accounts are often static, and do not account for cultural change and within-culture differences.

*Cross-national comparative approaches* are the most common kind of research on this topic. They involve making systematic comparisons between samples of interest drawn from different locations of the world. An inference is made that "culture" amounts to "people from different locations." For example, culture has been defined as "a difference in national heritage and permanent residence of the parties in negotiation" (Graham, 1983: 198). Obtained between-sample differences on negotiation variables then count as evidence that "cultural differences" exist. Considerable evidence suggests that negotiation behavior varies from location to location based on this approach. For example, existing research can be found comparing the tactics and outcomes of Americans with Brazilians and Japanese (e.g., Graham, 1984), Canadians (e.g., Adler, Graham, and Gehrke, 1987), Chinese (e.g., Adler, Brahm, and Graham, 1992), French (e.g., Campbell, Graham, Jolibert, and Meissner, 1988), and Russians (e.g., Graham, Evenko, and Rajan, 1993), among others.

*Strengths and weaknesses.* This approach has begun to accumulate a diverse pattern of empirical facts, usually taking the form, "People from country X use more Y tactics and achieve more (or less) outcomes in negotiation than people in country Z (Zartman, 1993)." Such results demonstrate that culture plays a role in negotiation, and that we cannot necessarily generalize findings from one country to another. Moreover, unlike the previous approach, this research attempts to find a common metric upon which negotiations can be compared. While such differences provide evidence in favor of the claim that culture plays a role in negotiation, this approach has been criticized for its atheoretical orientation (Lytle, et al., 1995; Zartman, 1993). For example, Zartman (1993: 17) concludes that culture is "every bit as relevant as breakfast and to much the same extent. Like the particular type of breakfast the negotiators ate, culture is cited primarily for its *negative* effects. Yet even the best understanding of any such effect is *tautological*, its measure *vague*, and its role in the process basically *epiphenomenal*."

Such concerns arise mostly from the practice of inferring culture from "location of sample," which can lead to inexplicit theorizing about culture, circular causal reasoning, and conclusions that resemble stereotypes. As explained by Zartman (p. 18), "Although conceived as the determinant of personal behavior, culture is a social phenomenon and so is related to a particular society. But it is never clearly established why the given traits inhere in that society. The approach perpetuates stereotypes and self-proving hypotheses...African culture (or whoever) is what Africans (or whoever) do, and they do it because they are Africans (or whoever)." Also, this issue extends to the problem of managing cross-cultural negotiations. For instance, what are the managerial consequences of average tendencies of groups of negotiators? One negotiates with another person, not with "Africans, on average."

The third and more recent approach is the *cultural dimensions approach*. Research in this tradition often derives predictions about negotiation behavior and outcomes based on broad *culture-level* dimensions, most notably, individualism-collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and/or masculinity-femininity (Brett and Okumura, 1998; Gelfand and Christakopolou, 1999; McCusker, 1994; Natlandsmyr and Rognes, 1995; Tinsley, 1998). This approach offers a much-needed "theoretical" boost to the study of negotiation within the *etic*, comparative tradition by incorporating cultural dimensions into negotiation theory.

For example, Natlandsmyr and Rognes (1995) created two opposing hypotheses based on Hofstede's broad culture value dimensions: Norwegians would have more integrative outcomes than Mexicans based on their low masculinity, weak uncertainty avoidance, and low power distance scores in Hofstede's (1980a) study. Alternatively, based on Hofstede's (1980a) individualism scores, they hypothesized that Mexicans would have more integrative outcomes than Norwegians. Support was found for their first hypothesis, in that Norwegians had more integrative outcomes than Mexicans. Likewise, Tinsley (1998) linked dimensions of culture with negotiators' beliefs about normative conflict models. She found that cultural differences on hierarchical differentiation (acceptance of social inequality, such as Japan), explicit contracting (using formal agreements, such as in Germany), and polychronicity (processing many tasks simultaneously, such as in the US) were related to preferences for using authorities, relying on external regulations, and integrating interests in conflicts, respectively.

*Strengths and weaknesses.* Research in this tradition represents an advance from previous approaches by shifting the focus from using "location" to infer culture (and merely documenting differences), to making *a priori* predictions from general cultural dimensions, and in some studies, verifying those cultural assumptions with existing measures (e.g., McCusker, 1994). In this respect, we are in a better position to understand some of the reasons for *why* there are differences in negotiation. Nevertheless, a weakness of this approach is that it generally uses *broad* and *distal predictors* (i.e., dimensions of culture) to understand *specific* behavior in negotiations. However, such "historical" concepts are not the best predictors of current actions (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). In contrast, actions are determined from contemporaneous psychological states – those that exist at the time the actions are occurring. This is what Lewin called the "life space," or psychological environment produced by the immediate situation. In this view, the past does affect current action, but only insofar as the past shapes the life space of a person at the present.

Indeed, the notion that broad dimensions are not as useful for predicting specific behavior has been illustrated in research on culture in negotiation. For instance, several authors (e.g., Tinsley, 1998) have noted there is much between-country variance in negotiation behavior and outcomes that is not explained by broad cultural dimensions. This suggests that our current traditions do not offer enough insight into how culture operates. Finally, the dimensional approach suffers from an inability to give prescriptive advice for managers. Cultures differ on many dimensions, and are complex wholes (Lytle et al., 1995), and as such, advice given based on individual dimensions has the potential to be piecemeal and even conflicting.

### SUMMARY

Existing research perspectives have undoubtedly helped us to begin to understand the importance of culture and negotiation, and each has unique strengths and weaknesses, all of which point to the need for new research perspectives. We believe that building on the strengths of each approach is important in advancing other perspectives on culture and negotiation. In particular, studies of culture and negotiation have demonstrated that we need to have a *holistic* account of culture that captures the multidimensional nature of culture (i.e., *the case study approach*). We also need to have a common metric upon which to make comparisons (i.e., *the cross-national comparative approach*), and we need to formulate theory regarding *why* differences arise in negotiation (*cultural dimensions approach*). Yet even further, we argue that we need to have an account of culture that is *proximal* to the negotiation context (is in the here and now), demonstrate how culture *functions* in the system of negotiation, and demonstrate culture's *utility* for managers.

