How Do I Trust Thee? Dynamic Trust Patterns and Their Individual and Social Contextual Determinants

C. Ashley Fulmer and Michele J. Gelfand

Abstract Levels of trust in a social relationship can fluctuate over time. However, few studies have directly examined the different trust decisions involved as the relationship progresses and delineated the various trust patterns that arise from these decisions. Our analysis examined the key processes in trust decisions during the phases of trust formation, dissolution, and restoration. These trust decisions across phases give rise to trust profiles. In this chapter, we discuss six unique trust profiles: High Trust, High Distrust, Tit-for-Tat, Seizing and Freezing, Assessment, and Grim Trigger, based on divergent trust patterns across trust phases. We focus on how individual and social contextual factors affect these patterns of trust. Our model highlights the need to consider multiple trust phases both theoretically and empirically to offer a more holistic understanding of how trust unfolds overtime in social relationships.

Keywords Trust • Trust building • Trust violation • Time • Profiles • Individual characteristics • Social context • Culture • Dynamic analysis

Author Note: This research is based upon work supported by research funded by the U. S. Army Research Laboratory and the U. S. Army Research Office under grant number W911NF-08-1-0144.

We give special thanks to the members of the MURI (Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative) Culture Group at the University of Maryland for their helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. We also thank Stephanie Van Nuner, Mashaia Vaughn, Emeilia Wilson, Ethan Wieselthier, Nicholas Jirnenez, Farrah Al-Mansoor, and Eric Barley for their assistance on the preparation of this chapter.

C.A. Fulmer (Ed)
Department of Psychology, National University of Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: sfulmer@nus.edu.sg

M.J. Gelfand
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

K. Sycara et al. (eds.), Models for Inter cultural Collaboration and Negotiation, Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation 6, DOI 10.1007/978-3-647-5574-1_5,
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
1 Introduction

Consider the following examples:

An employee agrees to be in a team project and puts in considerable amounts of time and effort. However, when she hears that her colleagues might have taken the credit for her work, she immediately decides to withdraw from the team project and requests a transfer to a different branch to avoid working with this group of colleagues in the future. Despite finding out that the person repeatedly mismanages their accounts, he continues to entrust the person to handle this vital function of the business, believing that the incidents of mismanagement are accidental and beyond the person's control because of a difficult economic climate. A buyer negotiates a partnership with a seller in a different country. Although during the negotiation the buyer lends the seller to be forthright and fair, he remains distrustful of him and watchful for potential contract violations. The partnership nearly breaks down when a shipment from the seller is delayed. The buyer believes that the delay is a sign of incompetence, but reluctantly agrees to give the seller another chance after receiving multiple apologies from the seller. The partnership continues but remains fragile.

As illustrated in these examples, trust can fluctuate widely over the course of a relationship as people manage their interdependence. A large body of research has indicated that trust is critical in all stages of relationships, from their initial development to breakdown and reestablishment. Research across a wide range of disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and economics, has found that trust serves vital functions. It promotes cooperation and teamwork (Dirks, 1999; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Simons & Peterson, 2000), organizational citizenship behavior (Connell, Ferres, & Travaglione, 2003; MacAllister, 1995; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990), leadership effectiveness (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Jung & Avolio, 2000), success in negotiation and mediation (Arnold & O'Connor, 2006; Okeke, Lau, & Smith, 2002; Valley, Moag, & Bazerma, 1998), and mergers and acquisitions (Grabner, 2009; Maguire & Phillips, 2008; Stahl & Sitkin, 2005), as well as national-level democracy (Putnam, 1993) and economic well-being (Fukuyama, 1995).

The examples above highlight the fact that trust in a social relationship evolves and changes over time. A trust relationship can go through different phases, including trust formation—a progression in which individuals choose to trust others and increase their trust over time; trust dissolution—a progression which occurs after violations when individuals decide to lower their trust in others; and trust restoration—a progression which occurs when trust stops declining after violation and rebounds toward stability (e.g., Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Miles & Creed, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). In each of these trust phases, individuals need to make a trust decision about whether to increase or decrease trust in the trustee. For example, some people can be more reluctant to build trust than others in trust formation. Likewise, during trust dissolution, some individuals may consider the smallest sign a breach, while others may give more latitude and the benefit of the doubt before deciding to lower their trust. Finally, people also diverge in their rate of trust recovery. Once people lower their trust in another, some may find it difficult to trust that person again while others are more willing to give the person another chance.

2 Phases of Trust

The trust literature has identified three distinct phases of trust—formation, dissolution, and restoration (Kim et al., 2009; Miles & Creed, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). These trust phases are interrelated and yet each has its distinct properties, processes, and functions. Reviewing the interdisciplinary research on trust, including psychology, sociology, and economics, Rousseau and colleagues concluded that trust is neither static nor stable. Instead, researchers should examine trust dynamically across phases as it fluctuates and changes in response to individual factors and social contextual demands. Before our analysis of the profiles of different trust patterns, each of the three trust phases is discussed in turn below.

2.1 Trust Formation

A trust relationship begins with trust formation (Cook et al., 2005; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). The key process
in trust formation is how trustors can infer the trustworthiness of the trustee. The perception of trustworthiness is multi-faceted and can be categorized in the forms of the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995). Ability refers to the trustee’s competence to carry out an expected action, benevolence refers to the trustee’s intrinsic and positive intention toward the trustor, and integrity refers to the trustee’s perception that “the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., p. 719). Integrity also includes factors such as honesty, fairness, consistency, and reliability (Mayer et al.).

To the extent that trustors perceive the trustee is sufficiently competent, benign, and upright, they are more likely to consider the trustee to be trustworthy. As a result, they are more likely to decide to increase their trust quickly during trust formation. Note that depending on the type of relationship and who the trustee is, trust formation can occur without all three of the trustworthiness facets. For example, in a buyer-supplier relationship, a positive perception of the other party’s ability and integrity may be sufficient to build trust that sustains the partnership without an explicit consideration of benevolence. As the relationship progresses and the number of interaction domains between the two parties increases, however, all three facets of trustworthiness are likely to be required due to the growing breadth of the relationship (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). Researchers have observed incidents in which organizations in stable alliances will forgo better business opportunities with alternative partnerships in exchange for the benevolence, commitment, and loyalty of their long-term partners (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).

2.2 Trust Dissolution

The very conditions that foster trust allow for future trust breaches (Granovetter, 1985). To trust, in essence, is to take risk based on positive expectations of others. This puts the trustor in a position vulnerable to violations. More frequently than we expect, violations occur in a trusting relationship (Blagovan & Shapiro, 1998; Kim et al., 2009; Morris & Moberg, 1994; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). The second phase of trust—dissolution—concerns decreases in trust after one or more violations have occurred. Two key processes in this phase, vigilance and idiosyncratic credits, affect people’s decisions on whether to lower trust. Borrowing from the definitions of the signal detection theory in the field of human factor and applied cognition (Blough, 2001; Parasuraman, 1998; Wickens & Hollands, 2000) and sensitivity to rejection in the close relationship literature (Downey & Feldman, 1996), we define vigilance as sustained attention and alertness directed to detect and identify signals of intentional violation of trust. When a trustor is vigilant toward violations, he or she will be more likely to notice violations and lower trust readily.