### A METAPHOR PERSPECTIVE ON CULTURE AND NEGOTIATION

Based on the previous discussion, we advance an alternative, yet complementary, perspective on cultural information processing and negotiation, which has its roots in cultural psychology (Bruner, 1990; Shweder and Levine, 1984), linguistics (Lakoff, 1993; Gibbs, 1990; Ortony, 1993), cognitive science (Gentner, 1983) and psychological anthropology (Schwartz, White, and Lutz, 1992). Consistent with a Lewinian perspective, and with existing views in cultural psychology, we argue that culture affects how people "enter into meaning" in the contemporaneous negotiation context. Central to our analysis is the assertion that shared metaphors, or coherent, holistic conceptual meaning systems, which have been developed and cultivated in particular socio-cultural environments, *function* to interpret, structure, and organize social action in negotiations. Below, we discuss the nature of culture as meaning systems, before turning to a discussion of the function of these meanings in negotiation.

### CONCEPTUALIZING CULTURE

In conceptualizing culture, we focus on the nature of culture as it exists in the here and now of negotiating. We adapt Geertz's (1973) perspective, which posits that culture consists of "historically transmitted patterns of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop knowledge about attitudes toward life."

Meanings fundamentally reflect mappings across conceptual domains, or what has been referred to as *metaphor* (Lakoff, 1987). While we experience them through language, metaphors operate on a conceptual level. The idea that metaphors are more than linguistic devices stems from Reddy (1993, who showed how the "conduit" metaphor conceptualizes the experience of communication. Since then, a growing body of evidence from cognitive science and linguistics supports the contention that metaphors are the

basic mechanism through which humans conceptualize experience (Gibbs, 1990; Lakoff, 1987; see also Ortony, 1993).

More specifically, metaphors are coherent conceptual systems in which different domains of experience are put into the same category so that knowledge from one can be used to make sense of the other (Lakoff, 1993). Metaphors can be thought of as sets of conceptual mappings that take place between domains of experience. While humans are capable of a wide array of different conceptual mappings, some are *selectively developed, activated, and perpetuated through participation in social institutions and practices*. As an example, Lakoff (1993: 243) illustrates how most basic concepts, such as time, are based on everyday socio-cultural experiences, and conceptualized through metaphor:

We have a TIME as MONEY metaphor, shown by expressions like he's wasting time, I have to budget my time, this will save you time; I've invested a lot of time in that; he doesn't use his time profitably. This metaphor came into English use about the time of the industrial revolution, when people started to be paid for work by the amount of time they put in. Thus, the factory led to the institutional pairing of periods of time with amounts of money, which formed the experiential bases of the metaphor. Since then . . . the budgeting of time has spread throughout American culture.

As in the above example, metaphors use information from a well-developed knowledge source domain (i.e., money) to construct a mental model about another target domain (i.e., time). Through cross-domain mappings, the entities associated with money (i.e., budgeting, saving, wasting) are specifically applied to the domain of time.

The cognitive process of making sense of something new based on what is known already has been referred to as *apperception* (James, 1890). Through apperception, sets of ontological correspondences are made between current and past experiences, and an interpreted "pattern of" behavior from a previous social situation becomes a "pattern for" expressing behavior in a current one. Thus, in the previous example, we construct meaning about the concept of time through a well-developed frame of reference, and the experience of time *becomes like* the experience of money. Importantly, it is assumed that this process takes place rapidly, automatically, and largely unconsciously (Lakoff, 1993), and further, once it has taken place, the meanings become indistinguishable from reality itself (Markus et al., 1997).

Apperception and metaphoric mapping are assumed to be natural cognitive processes that are universally applicable to all humans. Yet because metaphoric mappings stem from participation in social institutions and practices, the *content* of metaphoric mappings varies tremendously across socio-cultural contexts. Put simply, exposure to a similar cultural environment leads to shared metaphors (mental sameness) between members of groups. *Mental sameness* refers to intersubjective similarity in perceptions of a cultural environment between members of cultural groups (Malinowski, 1927). Likewise, to the extent that experiences diverge across socio-cultural contexts, metaphoric mappings between individuals will diverge as well. For example, the notion of "time as money" is a shared metaphor in the West, which is based on shared experiences, yet it does not exist in all cultures (Hall, 1984; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Thus, while metaphoric mappings are believed to have a universal function (i.e., provide a conceptual scheme for interpretation and expression), and follow a universal process (i.e., the process of apperception), the products of this process, which are the contents of metaphors, should be culture-specific (see also Gannon and Associates, 1994).

Consistent with a Geertzian perspective, although shared conceptual mappings are implicit, they are created, perpetuated, expressed, and institutionalized in various *symbolic forms*, such as language, laws, everyday routines and rituals, artifacts, etc. For example, conceptual mappings of time and money result in the development of language through which we communicate our conceptual mappings. In this respect, language is seen as a tool for "creating, maintaining, and communicating social and psychological realities, rather than merely a representational system" (Miller, 1997 citing Ochs, 1988: 94). Thus, symbols are the shared *explicit* coordinates of metaphoric mappings. Put differently, while conceptual mappings are ontologically subjective (i.e., thoughts are private), cultural symbols are epistemologically objective (i.e., symbols are transmitted between participants and can be directly experienced by more than one participant; see also Searle, 1995).

In sum, culture consists of shared meanings which are structured through cross-domain mappings (i.e., metaphors) that develop through experience, and that are embodied and perpetuated in various symbolic forms. Most basic concepts, such as time, are based on everyday experience, and conceptualized through metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Metaphors are not merely linguistic devices, but rather are a fundamental cognitive process. While this process is likely universal, the content of metaphors is culture-specific.

With this perspective in mind, we now turn to the role of metaphor in the system of negotiation. Just as other concepts and activities are conceptualized through metaphor, we argue that negotiations are conceptualized through metaphoric mappings. However, such metaphoric mappings are not universal — they are conditioned through participation in institutions and practices. That is, based on shared experience, a set of ontological correspondences are made between one domain of experience (such as war, or competitive sports) and the domain of negotiation, and in doing so, create different subjective and social realities of negotiation in different cultures. In the next section, we elaborate on this argument by first discussing the nature and function of metaphor in negotiation, and then discussing examples of metaphors of negotiation in the US and Japan.

## THE FUNCTION OF METAPHOR IN NEGOTIATION

Consider the following example of *argument as war*, offered by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4):

- ◆ Your claims are *undefensible*.
- ◆ He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.
- ◆ His criticisms were *right on target*.
- ◆ I *demolished* his argument.
- ◆ I've *never won* an argument with him.
- ◆ He *shot down* all of my arguments.

As discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), this example is not merely reflective of a linguistic device, but rather the *experience* of argumentation is conceived of in terms of the domain of war. In this respect, "many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal

battle, and the structure of an argument – attack, defense, counterattack, etc. reflects this . . . it structures the actions we perform in arguing” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 4).

Importantly, in the previous example, war metaphors do more than merely represent knowledge. They also have directive functions in negotiation. First, metaphors function to *create intentional subjective realities* (Bruner, 1990; Miller, 1997). In other words, metaphors dictate what negotiators should take to be their psychological reality – what does and does not exist (Kashima, 1994). In this respect, we argue that metaphors have a constitutive function in negotiation (cf. Miller, 1997) in that they contain concepts for defining the subjective reality of negotiation. Moreover, such subjective states are intentional in that they guide action. As Kashima (1994) states, “metaphors are not just food for thought, but food for action” (p. 352). The second function is social and concerns negotiation as a form of collective action. Here, we argue that coordinated, organized social action between negotiators is made possible through shared metaphoric mappings and their objective symbolic referents. In this respect, we suggest that metaphors have an *organizing* (Weick, 1979) function in the system of negotiation. Each of these functions is discussed in turn.

### PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF METAPHOR

The first function of metaphors in negotiation is to provide a set of ideas for interpreting the context, or defining the environment, of negotiation. Since negotiation is a form of social activity that exists only through mutual participation, metaphors provide a coherent, conceptual scheme for defining that activity. To use a metaphor, the conceptual content of metaphors can be used to “define the game” that “we” are playing. Metaphors give an answer to the question, “what are *we* doing here?” for individual participants in a contemporaneous social context which are constitutive of the activity. For example, Searle (1995) explains how ideas have a “constitutive function” for social activities with the game of chess:

the rules of chess do not regulate an antecedently existing activity. It is not the case that there were a lot of people pushing bits of wood around on boards, and in order to prevent them from bumping into each other all the time and creating traffic jams, we had to regulate the activity. Rather, the rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess. The rules are *constitutive* of chess in the sense that playing chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules. Such rules come in systems, and the rules individually, or sometimes the system collectively, characteristically have the form: X counts as Y in context C.

Searle’s quote shows how the objective context of chess is virtually meaningless for someone with no knowledge of the game. The board, how the pieces are lined up, the way each piece moves, and so on, are not intrinsic properties of the physical context. Rather, the rules of chess transform those objective features of the context into a meaningful social event. It is the rules themselves, as a system of ideas, which create the very possibility of the game. In addition, for chess to exist as a possibility, two people must similarly hold the belief, “we are playing chess” and have a common understanding of how “we” play. The entire set of actions that “I” can take as an individual chess player depends entirely on the fact that “we are playing chess” has been established as a social reality.

Much like knowing the rules of chess is a prerequisite to playing the game, knowledge of metaphors is a prerequisite to negotiation. In other words, negotiation is an experience that is possible because pre-existing ideas define a meaningful social context. Metaphors create the very possibility of "we are negotiating."

In addition, Searle's quote suggests that constitutive rules, like the ones that define the game of chess or the context of negotiating, come in systems. That is, it is possible to think of metaphoric mappings in terms of a system of ideas that come from a domain of experience and that are useful in making sense of another domain of experience. Systems tend to have a hierarchical structure (Simon, 1962). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe this hierarchical feature in terms of "entailments" of metaphor. With respect to negotiation, at the most superordinate level, metaphors are used to define the "we" negotiation situational context. In other words, metaphors provide a basis for answering the question, "What kind of situation are we experiencing?" For example, is this context a battle? A family gathering? A game? A dance? Within a particular superordinate metaphor category, there are many possible subsystems of meaning. These can be thought of as metaphoric entailments, or subcategories, of a negotiation context. While an infinite number of subsystems are possible, we analyze three that derive from a logical analysis of social systems (Thelen, 1959; Simon, 1962; McCusker, 2001).

Specifically, the first level of analysis is *problems*. While a context surrounds all aspects of negotiation, problems concern the tasks of negotiation. At the level of problems, the kind of question answered by metaphors is, "What kind of task are we doing in this situation?" For example, are we conducting a performance contest to see who will win (entailed by a game context)? In laboratory studies of negotiation, participants are given instructions about problems, yet in real life metaphors contain such instructions. Indeed, research has shown that definitions of negotiation tasks can be construed differently (e.g., Bazerman, et al., 1985; Pinkley, 1990; De Dreu and McCusker, 1997). Within our perspective, metaphors provide the basis for participants to define task characteristics. For example, a *negotiation as seduction* metaphor suggests a different task than a *negotiation as dental work* metaphor.

The second level of analysis is *scripts*. Scripts concern norms for interaction. The kind of question at stake for an analysis of scripts is, "How are we doing the tasks of negotiating?". Metaphors highlight aspects of the negotiation context that can enable or constrain particular patterns of interaction. In experimental situations, for example, subjects are constrained by instructions to exchange offers in a particular way. This can include specific instructions about when and how negotiators can interact (e.g., send offers back and forth in a sequential, turn-taking manner). Outside of the laboratory, the instructions for patterns of interaction are contained in metaphors. For example, a *negotiation as tango* metaphor would suggest that one person should lead during the negotiation process, whereas concepts from a *negotiation as tennis* metaphor would suggest that either person can lead at different times depending on who has earned the right to "serve."

Finally, the third level of analysis is *feelings*. Feelings in negotiation are based on performance standards. In laboratory studies, negotiators are given instructions that define outcomes associated with different levels of performance (e.g., "Try to get as many points for yourself as possible."). In real life, metaphors include concepts about what counts as effective performance (i.e., when we should be happy about negotiation results). The question underlying the use of metaphor to interpret feelings is, "How are we

evaluating the result of the negotiation?" For example, a *negotiation as individual sport* metaphor suggests that feelings will depend on which negotiator ended up with a relative advantage over the other. Or, a *negotiation as family vacation* metaphor suggests that mutual advantage is a basis for feelings.

### SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF METAPHOR

A second function of metaphors is that they remove equivocality in social information and *organize social action*. Organizing concerns the mechanisms through which social actors stabilize meanings about common social conditions (Weick, 1979). Social action is said to be "organized" when social conditions exist in the life space of actors in a "sensible arrangement." Put another way, a social pattern is organized when social actors are oriented in the same way to common social conditions.

The notion of organizing dates back to Asch, who argued that "There can be no concerted action between persons unless they have cognitively structured the given conditions in somewhat similar ways" (Asch, 1959: 375). For social actors to hold common meanings their individual systems of orientation must be overlapping (Newcombe, 1959). That is, they have to be situated in the same subjective reality, i.e., looking at the situation from the same vantage point. This occurs if negotiators are using the same metaphor to define the negotiation context. Put differently, this means that negotiators are oriented in the same way to common *contexts*, and that negotiators have a similar construal of the *negotiation problem*, the *script* for solving it, and the *feelings* associated with different levels of performance.