Once a violation has been identified, trustors need to make a decision about how much trust to lower in the trustee. However, an awareness of violation or injustice may not always prompt responding actions (Greenberg & Alge, 1998). Some may be likely to reduce trust immediately, whereas others might be willing to withhold such decisions if they grant the other party “idiosyncratic credits.” Idiosyncratic credit is defined as an accumulation of positively disposed impressions residing in the perceptions of relevant others (Hollander, 1958, p. 120). Idiosyncratic credits are similar to the concept of latitude of acceptance in social judgment theory, defined as the range of positions accepted and tolerated (Hovland, Harvey, Sherif, 1957; Sherif & Hovland, 1961).

Both idiosyncratic credits and latitude of acceptance suggest that individuals may not change their trust attitude and lower their trust based on a single violation, but rather a number of violations. Research on justice violation threshold, for example, shows that individuals vary in the number of violations they allow before responding to injustice (Bougé, 2005; Gilliland, Benson, Schepers, 1998). To the extent that a trustor allows high levels of idiosyncratic credits for the trustee, the trustor should be less likely to lower trust at the first sight of a potential violation. The trustee is placed under “pards and paroles” instead so that the social relationship can continue to function (Doz & Emel, 1998). The rate of trust dissolution should thus depend on the vigilance level of a trustor and the idiosyncratic credits the trustor gives to a trustee.

2.3 Trust Restoration

The third phase of trust is restoration. Although violations can be a part of a trusting relationship, there is variation in how much and how fast the betrayed individuals restore their trust in the other party. A key process that affects trust restoration is the trustor’s attribution of the violation that has occurred. In the forgiveness literature, intent, controllability, and stability have been proposed as three major aspects within one’s causal attribution of a negative event in a relationship (Fincham, 2000; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986, 1995). Specifically, forgiveness and trust restoration have been predicted to be more likely when the trustor believes the cause of a violation to be unintentional and due to the situation, uncontrollable on the part of the trustor, or an isolated incident and unstable characteristic of the trustee (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). A recent meta-analysis by Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag (2010) indeed showed the negative effects of intent (weighted mean $r = - .49$) and responsibility (weighted mean $r = - .35$) on forgiveness.

Individual differences can also affect attributions. For example, some individuals can be high on hostile attributional bias (Dodge, Price, Bachorowski, & Newman, 1990), a tendency to make negative attributions of others’ intentions in ambiguous situations. These trustors would tend to think that a violation is intentional, controllable, and an action typical of the trustee. In contrast to this negative preconception, prior positive relationship history and empathy can buffer the trustors and prompt them to make positive attributions of the violations (Fehr et al., 2010). These examples underline the fact that the attributional process during trust restoration is subject to selective interpretation (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
3 Defining Trust Trajectories

As the above discussion implies, when a truster makes the trust decision across the three trust phases, levels of trust can fluctuate at divergent rates in different phases. In each trust phase—formation, dissolution, and restoration—levels of trust can change quickly or slowly. The trust changes across phases form a dynamic trust pattern, or what we refer to as trust trajectories.

More specifically, a trust trajectory indicates the magnitude of changes in trust level from one point in time to another. A trajectory is the same as the slope in a regression. On a graph, trajectory is shown by the differences in elevation among phases of trust. A small difference indicates a gentle slope and slow trust changes, whereas a large difference indicates a steep slope and fast trust changes. For example, as Fig. 1 displays, a fast trust formation refers to a large increase in trust levels during the formation phase. This is followed by a slow trust dissolution with a small decrease in trust levels in the dissolution phase, and a fast trust restoration leading to a quick rise in trust levels over time.

When we consider multiple trust phases sequentially, different trust patterns arise. We produced the different profiles of trust patterns by roughly differentiating trust changes in each of the three phases as either fast or slow and crossing the three trust phases orthogonally (2 x 2 x 2). This results in eight possible trust profiles that have yet to be identified in the literature. These trust profiles, each with unique trajectories across the formation, dissolution, and restoration phases, form the basis of our theoretical propositions.

In this chapter, we focused primarily on six profiles. Specifically, high trust profiles are characterized by fast formation, slow dissolution, and fast restoration. In contrast, high distrust profiles are characterized by slow formation, fast dissolution, and slow restoration. Tie-for-tat trust profiles are characterized by fast formation, fast dissolution, and fast restoration, and selving and freezing trust profiles are characterized by fast formation, slow dissolution, and slow restoration. Assessment trust profiles are characterized by slow formation, slow dissolution, and slow restoration. Finally, grim trigger trust profiles are characterized by fast formation, fast dissolution, and slow restoration.

In what follows, we discuss each of these profiles in more detail and we delineate examples of specific individual and social contextual differences that are theorized to underlie these different dynamics. Table 1 provides an overview of our discussion. We note that the list of variables identified for each profile is by no means exhaustive. They are examples to illustrate how various factors can affect the key process in each trust decision and the trust patterns across phases.

3.1 High Trust Profile: Fast Formation, Slow Dissolution, Fast Restoration

As can be seen in Fig. 1, this trust profile is characterized by a rapid trust formation in the beginning of a trust relationship, a slow trust dissolution when violations have occurred, and a quick trust restoration after dissolution. Fundamental to this profile is the notion that trusters do not perceive the trusting relationships to be risky and that their trust is very resilient, thus enabling them to 'move on' after trust violations. The individual differences relevant to this profile include high self-esteem (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), secure attachment style (Mikulincer, 1998), and locomotion regulatory mode (Kruglanski et al., 2000). The social contextual factors important to this profile are relational embeddedness (Fehr et al., 2010; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996), common third party and reputation (Ferrin, Dirks, & Shah, 2006; Glick & Croson, 2001), and collectivism (with ingroups: Triandis, 1995). Collectively these variables tend to facilitate perception of trustworthiness of others, lower vigilance toward violations, increase idiosyncratic credits that the trusters are willing to give to the trustees, and promote positive attributions of the violations.