A fundamental problem for organizing concerted social action, however, is that the information in the environment is equivocal. Equivocality is a property of social information and refers to its capacity for multiple interpretations, or meanings (Weick, 1979). A well-known example of an equivocal display is Wittgenstein's duck/rabbit image. While it remains objectively the same, it can be interpreted as either a duck or a rabbit depending on how one is oriented to it.

In the context of negotiation, equivocality can come from a variety of sources. In negotiation, the "We" context is a major source of equivocality. This is because any beliefs that negotiators hold about what "we are doing" are based on assumptions about the other party. In other words, the negotiation context, as represented in the minds of negotiators as a system of "we" concepts, necessarily contains assumptions about what the other negotiators are thinking. However, it is ontologically impossible to see what another negotiator is thinking. In addition, the social world is full of a wide array of possible metaphors for negotiation. There are many contexts that might be applicable, each with its own set of problems, scripts, and feelings.

Metaphors provide negotiators with the capacity to remove equivocality about what "we are doing" in two ways. The first way for metaphors to remove equivocality is for negotiators to operate unconsciously from the same metaphor. This is more likely when a cultural group relies on a single metaphor, derived from shared experiences. The other way is for negotiators to resolve discrepancies in their beliefs about what "we are doing" through the presentation of symbols. The communication of symbols through actions can help situate negotiators in the same subjective reality, enabling concerted, organized,

social action. This process is called "co-orientation" (Newcombe, 1959). Co-orientation to a metaphor occurs when symbols are displayed and a corresponding set of concepts are then mutually understood. Moreover, by "co-orienting" to symbols throughout negotiation, negotiators can continually cultivate a common metaphor. Communication, be it verbal or nonverbal, is an example of symbolic actions that are rooted in metaphor.

In sum, we propose that metaphors have an organizing function in negotiation. Metaphors are made up of concepts and symbols. Negotiation processes are organized when negotiators structure problems, scripts, and feelings in similar ways. This means that a common set of concepts are used for defining the negotiation context. Since concepts are ontologically subjective, and negotiation can be understood from an infinite number of metaphors, equivocality pervades negotiation. But, a stable and mutual metaphoric understanding is cultivated and reinforced in negotiation through an ongoing symbolic exchange.

### METAPHORIC MODELS OF CULTURE AND NEGOTIATION

In the current formulation, cross-cultural differences amount to different ways of defining subjective realities and organizing social action in negotiation through different metaphoric mappings (and associated contexts, problems, scripts, and feelings) that have been cultivated through shared experiences. To make these differences visible, it is necessary to make *explicit* the metaphors that have been cultivated in different cultural contexts. That is, in order to compare negotiation across cultures, we need to become aware of the subsets of available metaphors and symbols that have been stored up and institutionalized through shared experience. Below, we juxtapose two metaphoric models, "*negotiation as sport*" and "*Negotiation as ie household gathering*" to describe cultural differences in negotiation for the U.S. and Japan, respectively. In our discussion, we focus on how co-orientation to metaphoric mappings of the domain of sports versus the domain of the Japanese household entails the social construction of different problems, scripts, and feelings in negotiations in these two cultures. Table 15.1 summarizes our discussion. These are not the only metaphors that can be used to understand negotiation in these two cultures, a point to which we will return later. Yet each is based on a tremendous amount of shared experience in each cultural context, and thus offers a window into the metaphoric dynamics of negotiation in these two cultures.

### SPORTS IN AMERICA

Sports plays a paramount role in the life of most Americans (Gannon and Associates, 1994). Remarking more recently on sports in America, President Bill Clinton argued "America, rightly or wrongly, is a sports-crazed country. We often see games as a metaphor for what we are as a people" (*New York Times*, April 18, 1998). Likewise, the sportswriter Thomas Boswell noted:

These days, sports may be what Americans talk about the most. With the most knowledge. The most passion. Not so long ago, such discussions . . . were couched in specifically religious terms . . . Today, where would we reach first for material or metaphor to make

TABLE 15.1 Cultural differences for negotiation for the US and Japan, respectively

<i>Target domain</i>		<i>Source domain</i>
<i>Negotiation</i>		<i>US Sports</i>
<i>Entailments</i>		<i>Japan: Japanese ie household</i>
Problems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ To conduct a performance contest</li> <li>◆ Task-oriented</li> <li>◆ Conflict is normal and overt</li> <li>◆ Discrete activity (beginning and end; events are kept separate)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ To ensure continuity and harmony of the group</li> <li>◆ Relationally oriented</li> <li>◆ Conflict is avoided and kept covert</li> <li>◆ Continuous activity (no beginning or end; interactions in one context affect the other)</li> </ul>
Scripts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Action organized by universalistic rules</li> <li>◆ Turn-taking, reciprocity.</li> <li>◆ Aggressive behavior yet sportsmanship is expected.</li> <li>◆ Person is kept separate from the task</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Actions organized by particularistic rules</li> <li>◆ Status and needs dictate actions</li> <li>◆ Face-saving is critical; aggression is eschewed</li> <li>◆ Person = task (is inseparable from the task)</li> </ul>
Feelings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Outcomes are determined by skill; are explicit</li> <li>◆ Satisfaction is derived from winning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Outcomes are determined by roles; are implicit</li> <li>◆ Satisfaction is derived from role fulfillment</li> </ul>

such points to our children? Probably to sports . . . in fact, sports has become central to what remains of our American sense of community. (*Washington Post*, pp. 24–6)

Given the amount of shared experience provided by sports, this metaphor has the potential for seeing systematic patterns of cultural co-orientation in the domain of negotiation in the U.S.

The domain of context of sports has particular problems, scripts, and feelings that are socially agreed upon and define the activity. A sporting event is a discrete activity with a beginning and end. Each match is considered separate and unrelated. The “problem” in sports is to conduct a performance contest between opposing players based on skill. Each side in a sporting event is co-oriented to this basic problem. For example, when two heavy-weights stand eye-to-eye before a boxing match, there is a clear consensus over the “problem” to be solved by their looming social action. There is no need for one of them to ask the other “Do you have any idea what is going on here?” They step into the ring knowing that their problem is to “beat” the other side.

Sports also present a vivid image of co-orientation to scripts, or the rules that coordinate social action during the performance contest. The “scripts” in sports concern

how the contest is carried out, or how the game is played. Co-orientation to scripts is necessary for the contest to occur. For example, a child playing baseball for the first time will need to learn when to hit the ball, when to run to the "bases" and when to throw the ball to other people. After "learning how to play," scripts are not something that need to be discussed before the contest. Hitting the ball and then running to third base would be a sure way for a professional baseball player to make the evening news.