First, a high level of self-esteem should lead to the high trust pattern. Rotter (1954, 1967, 1971) discussed trust from a social learning perspective, explaining that trust is a result of one's generalized expectancies of the trustworthiness of other people that one developed over time. As individuals high on self-esteem tend to have

---

1There are two additional possible trust profiles: (1) slow formation, fast dissolution, and fast restoration and (2) slow formation, slow dissolution, fast restoration. However, because not all trust profiles occur with equal frequency, we focused on the six commonly occurred trust profiles in this chapter.
Table 1 The trust patterns and the individual and social contextual determinants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust profiles</th>
<th>Individual and social contextual determinants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile #1 High Trust</strong></td>
<td>Individual: High self-esteem, Secure attachment, Locomotion; Social contextual: Relationship history, Third party and reputation, Collectivism with ingroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile #2 High Distrust</strong></td>
<td>Individual: Low self-esteem, Anxious attachment, Cynicism, Betrayal aversion; Social contextual: Surveillance and monitoring, Honor logics, Collectivism with outgroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile #3 Tit-for-Tat Trust</strong></td>
<td>Individual: Tit-for-tat, Equity sensitivity; Social contextual: Exchange relationships, Dignity logics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile #4 Seizing and Freezing Trust</strong></td>
<td>Individual: Need for closure; Social contextual: Time Pressure, Power distance with authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile #5 Assessment Trust</strong></td>
<td>Individual: Assessment; Social contextual: Need to avoid closure, Public situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile #6 Grim Trigger Trust</strong></td>
<td>Individual: Grim strategy, Interpersonal orientation; Social contextual: Performance orientation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Related to self-esteem is the construct of secure attachment (Cassidy, 1988). The secure attachment style in adults has consistently been linked to a higher level of trust in others (Collins & Read, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer, 1998). Specifically, people with a secure attachment style should have greater perceptions of the benevolence of trustees, and expect that the trustees care about their personal well-being (McCullum, 1995). Murray and colleagues (2006) also found that adults with a secure attachment style were less concerned about social rejection and violations. Likewise, Mikulincer (1998) found that adults with a secure attachment style felt more trust in partners in close relationships and adopted constructive coping strategies such as communication after violations. Their positive perceptions of the relationship and partner should also promote positive attributions of the violations (Collins, Ford, Guichard, & Allard, 2006). For example, Collins and colleagues (2006) found that secure trustors were less likely to make intentionality attributions than anxious trustors. Based on these factors, we predict that secure attachment should lead to fast formation, slow dissolution, and fast restoration.

Motivational factors are also relevant to this trust pattern. In particular, individuals who endorse self-regulation strategies of locomotion (Kruglanski et al., 2000) can exhibit the high trust profile. Locomotors are “concerned with movement from state to state and with committing the psychological resources that will initiate and maintain goal-related movement in a straightforward and direct manner, without undue distractions or delays” (Kruglanski et al., 2000, p. 794). It has been noted that interpersonal relationships can serve as a means to a goal through which motivation and goal commitment can be elicited (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Consequently, when locomotors enter a trusting relationship instrumental to a goal, they should build trust quickly. Another unique quality of locomotors is their willingness to invest efforts (Pierro, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2006). They continually exhibit goal-directed persistency despite setbacks (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). When facing violations, therefore, locomotors are expected to lose trust slowly and repair trust quickly to maintain relationships in order to continue the tasks at hand. Research has also found that locomotors in close relationships frequently engage in affiliation of the partner (Kumashiro, Rusbult, Finkel, & Stocker, 2007). Based on these considerations, we expect that when pursuing a goal, high locomotors will perceive the trustee to be more trustworthy, behave in a less vigilant manner, and make more positive attributions of violations than low locomotors.

At the social contextual level, the degree to which individuals are embedded in relationships that are of high quality—such as satisfaction, commitment, trust, and communication (Canavello & Crocker, 2010; Collins & Read, 1990)—is related to this trust profile. A pre-existing positive relationship should facilitate trust building (Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). During the trust dissolution phase, previous positive relational experiences with another can decrease vigilance and reaction to violations (Murray et al., 2006). A trustee’s perceived idiosyncratic credit for a trustee can similarly be affected by the history of the particular relationship. For example, if the trustee is in a committed relationship of high quality, the trustor should be more likely to grant more idiosyncratic credits.

A positive expectation of interactions with others (Leary et al., 1995), the process of trust formation for them should be fast. Further, verification of the self by another person, which occurs more frequently with individuals with high (vs. low) self-esteem, can also facilitate trust formation (Burke & Stets, 1999). High self-esteem individuals have been found to be less concerned about threats to their relationship (Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2005) and they should allow more idiosyncratic credits in trust dissolution. During trust restoration, their positive expectations of others (Leary et al., 1995) should prompt them to make positive attributions of the violations, believing that the violations are unintentional, uncontrollable, and uncharacteristic of the trustee.
to the trustee. Positive relationship quality should also promote trust restoration. In a meta-analysis on forgiveness, Fehr and colleagues (2010) have found relationship closeness, satisfaction, and commitment between a trustee and their trustor to be strong determinants of forgiveness. These signs of high relationship quality should motivate a trustor to overcome negativity to maintain a trust relationship (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002; McCullough et al., 1998).

In cases where the trustor and trustee do not know each other directly, a trusted third party between the trustor and trustee can lead to a high trust pattern. During trust formation, a common third party may help the trustor assess the trustee's trustworthiness. Ferrin and colleagues (2006) found that a trusted third party directly increases the trustor's trust in the trustee. We expect that the effect of a common third party should be even stronger if the third party, an ingroup member of the trustor, lends the perception that the trustee is also an ingroup member of the trustor. People tend to perceive a higher level of trustworthiness from an ingroup member compared to an outgroup member (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Sharing a common identity with the trustee, such as one through common group membership, has been found to facilitate trustor's trust building (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002). In this way, a common third party should also benefit the process of trust dissolution and restoration by lowering vigilance, increasing idiosyncratic credits, and leading to a positive attribution of a violation.

When a common third party is not available, the trustor may nevertheless rely on the reputation of the trustee (Glick & Croson, 2001) to infer the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee. Reputation has been found to increase trust, particularly in a competitive environment (Glückler & Armbuster, 2003). A positive reputation should also lead the trustor to have lower vigilance and higher idiosyncratic credits during trust dissolution, as well as more positive attributions of the violation during trust restoration.

Culture is another relevant social contextual variable to this pattern. In particular, when people from collectivist cultures interact with ingroup members, they should exhibit the high trust pattern. Collectivism is defined as "a situation in which people belong to in-groups or collectivities which are supposed to look after them in exchange for loyalty" (Hofstede, 1984, p. 419). Therefore, the distinction of ingroup versus outgroup status of others is especially relevant to collectivists (Triandis, 1995; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). As mentioned previously people tend to perceive their ingroup members to be trustworthy (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). This effect should be stronger among collectivists and lead to a fast trust formation. We similarly predict that the higher cohesiveness with ingroup members (Hofstede) will lead collectivists to allow more idiosyncratic credits for their ingroup trustor (particularly when violations are not large) and exhibit a slower trust dissolution. Finally, because collectivists are more likely to make situational attributions (Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994) and have higher perspective taking (Cohen & Hoshino-Browne, 2005; Kitayama & Markus, 1999), they are likely to make positive attributions of the violations and display a fast trust restoration.

3.2 High Distrust Profile: Slow Formation, Fast Dissolution, and Slow Restoration

As shown in Fig. 2, a high distrust profile is characterized by a prolonged trust formation in the beginning of a relationship, a rapid trust dissolution when violations have occurred, and a slow and difficult trust restoration after dissolution. Fundamental to this profile is the notion that trustors perceive the decisions to trust and social relationships to be very risky and that their trust tapers easily. The individual differences relevant to this profile include low self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995), anxious attachment style (Mikulincer, 1998), cynicism (Costa, Zonderman, McCrae, & Williams, 1985), and betrayal aversion (Bohnert & Zechhauser, 2004). The social contextual factors important to this profile include surveillance and monitoring (Sitkin & Roth, 1993) and, at a more macro level, cultures of honor (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) and collectivism (with outgroups; Triandis, 1995). Overall, these variables decrease perception of trustworthiness of others, heighten vigilance toward violations, limit idiosyncratic credits granted to the trustees, and lead to negative attributions of the violations.

Opposite to the high trust profile, individuals with low self-esteem and anxious attachment style should exhibit a high distrust profile. People with low self-esteem tend to have more negative expectations of others, resulting in a low perception of trustworthiness and a slow trust formation. The chronic negative expectations of other people should also lead them to expect rejections and violations in relationships (Leary et al., 1995), be highly vigilant (Murray et al., 2006), and allow few idiosyncratic credits. As a result, trust should decrease quickly at the first likely sign of violation. Finally, the negative expectations people with low self-esteem
have about others should lead them to make negative attributions of the violations, believing they are intentional, controllable, and characteristic of the trustee.

Compared to individuals with a secure attachment style, those with an anxious attachment style tend to have a lower level of trust (Collins & Read, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer, 1998). It stands to reason that trust formation can be difficult for them. The anxious attachment style has also been found to lead to hypervigilance toward threatening cues in a relationship (Murray et al., 2006; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2003). We also expect that individuals with an anxious attachment style would allow few idiosyncratic credits and exhibit fast trust dissolution. After violations, anxious individuals tend to engage in ruminative worry (Mikulincer). Ruminative, defined as "passive and repetitive focus on the negative and damaging features of a stressful transaction" (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003, p. 242), has been found to lower forgiveness (Feber et al., 2010). Anxious individuals have also been found to endorse more relationship-threatening and conflict-inducing attributions than secure individuals (Collins et al., 2006). Consequently, trust restoration can be slow for people with low self-esteem.

In addition to self-esteem and attachment styles, another individual-difference variable that can affect people's trust decisions throughout trusting relationships is their levels of cynicism. Cynicism reflects "distrusting and disparaging attitudes toward the motives of others, and beliefs in the selfishness of human nature" (Costa et al., 1985, p. 929; see also Leung et al., 2002). Notably, cynicism has been differentiated from distrust on multiple aspects, such as the emotions of disgust and shame that are unique to the former and the requirement of vulnerability to the latter (Dean, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 1998). Nevertheless, we expect that the negative view of others prescribed by cynicism will lead individuals to display the high distrust pattern. In organizations, for example, cynics have been found to be more likely to question the motives of their leaders (Kanter & Mirvis, 1989). As a result, people high on cynicism should have lower perceptions of others' ability, integrity, and benevolence. Cynics are also expected to have high vigilance toward violations and grant few idiosyncratic credits, especially as cynical attitudes are typically acquired through a series of unmet expectations and disappointment (Andersson, 1996) and a lack of contingency between one's actions and the environment (Triandis, 1976). Because cynicism is related to a host of negative emotions such as distress and disgust (Andersson & Bateman, 1997; Dean et al., 1998) and a belief that others are selfish (Costa et al., 1985), individuals high on cynicism should be more likely to make negative attributions after violations than those low on cynicism, making trust restoration slower and more difficult.

Individuals also differ in the extent to which they are willing to take risk from other people. Bohnet and colleagues (2004, 2008) termed the trustees' tendency to avoid violations from other individuals as betrayal aversion. They suggested that it is betrayal aversion, not risk aversion alone, that affects people's trust decisions (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). More specifically, betrayal aversion refers to a phenomenon wherein individuals are more averse toward social risk caused by other people than those toward natural risks from inanimate objects (Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2008). This is partially because people are concerned with process through which their outcomes are generated, which is a distinct concern when dealing with human versus inanimate decision-making (Rabin, 1995).

When individuals are betrayal averse, they should thus be less likely to find another person trustworthy in the beginning of a trust relationship, more likely to be highly vigilant and assume a violation has occurred, and more likely to make negative attributions of the trust violation. Empirical evidence indeed suggested that people tend to be more conservative in their risk-taking when the outcomes are determined by another individual (i.e., betrayal aversion) than by randomness (i.e., risk aversion), even though the outcomes are identical (Bohnet et al., 2008; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Feih, 2009; Koehler & Gershoff, 2010). Failing to consider the interpersonal component in the examination of trust as risky decisions may explain some of the mixed empirical results on the relationship between trust and risk (c.f. Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004).

Highly relevant to the individual differences of betrayal aversion is the social contextual factor of honor cultures. Honor has been defined as "the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim" (Pitt-Rivers, 1966, p. 21). Miller (1993) further explained that "honor is above all the keen sensitivity to the experience of humiliation and shame" (p. 84). Just as betrayal aversion is high in the Middle East, the culture of honor is pronounced in the region, suggesting that betrayal aversion and the honor logics may be interrelated. Bohnet, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser (2010) found that people in the Persian Gulf regions required a higher level of trustworthiness before they were willing to trust than Swiss and Americans. People in honor cultures may have a stronger concern for the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee than people in other cultures, which can lead to a slow trust formation. Indeed, benevolence has been found to be an especially relevant concern in Middle East cultures (Dorfman, Hanges, & Brodbeck, 2004).

Trust dissolution may likewise be difficult and can occur quickly in honor cultures. Bohnet and colleagues (2008) have found that people in the Middle East have an exceptionally high level of betrayal aversion, compared to Americans, Europeans, and East Asians. As discussed previously, this high level of betrayal aversion should lead to heightened vigilance for potential trust violations. Further, people in honor cultures are compelled to defend their honor and seek revenge when others trespass their properties and rights or fail to reciprocate in a relationship (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). This is because an individual's personal worth is determined by both the self and others in these cultures (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Stewart, 1994). As a result, violations acquire a special meaning in honor cultures as they are a direct test of what others can do to one and an indirect test of one's self worth (Leung & Cohen, 2011). In the justice literature, reactions to injustice lead to stronger reactions when individuals' self-worth is threatened (Greenberg & Alge, 1998). It stands to reason that, following trust violations, trust restoration in honor cultures would be very slow and difficult.