While scripts vary from sport to sport, there are numerous scripts that are common to most sports. First, sports have formal rules that are established to equalize the teams. These rules ensure that each team is given a fair chance to win by creating a clearly defined, objectively fair framework within which the competition takes place. For example, sports involve turn-taking (e.g., in boxing, exchange of blows; in baseball, batting and fielding; in football, offense and defense) in which players get equal chances to score points. Professional sports implement or change rules in order to achieve parity and enhance fair competition. For example, most professional sports hold an annual draft, in which the best new players are distributed to the inferior teams in order to give them the chance to become more competitive. Similarly, in baseball, the "expanded strike zone" rule was implemented to make pitchers more competitive when it was determined that batters had achieved an advantage.

Second, all sports involve the use of a strategy, or a calculated play about a sequence of events, to coordinate actions among players for the purpose of scoring. Strategies involve the use of logic, and are based on facts and figures about pre-existing conditions. They are rarely based on feelings or intuition. Sports scripts also involve recorded action, in that points are tallied as the process ensues, and there are often no "do-overs." (i.e., going back in time). Finally, scripts in many sports serve to legitimize and enable ritualized aggression. Aggressive behavior, however, is confined to the event itself, and scripts dictate that players engage in friendly behavior outside of the event (i.e., have good sportsmanship). All of the aforementioned scripts are *universalistic* – they apply to all teams and players, regardless of position, ability, or preferences.

Sports also provide a vivid image of co-orientation to metrics of performance, which correspond to ideas about why some outcomes *feel* better than others. The "outcomes" in sports concern the meaning of actions, i.e., performance. It is understood that both sides want to win. It is not necessary to discuss whether one side *needs* or *deserves* to win more than the other. Outcomes are based solely on performance metrics. It is impossible to determine who should be happy or unhappy, i.e., who won versus lost, without them. Moreover, you are not a winner or a loser based on who you know, how hard you tried, how old you are, how long it has been since your last victory, and so on. You are a winner or a loser based on objective performance, e.g., more points. Importantly, the consequences of outcomes (i.e., winning or losing) do not need to be discussed because they produce unequivocal affective states. In individual sports, there are clear emotions associated with winners and losers: Winners are happy, losers are upset. For example, following their record-setting fourth championship defeat, there was no need to ask a member of the Buffalo Bills football team, "what are you feeling at this time?" There is a pre-existing consensus regarding how different levels of performance translate into affective states after the championship game.

Sports is a general metaphor that can be used to see culture in negotiation. To explore this, we discuss two basic types of contests – individual versus team sports.

## INDIVIDUAL SPORTS AND DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATION

Individual sports involve competition between individual actors. Some examples are golf, tennis, boxing, running, racing, and the like. Individual sporting events are a metaphor for distributive negotiation, a phenomenon well documented in the US (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993).

In distributive negotiation, each side is co-oriented to the problem – to outpace the other, and to demonstrate *relative advantage* over the other. Parties know that the negotiation involves zero-sum conflicting interests – one party will win and the other will lose. Co-orientation to the negotiation task from an individual sports metaphor is one way to interpret what has been called a “fixed-pie” perception (Thompson and Hastie, 1990). Negotiators do not typically begin distributive negotiation with discussion of whether interests are opposed in reality. Cultural co-orientation to the problem results in distributive negotiation when knowledge from individual sporting competitions is mapped onto the negotiation task.

There is also a “script” for distributive negotiation which follows the “script” of individual competition in many respects. Like turn-taking in sports, that script consists of reciprocal concessions. That is, parties are expected to “exchange punches” or “volleys” in the form of demands. The sports metaphor offers an explanation of the tendency for negotiators to “overbid.” Starting with higher offers lets negotiators “play the game” by exchanging demands and scoring points. Negotiators use logic and strategize to obtain desired outcomes. In *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, Raiffa (1982) illustrates how negotiators need to break a problem into parts, and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different alternatives. Moreover, like sports, the distributive script also consists of recorded action and you cannot take back a concession (i.e., there are no “do-overs”). Finally, similar to ritualized aggression in sports, competitive tactics abound during negotiations (e.g., threats, warning, positional commitments). Yet like good players in sports, negotiations is viewed as a process in which substantive and relational issues should be handled separately. Parties are expected to “separate the person from the problem,” and not take such behavior personally (Fisher and Ury, 1981).

In distributive negotiation, there is also co-orientation to performance metrics consistent with an individual sports metaphor. Just as we do not need to discuss what losing a championship game feels like, we do not need to discuss what making a concession feels like. We are co-oriented to concessions as a symbol of loss. Therefore, we expect that any feelings associated with concessions are negative. In this way, the sports metaphor can offer an explanation for reactive devaluation (Stillenger, Epelbaum, Keltner, and Ross, 1990). If someone makes a concession, it means that they are at a relative disadvantage and should experience the pain associated with loss. But, if they make a concession freely, or are even delighted to do so, our common understanding about what that action meant will produce suspicion. Also, agreement represents the end of the game, like a contest. When the agreement is reached, the issue is settled – one side was better than the other.

## TEAM SPORTS AND INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION

Sports metaphors can also be used to see co-orientation in integrative negotiation. However, in this case, the sports metaphors that map knowledge from the sports domain into the negotiation situation are team, not individual, sports. Specifically, integrative negotiation involves problems, scripts, and feelings that are similar to how we interact with team-mates.

The problem shared by team-mates is that they must work together to beat the competition and to make contributions toward this common goal. Integrative negotiation means that parties must engage in collaborative problem solving. The script for team sports involves people coordinating based on how well they contribute to meeting the group's objective. There is no discussion needed that it is in everybody's interest to pass the ball to the open player, even though, in doing so, it becomes more likely that she can score "more points" than the other players. Differences in skills are seen as opportunities to increase overall performance. Consider the Chicago Bulls during the 1990s. The team performed better as a whole when Michael Jordan did the scoring and Dennis Rodman did the rebounding. It would be less productive if each player had spent half of the game trying to be the shooter or the rebounder. This would be similar to two sisters dividing the orange in half in the famous Follet example (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993), who were able to trade off on the peel and the pulp in order to maximize each other's interests. By "logrolling" their talent, each player contributes more to the team's output. Such logrolling is more possible when players are co-oriented to a script that enables synergy. In much the same way, collaboration in integrative negotiation is possible. While we typically think of integrative negotiation in the context of making tradeoffs on economic issues of different value, the sports metaphor lets us see how mapping knowledge from team sports co-orient negotiators to a collaborative script. Successful enactment of the relationship synergy in team sports requires accurate information about abilities, much the same way that logrolling in negotiation requires accurate information about the importance of issues.