Another relevant social contextual factor to the high distrust profile is collectivism. In particular, people in collectivistic cultures should display the high distrust
pattern when dealing with outgroup members. Collectivists value relationships with ingroup members and perceive large social distance with outgroup members (Hofstede, 1984; Triandis et al., 1990). Further, people tend to find outgroup members to be less trustworthy than ingroup members (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Kramer & Brewer, 1984), and this effect should be stronger for collectivists. Because of the distrust collectivists have for an outgroup member, it can take longer for them to build trust. Branzei, Vertinsky, and Camp (2007) found that collectivists engage in more incremental testing of a stranger's trustworthiness in a trust relationship than individualists, suggesting that collectivists may be vigilant toward violations and give limited idiosyncratic credits with an outgroup trustee. During trust restoration, we expect that collectivists would make more negative attributions when violations are from an outgroup member than an ingroup member, making the process slower than usual.

Finally, at the social contextual level, surveillance and monitoring can also lead to the high distrust pattern. To ensure trustworthiness, people sometimes elect to monitor their trustees. The degree of monitoring in a society is related to its levels of constraints. People in a tight society, characterized by strong and pervasive social norms and little tolerance toward deviations (Gelfand, Nisbett, & Raver, 2006), should engage in and be accustomed to a high level of monitoring than those in a loose society. Tight societies, for example, have been found to have higher population density and higher police, both of which afford higher monitoring (Gelfand et al., 2011).

Monitoring and surveillance can have unintended negative effects on trust. The emancipation theory of trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) suggests that trust is a more effective means to manage social uncertainty than active surveillance and monitoring because trust allows flexibility for parties in a relationship to focus their energy on performing constructive activities instead of safeguarding and checking compliance (c.f. Mayer & Gavin, 2005). Moreover, McAllister (1995) found that trust and monitoring are negatively related, a result consistent with prior literature (Kruglanski, 1970; Strickland, 1958). The efforts that the trustees use in conducting surveillance and monitoring may therefore ironically decrease their efforts to promote trust (Kramer, 1999). Cialdini (1996) suggested additional reasons for this negative relationship, such as attributions of honest behaviors to the surveillance by both the trustee and trustee and increased fear and suspicion in both parties. Fear and suspicion are likely to increase trustees' vigilance and decrease the idiosyncratic credits they are willing to grant. Together, these effects should lead a trustee to perceive a low level of others' trustworthiness, be highly vigilant, and make negative attributions of the violation.

The negative relationship between monitoring and trust could be due to the strong overlap between trust and risk. As trust only occurs when individuals face uncertainty (Gambetta, 1988; Mishra, 1993) and need to make a “leap of faith” choice despite the uncertainty (Holmes & Boon, 1991; Sitkin & Roth, 1993), monitoring eliminates the necessary uncertainty and deprives opportunities for trust to develop. In addition to being detrimental to trust, surveillance and monitoring may actively promote distrust, a confident expectation about the negative attitudes and behaviors of another (Lewicki et al., 1998).

### 3.3 Tit-for-Tat Trust Profile: Fast Formation, Fast Dissolution, and Fast Restoration

As Fig. 3 demonstrates, the tit-for-tat trust profile is characterized by a quick trust formation in the beginning of a trust relationship, a quick trust dissolution when violations have occurred, and a quick trust restoration after dissolution. Fundamental to this profile is the notion that the decisions to trust are rational and calculative. The individual differences relevant to this profile include the tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod, 1984) and equity sensitivity (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987). The social contextual factors important to this profile are exchange relationships (Clark & Mills, 1979) and cultures of dignity (Leung & Cohen, 2011). These variables all tend to facilitate perceptions of others' trustworthiness, increase vigilance toward violations and lower idiosyncratic credits, as well as promote relatively positive attributions of the violations after they perceive remorse from transgressors.

Research has suggested that the tit-for-tat strategy is effective in eliciting cooperation in social relationships (Oskamp, 1971; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Tit-for-tat is a contingent strategy that matches the other party's prior behavior in relationships (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Individuals who adopt the tit-for-tat are concerned with mutual outcomes and avoidance of being exploited at the same time (Van Lange & Visser, 1999). In the beginning of a relationship, individuals with the tit-for-tat strategy always begin with trust and cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). In the absence of information indicated otherwise, they assume others are trustworthy. However, the use of the tit-for-tat strategy implies that individuals should be ready to retaliate immediately in the case of defection. In other words, these people should...
be vigilant toward violations and allow very few idiosyncratic credits. Once the other party resumes cooperation, individuals who adopt the tit-for-tat strategy will choose to cooperate again. Because of this, those who adopt the tit-for-tat strategy are considered to be rational and maximizing (Gutman, 1996). They are quick to forgive (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis, 2004) and not expected to make negative attributions of the violations.

Another individual-difference factor that is particularly relevant to this profile is equity sensitivity. People vary in their degrees of sensitivity to equity (Fehr & Schmidt, 2000; Huseman et al., 1987). Specifically, individuals who are equity sensitive prefer a matching level of output, compared to their input, to that of others (Huseman et al., 1987). Preferences for equity and fairness have been found to motivate behaviors in situations that require cooperation (Croson, 1996; Kurni, Salmon, & Sopher, 2008). We expect that those with high preferences for equity and fairness are more likely to adopt the tit-for-tat strategy in their relationship than others. During trust formation, concerns for similar outcomes should facilitate trust building. Employees who prefer equity (comparable outcomes to contributions ratios between oneself and others) or underpayment (a smaller ratio compared to that of others) have been found to trust the organization more than those who prefer overpayment (a larger ratio compared to that of others; Kickul, Gundry, & Posig, 2005).

Equity sensitivity can also affect perceptions of whether a violation has occurred. Compared to those who prefer underpayment, individuals who prefer equity and overpayment have a lower threshold of violation perception (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Further, when equity sensitive individuals perceive unfair treatment, they experience distress (Huseman et al., 1987). Because of these two factors, equity sensitivity is likely to increase vigilance toward potential violation that may compromise fairness. Trust dissolution should be rapid as a result. However, once the inequity is restored, such as by the repair efforts put forth by the trustee, trust restoration should be relatively fast. Perceptions of justice in repairing efforts have been found to increase positive attitudes toward the trustee (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). Equity sensitive trustors should make positive attributions prompted by the trustee’s attempts to rectify unfairness.