The co-orientation to performance metrics provided by team sports also maps onto feelings in integrative negotiation. When the team wins, all the players know without discussion of who did what, etc., and that it is time to celebrate. Even though there will always be differences in objective individual measures of performance, co-orientation to performance in team sports means that success is shared by the players - i.e., it is "win-win."

In sum, sports metaphors generally provide a window on processes in distributive and integrative negotiation. Whereas there are differences in problems, scripts, and feelings that constitute the activity, they both focus on the task and substantive issues (which are kept distinct from relationships), the use of turn-taking and recorded action, and the notion that outcomes are based on skill and strategy at the table. Kinhide (1976) summarized this approach to negotiation as illustrative of an *Arabi* style (roughly "manipulative", "can do", "choosing"), wherein "a person sets his objective, develops a plan to reach that objective, and then acts to change the environment in accordance with that plan" (Cohen, 1991: 30). Thus, like American sports, negotiations are conceived of in instrumental terms and on reaching a desired solution to the task (Ting-Toomey, 1990).

Sports are a cultural metaphor for the US because there is a tremendous amount of shared experience with sporting events in this culture. "Super Bowl Sunday" is a national holiday. Most public school districts require a certain amount of physical activity in gym class every day. Given the connections between sports and negotiation processes, it could be argued that it is through contests of sport that Americans learn how to interact with one another. Through the "education of attention" (Gibson, 1979) during sports, cultural co-orientation is made possible in other domains of life. Yet this domain of experience is not necessarily shared and thus accessible as a domain to understand negotiation in other cultural contexts. Next, we discuss a metaphor of negotiation that is likely to be more applicable in the context of Japanese culture.

### THE JAPANESE HOUSEHOLD (*ie*)

While sports metaphors can help to understand cultural processes in the US, it is through the organizing metaphor of the traditional Japanese household, or *ie*, from which we can view the cultural basis of problems, scripts and feelings in negotiations in Japan. The origin of the *ie* household dates back to the Meiji and feudal period of Japan (Kashima and Callan, 1994), but has persisted in modern social organization in Japan today. Like the shared experience of sports in the US, the *ie* "penetrates every nook and cranny of Japanese society" (Nakane, 1970a: 4). Lebra (1992: 16), for instance, noted that:

No discussion of Japanese social organization would be complete without some reference to the *ie* . . . Some scholars . . . have gone as far to characterize Japan as an *ie*-society in the sense that the *ie* is the most basic unit and penetrates Japanese society or is replicated in many other organizations.

According to Nakane (1970b), the *ie* household is a social unit that "once established assumes its continuity regardless of changes to its members, and exists at a core of the social system as an individual unit. (p. 102)." It constitutes, in essence, a well-defined social group who share work in an established frame of residence which controls assets (*kasan*) (Nakane, 1972; Kashima and Callan, 1994). In Japan, the *ie* has a different meaning than a typical Western notion of family in that those within the *ie* do not think of themselves as separate entities; rather there is a group consciousness (*shyudan ishiki*) that pervades the *ie* (Nakane, 1970a).

The fundamental "problem" within the *ie* is to ensure a sense of continuity and succession over future generations. The problem is conceived of in future terms, but also reaches into the past through symbols of ancestors, such as shrines and graves (Lebra, 1992). Thus, unlike the sporting event, the problems involved in the *ie* are continuous and do not have a beginning and end. Another aspect of the *ie* is that it has mechanism for expansion, including *honke* (the first household) and *bunke* (the branch household), which are hierarchically organized and linked together through mutual obligations related to the problem of group preservation (Kashima and Callan, 1994). In this respect, the problem is merged with relationships, unlike in individual sports, where the problem (to win) is separated from the relationships involved. Like the metaphor of sports in the US, within the *ie*, there is no need to select a method to assemble consensus over "what is going on here?" All members of the *ie* family understand that they are part of an

indivisible functional unit who work together to ensure the continuity of the group.

The *ie* also includes a view of scripts. The "scripts" of the *ie* are concerned with how the specific family members organize relations and share work for self-preservation. This is necessary for group preservation. Social actions in the *ie* are coordinated through interpersonal bonds and power relationships. Activity is regulated by clear structural roles between more senior members (e.g., father or eldest son) and subordinates, and there are informal rules regarding the nature and amount of emotional involvement within the vertical structure. For instance, subordinate members of the *ie* seek acceptance and dependency from others, which is referred to as *amae* (Doi, 1973). When a person of higher status fulfills *amae*, this produces obligations (*gimu*) to repay the favors of subordinate members (*on*), all of which create a perpetual mutual involvement (Kashima and Callan, 1994). Thus, the *amae-on-gimu* system regulates interaction between members of the *ie*. As a set of coordinated actions, it provides the mechanisms through which the quality or harmony (*wa*) of the relationships are maintained in the *ie*. These informal rules are regulated by those within the *ie* structure, and are highly *particularistic*. Just as Americans are given many opportunities to be skilled in learning the formal rules of interaction in sports, Japanese are given many opportunities to gain skills in learning the informal rules which enact the coordinated scripts characteristic of the *ie*.

Finally, the *ie* organizing metaphor elucidates the cultural basis of feelings. Unlike the individual sports metaphor, differences in performance levels do not have the meaning of winning versus losing. Instead, they reflect sacrifice for the greater whole and are rewarded with loyalty. And, unlike sports, outcomes are determined: not abilities or skills that are enacted during the activity; but, rather, by ascribed characteristics of parties.

### THE JAPANESE *IE* AND NEGOTIATION

The *ie* organizing metaphor can be used to examine cultural dynamics of negotiation in Japan. Interpretations of the negotiation task come from co-orientation to the conditions of survival of the group. Survival of the group requires that negotiators must incorporate another's interests in defining problems, rather than treating them as separate and opposed, as in the sports metaphor. Union activity in Japan, for instance, reflects the desire to cultivate cooperation and harmony between labor and management. Management often uses 'goal alignment' techniques, whereby through information exchange, they attempt to reduce demands (e.g., for increases in wages) through increasing employees identification with the goals of the entire organization (e.g., the company profit) (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992). These techniques are not used as much in the US (Morishima, 1991), which is consistent with our previous analysis of the sports metaphor.