At the social contextual level, the tit-for-tat trust pattern can also be observed in exchange relationships. In exchange relationships, "benefits are given with the expectation of receiving a benefit in return" (Clark & Mills, 1979, p.12). Record-keeping, or concerns of individual inputs in joint tasks, are salient in exchange relationships (Clark, 1984). Consequently, the interaction logics of tit-for-tat are commonly used. During trust formation, individuals should be able to trust quickly, with the expectation that the other party will reciprocate the trust. However, idiosyncratic credits should be limited in an exchange relationship because of the strict rule of tit-for-tat and expectation of immediate reciprocity that is "in kind" with the exchange. Trustors in exchanges relationship are also vigilant toward deviations of the exchange norms (Clark & Chrisman, 1994). Trustors should thus respond quickly to violations. During trust restoration, trust is expected to build again quickly during trust restoration once the norms of exchange have been reestablished.

Culture can also act as a social contextual factor to influence this pattern. In particular, this pattern can be observed in the dignity cultures (Leung & Cohen, 2011). The culture of dignity is closely related to individualism which endorses the rational principles and individual rights (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004; Triandis, 1995). In dignity cultures, individuals' personal worth is intrinsic within each person and cannot be stolen by others. Dignity cultures thus value one's interval evaluation of the self and a moderate version of the tit-for-tat strategy in interacting with others (Leung & Cohen, 2011). People in dignity cultures generally have higher trust toward others because of the belief that dignity, or self-worth, is inherent in all human beings. They also believe that morality and integrity are attributes innate to people (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Ross, 1930). However, their concerns for equity and fairness should make them sensitive to trust violations and lead to fast trust dissolution. Moreover, the cultures of dignity endorse governing by internal standards rather than social sanctions (Kashima et al., 2004). Trustors in dignity cultures should therefore be less inclined to make negative attributions of the violations during trust restoration, believing that the trustee would experience guilt about the transgression (Leung & Cohen, 2011).

### 3.4 Seizing and Freezing Trust Profile: Fast Formation, Slow Dissolution, and Slow Restoration

Figure 4 shows the seizing and freezing trust profile, which is characterized by a relatively quick trust formation in the beginning of a trust relationship, a prolonged trust dissolution when violations have occurred, and a slow and difficult trust
restoration after dissolution. Fundamental to this profile is the notion that trustors have a tendency to build trust quickly, but become affixed to the trust decisions made in the prior phase and slow to change their trust levels. This tendency for trustors’ attitudes to stay close to a pre-established position is akin to the concept of attractors in dynamic modeling (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998). Attractors emerge in cognitive networks when individuals cannot fully integrate all available information and increasing rely on prior evaluative parameters as heuristics (Nowak & Vallacher).

An individual-difference variable that is highly relevant to this profile is need for closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). The social contextual factors relevant to this profile are time pressure (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) and power distance with authority (Carl, Gupta, & Javidan, 2004). Other factors that can also affect this pattern are noise and fatigue (Kruglanski & Webster). These variables facilitate perceptions of others’ trustworthiness, decrease vigilance toward violations and increase the number of idiosyncratic credits, but lead to negative attributions once the trustors eventually recognize the violations.

As an individual-differences dimension, need for closure (NFC) refers to “individuals’ desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward ambiguity” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Trust building has been found to be more likely in certain versus uncertain situations (Gore, 1996) and it generally saves trustors time and effort to assume others’ are trustworthy in the beginning of relationships (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006). Driven by their orientation for certainty, high NFC individuals are expected to trust quickly when they find evidence of the ability, integrity, and benevolence of the trustee. Based on the initial evidence of trustworthiness, trustors high on NFC would begin trust formation quickly to avoid prolonged uncertainty.

After seizing on a closure, NFC continues to motivate individuals to maintain the closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Therefore, high NFC individuals may be inclined to “freeze” on their trust in the trustee during trust dissolution. They may be less vigilant toward signs of trust violations as they focus on prior knowledge about the trustee and ignore subsequent information. They will also be more willing to give the trustees idiosyncratic credits because of the perceptions that trustees are trustworthy. However, once individuals with high NFC do decide to lower their trust, they should freeze on the notion that the trustee is untrustworthy and be disinclined to rebuild their trust in the trustee again. As these trustees freeze on the trust violations and the notion that trustors have acted in an untrustworthy manner, it would be difficult for them to make positive attributions of the violations and engage in trust restoration. Indeed, experimental work has demonstrated that people high on NFC exhibited abrupt conflict escalation, without a gradual progression, and difficulty in de-escalation (Bui-Wrzosinska, Cicheck, Nowak, & Formanowicz, 2009). The motivation to avoid ambiguity and maintain congruence promotes a nonlinear trust pattern of attractor dynamics of moving from one stable state to another (Vallacher & Nowak, 2007).

Related to dispositional NFC, we predict that social contextual factors that promote NFC should similarly lead to this trust pattern of fast formation, slow dissolution, and slow restoration. For example, time pressure has been found to increase NFC (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) by increasing the use of heuristics in information processing and decision making (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). We thus expect that, under high time pressure, people will build trust quickly in trust formation, as trustors in general assume others’ trustworthiness in the beginning of trust relationships (McKnight et al., 1998). Research has indeed found evidence of “swift trust” formation in temporary teams (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). Once perceptions of trustworthiness are formed, trustors under time pressure may rely on this belief heavily during trust dissolution. The heightened NFC of these trustors should lead them to be low on vigilance and allow more idiosyncratic credits than those trustors not under time pressure. However, when the trustors cannot ignore the signs of violations anymore, they will shift their position by changing their perceptions of the trustees from being trustworthy to untrustworthy. Time pressure will lead the trustors to “freeze” on this new position and the negative perceptions during trust restoration (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), rendering the trust rebuilding process slow and difficult.

At the cultural level, this trust pattern may be found in cultures high on power distance, particularly with an authority. Power distance has been defined as “the degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be shared unequally” (Carl et al., 2004, p. 517). In high power distance cultures, paternalistic leadership that demonstrates humane considerations and promotes hierarchical harmony is common and effective (Carl et al.). As a result, people in high power distance culture generally expect the authority figures to be high on ability, benevolence and integrity. Further, obedience and deference to authority is a key feature in high power distance cultures. People should thus be less vigilant toward violations from authorities and allow them more idiosyncratic credits. Individuals with high power, such as leaders, are generally given more latitude and idiosyncratic credits to violate group norms (Hollander, 1958; Homans, 1950). Greenberg and Alge (1998) predicted that subordinates tend to give violators of high power the benefit of the doubt, to avoid escalation of conflict. These effects should be stronger in high power distance cultures. However, because of the obligation and benevolence expected from authorities in high power distance cultures, trust restoration may be slow and difficult once the subordinate decides to lower their trust in the authorities. Brocker, Tyler, and Cooper-Schneider (1992) indeed showed that when subordinates who were highly committed to the authority ultimately found violation of fairness from the authority, their attitudes toward the authority became more negative than those of the subordinates low on commitment.

3.5 Assessment Trust Profile: Slow Formation, Slow Dissolution, and Slow Restoration

As can be seen in Fig. 5, an assessment trust profile is characterized by a prolonged trust formation in the beginning of a trust relationship, a prolonged trust dissolution
when violations have occurred, and a prolonged trust restoration after dissolution. Fundamental to this profile is the notion that the decision to trust in each phase should be a careful and slow process that cannot be easily made. Trustors would prefer to have as complete information about the trustee and the situation as possible and to weigh the pros and cons before making any trust decisions. The individual differences relevant to this profile include the assessment regulatory mode (Kruglanski et al., 2000) and need to avoid closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). The social contextual factor relevant to this profile is public situations (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). These variables lead trustors to resist making decisions about others' trustworthiness quickly, increase the likelihood of granting idiosyncratic credits to allow the benefit of the doubt, and refrain from making attributions of the violations immediately after violations.

The slow formation, dissolution, and restoration trust pattern can occur with individuals high on the regulatory mode of assessment. Assessors are concerned with "critically evaluating entities or states, such as goals or means, in relation to alternatives in order to judge relative quality" (i.e., judging the quality of something by considering both its merits and demerits in comparison with an alternative; Kruglanski et al., 2000, p.794). Individuals high on assessment prefer to have as much information as possible when evaluating situations and making decisions. Uncertainties increase the likelihood that trustors give the benefit of the doubt (Carson, Madhok, Varma, & John, 2003). Therefore they should be slow to trust because they need time and information to determine the trustee’s trustworthiness. They are also slow to lower their trust because they are unlikely to jump to a conclusion at the first sight of a violation, as assessors evaluate both positive and negative information lengthily (Kruglanski et al., 2000). However, once their trust is decreased, it will take an equal amount of time and efforts, if not more, to verify the trustee’s trustworthiness, which makes them slow to trust again. Moreover, assessors are likely to make negative attributions of the violations during trust restoration and prolong the recovery process because assessment has been shown to have a positive correlation with social anxiety and a negative correlation with self-esteem (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003).

Another individual difference that can promote the assessment trust pattern is the need to avoid closure. Need to avoid closure is on the opposite end of the continuum from need for closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Need to avoid closure therefore refers to individuals’ desire to "suspend judgmental commitment" (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990, p.196). Because need to avoid closure is motivated by the benefits of suspending judgments and the costs of committing cognitive closure and even judgment mistakes (Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzraht, 1985; Webster, 1993), trustors high on need to avoid closure should spend a prolonged period of time to gather and consider the three facets (ability, integrity, and benevolence) related the trustee’s trustworthiness. During trust dissolution, the trustors may grant the trustee high idiosyncratic credits. Individuals high on need to avoid cognitive closure are capable of generating alternative explanations (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987), and are thus more likely to give the benefit of the doubt when facing violations. Further, violations are sometimes ambiguous in their meanings, and trustors high on need to avoid closure would want to be certain about the situations before making a decision to lower trust. The process of trust dissolution would thus be slow. Need to avoid closure also affects how individuals make casual attributions (Webster). In trust restoration, these trustors should avoid making quick decisions about the intentionality, controllability, and stability of the violations.

At the social-contextual level, the assessment trust pattern may also be found when a trustor is making trust decisions in public, representing constituents. When the trustor is representing a group of constituents, the accountability involved and the public nature of the situation should lead the trustor to be slow to trust. Prior research suggests that constituents can lead their representative to take a contentious stand toward the opponent (Adams, 1976), particularly in individualistic cultures (Gelfand & Realo, 1999). Further, concerns for accuracy, such as those prompted by accountability, should promote prolonged decision-making (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990). Because of these factors, trust building should be slow when the trustee is responsible to a group of constituents.

Likewise, the representative may be reluctant to lower their trust when signs of violation appear in order to maintain an impression of positive outcome and avoid accountability. When a trust relationship can be observed in public, the potential costs and benefits associated with identifying trust violations should further heighten the desire for accurate trust decisions in the relationship. Trustors with the constituents should thus spend time to evaluate both favorable and unfavorable information about the trustee (Reckman & Goethals, 1973). Costly judgment mistakes in public situations have been found to reduce need for closure and suspend judgmental commitment (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Finally, trust
Fig. 6 The grim trigger trust profile with a fast formation, a fast dissolution, and a slow restoration in the public situations and with constituents would be particularly difficult to repair after violations, as conflicts in this situation tend to be more severe than between individuals (Polzer, 1996). Additionally, because the trust decision will be made in public, the concern for accuracy should prolong the process of trust restoration.

3.6 Grim Trigger Trust Profile: Fast Formation, Fast Dissolution, and Slow Restoration

As Fig. 6 shows, a grim trigger trust profile is characterized by a quick trust formation in the beginning of a trust relationship, a quick trust dissolution when violations have occurred, and a slow and difficult trust restoration after dissolution. The name “grim trigger” reflects the fact that a single defection from the partner “triggers” one’s defection in all subsequent interactions (Campbell, 2006). This profile is an epitome of “Trust, but verify,” a catchphrase of President Ronald Reagan during the Cold War. Fundamental to this profile is the notion that trustors enter a trust relationship with positive perceptions of the trustees but expect a possibility of violations. More specifically, the grim trigger is a strategy used in relationships that engages in permanent retaliation once a violation has occurred (Axelrod, 2000). Individuals who adopt the grim trigger always cooperate in the absence of trust violations (Axelrod, 2000). Therefore, they should build trust quickly to sustain the cooperation (Hwang & Burgers, 1997). However, the trust relationship can only continue if no trust violation has occurred. Individuals with the grim trigger strategy would choose to stop the interactions for the slightest deviation from the relationship norms (Friedman, 1971), even if it is only a single incident (Buskens & Weenie, 2000). Trustors with the grim trigger strategy therefore should have a high level of vigilance toward violations and grant practically no idiosyncratic credits to the trustees. Further, these trustors will not cooperate again once defection has been found (Friedman, 1971). The grim strategy is thus considered to be completely unforgiving (Axelrod, 2000). These trustors are expected to make very negative attributions about the violations and refuse to rebuild trust with the same trustees.