Like the household *ie*, negotiations are kept within the group or organization in Japan. For instance, there are mainly enterprise unions in Japan, which are not tied to industry, but, rather, are geared toward dealing with a particular employer (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992). Allowing disputes to be resolved within the organization allows for more flexibility in the agreements that can be reached for the good of the group. As Nakane (1970a) noted:

Members of a trade union, for example are too loyal to their own company to join forces with their brothers in other company unions . . . a union movement, a confrontation,

whether they may be carried on between the managers and workers or between the faculty and students, is always carried on within an institution . . . it is like domestic discord.

Just as activity is governed by status and interpersonal bonds to preserve harmony in the *ie*, behaviors (scripts) are coordinated in negotiations in a similar manner. In trying to solve the group problem, negotiators are less focused on what each brings to the table in terms of achievements, as in sports. Rather, they use ascribed status and informal context-specific rules of conduct (*shikata*) to guide the behavior of the parties in order to maximize cooperation and harmony (*wa*). Consistent with our analysis of the *ie*, Graham and his colleagues have demonstrated that variability in outcomes in dyadic negotiations in Japan is explained most by roles, not tactics, as is the case in the US (Graham, 1983). Along with this deference to verticality, however, comes a responsibility for the superior in providing continuous support and loyalty. Thus, negotiators (e.g., sellers) are able to interpret differences in outcomes which come about through deference (e.g., to buyers) as being appropriate for the reward of loyalty in future interactions.

Likewise, just as scripts are based on emotional relatedness within the Japanese *ie*, negotiators' scripts often involve appeals to the feelings and goodwill of others (e.g., the use of *amae*, *nemawashi* and *naniwabushi*), rather than to logic and rationality (March, 1990). For example, March (1990) describes the script of "*Naniwabushi*" as involving an emotional appeal that takes place in three stages: the opening (*kikkake*), wherein the negotiator discusses his feelings about the relationship between the parties and his feelings; the *seme*, which details critical events that have led up to the negotiation; and the *urei*, in which the negotiator expresses great sorrow or self-pity surrounding the events. A negotiation over repayment of a loan in Japan is described as follows:

In your approach to the finance company, you open with a statement that describes your relationship with them over the years. You tell them what a good customer you have been . . . how you brought new customers to them . . . This is the *kikkake*. In the *seme*, you focus on the disastrous effects the recession has had on your business. . . your family now eats nothing but the Japanese equivalent of Big Macs . . . you can only continue to survive if the payments are cut in half . . . In the *urei*, you explain what will happen to you if your creditors do not grant this request. You will lose the automobile and therefore all your income . . . So you plead "Grant my request."

As March (1990) notes, the more emotionally moving the story, the more likely it is that it will be persuasive, as parties who do not compromise in such situations would be seen as cold-hearted. Unlike sports, the use of a victim mentality (*higaisaha ishiki*) is frequent, and not surprisingly, is not associated with the same feelings as in the sports context.

In sum, the Japanese *ie* provides a window into cultural co-orientation in negotiation. Like the *ie* household, the problems, scripts, and feelings that constitute the activity focus on relational and emotional issues (which are merged with the substantive task) (Ting-Toomey, 1990), the use of status and interpersonal bonds to guide action, and the notion that outcomes differences reflect loyalty and protection. Kinhide (1976) summarized this approach to negotiation as illustrative of an *Awase* style ("adaptive"), in which one adapts to the environment and treats the social relationship as the end in and of itself (Cohen, 1991). Thus, as in the *ie*, negotiations are conceived of in relational/emotional terms and on preserving the continuity and harmony of the group.

## DISCUSSION

In this chapter, we have argued that negotiation is a socially constructed reality based on metaphoric mappings. We further argued that through apperception, metaphors create correspondences between shared domains of experience (e.g. sports, Japanese *ie*), and the negotiation environment itself, and in effect, create the subjective and social reality of negotiation. We then argued that by making dominant metaphors explicit, it is possible to see cultural processes in negotiation. Specifically, we described two metaphors, *Negotiation as sport* in the US and *negotiation as ie household gathering* in Japan to illustrate our thesis that negotiations are constructed as conceptual mappings to other shared domains of experience which vary across cultures.

Our examples of metaphoric mappings were selective by necessity. For example, there are other aspects of mappings within the sports and Japanese *ie* metaphor that are informative of cultural dynamics, such as the role of audiences and third parties, conceptions of time in negotiation, the selection of negotiators, etc. An understanding of these elements in negotiation can be found through further analysis of ontological correspondences in the contrasting metaphors. For example, audiences in sporting events expect competition, whereas audiences in the Japanese *ie* expect cooperation, which can help us to understand the role of constituents in negotiations.

Furthermore, our discussion was selective in that the specific metaphors we described (sports and the *ie*) are not the only domains that are mapped to the context of negotiation in the US and Japan. Indeed, we emphasize that multiple negotiation metaphors are developed within every culture. For example, different metaphors are probably activated when individuals are negotiating with in-groups versus out-groups in collectivistic cultures (Triandis, McCusker, and Hui, 1990). Similarly, within the US given that women have historically had less shared experience with the domain of competitive sports, both informally and professionally, it is likely that they have different "metaphors-in-use" in negotiation. A critical issue for future research, therefore, is to document the subsets of metaphors available in different cultures. In addition, we also emphasize that our conceptualization of the metaphoric construction of negotiation is dynamic, not static; that is, metaphors become activated by situational conditions and also change over time throughout social interactions. As such, we believe that it is crucial for future research to focus on the conditions under which different metaphors gain cognitive and motivational force in negotiation. Below, we discuss additional theoretical and practical implications of our metaphor perspective on negotiation.

## THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Theoretically speaking, a metaphoric perspective on culture and negotiation is likely to be useful in understanding and predicting cultural differences in negotiation. By documenting different metaphors-in-use, we can illuminate different levels of reality in negotiations. Metaphors can also be useful to test whether negotiation theories, which have been generally developed in the West, are applicable in other cultural contexts. For instance, many of the competitive cognitive biases that have been well-documented in the

negotiation literature (fixed-pie error, self-serving biases), are likely to be constructed through dominant metaphors which highlight competition (e.g., individual sports) and are probably cultivated less in other cultural contexts.

In developing a cultural perspective on negotiation it will be important to unearth the dominant metaphors in our *science* as well. Just as humans conceptualize negotiation through metaphors, scientists also rely on the use of metaphor to develop theories (Leary, 1990; Weiner, 1991). Given that the science of negotiation has been developed in the West, it is likely that it is laden with Western metaphors (cf. Gray, 1994). Indeed, a perusal of the literature reveals symbolic evidence of underlying conceptual mappings that are reflective of battle and game metaphors (e.g., "common ground," "strategy," "matching tactics"), as well as dramaturgical metaphors (e.g., "frames," "roles") (Gelfand and Raver, 2000). Indeed, to advance theorizing in this area, it would be useful to generate new metaphors in order to highlight additional components of the phenomenon that are neglected by current metaphors in the science of negotiation.

The metaphor perspective can also be useful in cross-cultural psychology (Gannon and Associates, 1994). In particular, it both complements and adds to a dimensional approach (Hofstede, 1980a). Dominant cultural metaphors, which reflect holistic accounts of shared experience, should incorporate multiple dimensions of culture (cf. Gannon and Associates, 1994). For instance, the Japanese *is* described previously reflects the focus on vertical collectivism (Triandis and Gelfand, 1998). Likewise, individual sports in the U.S. reflect dimensions of vertical individualism (Triandis and Gelfand, 1998). Metaphors then, simultaneously reflect and support broad cultural themes. Yet metaphors, as dynamic, multifaceted cultural experience, may help link more distal perspectives of culture, which are captured well by a dimensional approach, to the more proximal "here and now" of the life space of the individual (i.e. individuals' cognitions), which is more predictive of behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). We also suggest that the "here and now" of negotiating can be understood with the categories of problems, scripts, and feelings. Each is a part of every negotiation experience, and, taken together, as entailments of a surrounding metaphoric context, they provide a holistic account of negotiating.

In addition, a metaphor perspective on culture should add to basic research on subjective culture (Triandis, 1972). In recent years, researchers have begun to document and categorize the tendencies of "individualists" and "collectivists." The person, as a member of a particular cultural group, has been the basic unit of analysis. However, the nature of metaphor, as a coherent, holistic, conceptual scheme suggests an alternative view. Rather than stable traits, cultural attitudes are seen as "systems of orientation." (cf. Hong, Morris, Chui, and Benet-Martinez, 2000). This shifts the basic unit of analysis in cross-cultural research to the "here and now" of a particular social situation, rather than the person, on average, across a variety of situations. And, a metaphor view suggests that cultural attitudes are not necessarily stable across situations, but, rather, can be chosen. In effect, it might be the case that one's cultural attitude can be the product of a reasoned choice, rather than the accident of one's national heritage. In short, a metaphor perspective on culture raises interesting questions about the very nature of cultural attitudes.

### PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: METAPHOR AND INTERCULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS

The current perspective also helps us to see why intercultural negotiations can be more difficult than intracultural negotiations (Graham, 1985). In other words, when negotiators are operating with the same metaphorical framework, as is often the case in intracultural negotiations, they co-orient to the situation, and, thus, share the same social reality. Sharing reality puts them in a better position to negotiate successfully. However, when metaphors are not shared, as is often the case in intercultural negotiations, enactment of social reality is more difficult. In short, it requires that steps must be taken to assemble consensus over problems, scripts, and feelings, or in essence, defining the constitutive rules that define the negotiation context. In this way, metaphor is a tool for *negotiating the negotiation*. In other words, a metaphor perspective places an emphasis on problem-setting (Schön, 1993) in addition to problem-solving.

In this respect, metaphors are useful for prescriptive research on culture and negotiation. The purpose of this type of research is to prescribe methods for managing cultural dynamics in negotiation, and asks the question, "What should be done when two parties from different cultures are attempting to negotiate?" According to the current theory, cross-cultural trainers can first try to create a shared metaphor, which both parties can use to coordinate their attempts to manage their interdependence. This approach relies on perspective taking, rather than trying to change the parties themselves. In this view, the most important role of cross-cultural trainers (or mediators) is the making of "generative metaphor" (Schön, 1993) and helping negotiators to restructure their cognitions to be complementary.

In addition, metaphors provide a useful tool because negotiators are not able to "see" their own culture. By using metaphors, we are in a better position to help negotiators within a culture develop an understanding of how their own culture has shaped the reality they impose on negotiation situations. As compared to a dimensional approach to cross-cultural training, this method provides a rich domain of experience within which negotiators can understand the dynamics of their culture (see Gannon, 2001 for other applications of metaphor training). Indeed, recent research within the US has shown that negotiators can benefit from receiving training which has its basis in metaphor (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Gentner, 1999).

Moreover, as described above, new metaphors can be chosen in negotiation. Since metaphors can be used to create, change, sustain, or eliminate culture as needed, the current view avoids ecological determinism (Kashima and Callan, 1994). By illuminating the functions of culture, we are able to actively "create" different cultures in negotiation. For instance, in the US, scholars and practitioners alike advocate an integrative approach to negotiation over the distributive approach. To better facilitate the use of integrative negotiation, we can encourage negotiators to apply different metaphors to enact negotiation. We can try to focus negotiators on seeing themselves as part of the same team, rather than competitors, in a sporting contest. By doing this, negotiators would be oriented to problems that are win-win in nature, scripts would relate to using each negotiators skills and information about the situation to come up with the best strategy for both to win, and would affirm the identity that goes along with being a functional member of the same team with a common goal.

## CONCLUSION

Centuries ago, Aristotle argued that "the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor (Aristotle, ca. 330 BC/1924, cited in Leary, 1990). Like Aristotle, we argue that metaphors are crucial to the understanding of cultural dynamics in negotiation. By making metaphors explicit, insights about cultural differences, and their origins, can be unearthed. Moreover, when culture can be viewed, it can also be managed. Managing culture, as metaphor, is about creating a new social reality.

## NOTES

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Portions of this paper were presented at the Stanford University Cultural Psychology Mini-Conference, Organized by Hazel Markus in 1998. The authors express their gratitude to Paul Hanges, Yoshi Kashima, Aric Kruglanski, Peter Smith, and Harry Triandis for their very helpful comments on the content of this chapter.

- 1 As an example of an integrative negotiation structure, imagine a negotiation between a married couple over where to go on vacation (Pruitt, 1986). The husband insists on going to the mountains and staying in a log cabin, whereas his wife demands to go to a luxury hotel on the beach. At first glance, their interests appeared to be of a fixed-sum nature – one party's gain (going to the mountains and staying a log cabin) is the other party's loss (going to a luxury hotel on the beach), and therefore one party will have to sacrifice his or her preferences completely in order to reach an agreement. However, with further discussion, the parties discover that there are two issues at stake in the negotiation, location and accommodations, and that they differ on the extent to which they *prioritize* these issues. Suppose that the husband reveals that his priority is the location (i.e., the mountains), while the wife reveals that her primary concern is the accommodation (i.e., the luxury hotel). By recognizing such differences in priorities, the couple can make tradeoffs that provide mutually beneficial outcomes (e.g., go to a luxury hotel in the mountains).