The individual differences relevant to this profile include interpersonal orientation (Rubin & Brown, 1975) and the social contextual factor relevant to this profile is performance orientation (Javidan, 2004). These variables promote positive perceptions of others’ trustworthiness. However, they highlight vigilance toward violations, lower idiosyncratic credits, and produce negative attributions of the violations. For example, people high on interpersonal orientation are “responsive to the interpersonal aspects of his relationship with others. He is both interested in, and reactive to, variation in the other’s behavior” (Rubin & Brown, 1975, p.158). In negotiation contexts, interpersonal oriented individuals have been found to behave cooperatively toward a cooperative opponent, but competitively toward a competitive opponent (Net, Graham, & Gilly, 1988). Because they are attentive and responsive to the relational aspects of relationships (Graham, 1987) and are concerned about mutual benefits, individuals high on interpersonal orientation should exhibit fast trust building in the beginning of trust relationships. However, because interpersonally-oriented individuals have high sensitivity toward the behaviors of others (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Swap & Rubin, 1983), they are expected to exhibit high vigilance toward trust violations and grant few idiosyncratic credits. Once trust violations are identified, interpersonally-oriented individuals have high reactivity toward others’ behaviors (Rubin & Brown, 1975) and will exhibit fast and negative responses in their trust. Indeed, individuals high on interpersonal orientation take the actions of another seriously (Rubin & Brown, 1975) and personally (Swap & Rubin, 1983). They are more likely to make internal attributions that those low on interpersonal orientation (Apostolou, Cotten, & White, 1981) and could thus attribute the violations as intentional, controllable, and a stable feature of the trustee, thus exhibiting a slow trust restoration.

At the social contextual level, performance cultures are relevant to the grim trigger trust profile, which have been defined as “the extent to which a human community encourages and rewards setting challenging goals, innovation, and performance improvement” (Javidan, 2004, p.276). High performance orientation creates a sense of urgency (Javidan, 2004) and individuals should thus be quick in their trust building. Indeed, a task-oriented culture has been theorized to have higher initial trust while a relationship-oriented culture should have lower initial trust (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Because of the emphasis on contingent rewards, direct feedback, and competitiveness (Javidan, 2004), once a trust violation occurs, trustors in high performance orientation cultures should be responsive and lower their trust accordingly. In other words, we expect that the trustee has fewer idiosyncratic credits in high performance orientation cultures than low performance orientation cultures. Finally, trust restoration is expected to be slow in performance orientation cultures.
oriented cultures. When facing failures, performance orientation can lead people to withdraw effort and commitment (Bell & Kozlowski, 2002). Further, performance orientation is related to the implicit theory of entity, believing that intelligence and ability are fixed attributes that cannot be changed (Button, Mathieu, & Zajac, 1996; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). These trustors are thus likely to use violations as diagnostic information about the trustee and make negative attributions of the violations in terms of the trustee’s controllability and stability.

4 Discussion

Trust is critical for all forms of social relationships. It has been found to have ripple effects at multiple levels of analysis, including interpersonal (McAllister, 1995; Otekalns et al., 2002), group (Dirks, 1999; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999), organizational (Graebner, 2009; Maguire & Phillips, 2008; Stahl & Sitkin, 2005), and national levels (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993). Further, trust in relationships can evolve through multiple phases, from the initial development, through breakdown, to reestablishment. The growth and decline in trust across phases form trust dynamics that produce distinct patterns based on individual and social-contextual factors.

4.1 Theoretical Implications

Despite the fact that trust is dynamic, trust research has been criticized for neglecting the longitudinal nature of a trusting relationship by limiting it to one of the trust phases: trust building (Lewicki et al., 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust does not exist only in formation. Importantly, violations have been shown not to be exceptions but common occurrences (Jones & Burdette, 1994; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Multiple trust decisions are thus required throughout a trust relationship. Without taking into account the changes in the additional trust phases, our understanding of trust in relationships is incomplete. In this chapter, we took a holistic view by integrating trust trajectories in the three trust phases and examining how, together, they form divergent trust patterns that unfold over time in social relationships, which is of the first attempts to do so in the literature.

While by no means exhaustive, this chapter has provided a coherent framework of trust dynamics through a simultaneous consideration of trust across the formation, dissolution, and restoration phases. In particular, we identified six commonly-occurring trust patterns: high trust, high distrust, it-for-tat trust, seizing and freezing trust, assessment trust, and grim trigger trust. We also illustrated how these profiles are afforded by a multitude of individual difference and social contextual factors. The resulting framework provides a valuable springboard for future research. Empirical research is needed to test this framework and identify additional individual difference and social-contextual factors that underlie trust trajectories.

4.2 Research Implications

Multiple methods are available to test the theory advanced in this chapter. For example, naturalistic methods could rely on experiential sampling of trust building, violation, and repair to test the ideas presented. Research can also use the critical incident technique to examine trust violations that occurred in the past and relate them to individual and social context factors. Interviews and content analysis of archival records are additional means to reveal how trust patterns unfold before and after violations over a period of time.

Experimental methods will likewise prove useful. For example, the proposed trust patterns can be examined in laboratory experiments using a variant of the Trust Game—the Investment Game (IG; Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). The IG is ideal for this research for a number of reasons. It affords social exchanges that mirror real-world interactions and permits observation of how violations and the resultant trust dissolution and restoration that occur during a trust relationship changes individuals’ trust in their partner. In particular, an iterated IG (Cochard, Nguyen Van, & Willinger, 2004) is suitable for examining nonlinear and dynamic trust patterns because of the repeated measures of trust. We describe the structure of IG briefly below.

The IG typically involves two players, Player A and Player B. In this example, all participants are assigned to the role of Player A (trustor) and the computer-programmed partner is Player B (trustee). The game in this example consists of 15 rounds. The trust formation phase consists of rounds 1–5, and the trust dissolution phase consists of rounds 6–10. The remaining rounds (rounds 11–15) form the trust restoration phase. In the beginning of each round, Player A is given 100 coins and decides a proportion of the endowed coins (0–100) to entrust to Player B. This decision reveals how much Player A trusts Player B. The amount Player A sends to Player B is then tripled by the program, and Player B decides a portion of the tripled coins to return to Player A. Specifically, trust violations occur in the 6th, 7th, and 8th rounds, between the beginning and middle of the game. Violations that occur during rounds 6–8 allow trust to develop first. Violations occurring in the beginning of a relationship can lead to irreversible damage to trust (Louni, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008). Further, the three rounds of violations are designed so that participants would not perceive the violations as an isolated incident, which they may discount and thus keep trust unaffected (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). During these three violation rounds, the programmed partner keeps around 90% of the tripled coins with small random variation. In all other non-violation rounds, Player B returns approximately half of the tripled coins.
At the end of the 15th round, the game stops. As knowledge of the end of social exchanges tends to decrease cooperation (Murnighan, 1981), participants do not know how many rounds remain during the game before the end. This method can be readily combined with manipulation of the constructs discussed, such as high versus low self-esteem, differences in time pressure, surveillance and monitoring, third party and monitoring, as well as public versus private situation. Additionally, a series of measures on individual differences and social contextual factors can also be included to discern their effect on the dynamic trust patterns.

4.3 Practical Implications

In addition to the theoretical and research implications, the proposed framework has important practical implications. The different trust patterns help to identify when and which phase trust management is particularly critical, depending on the individual and social-contextual factors. With this knowledge, third parties such as mediators can use this framework to intermediate conflicts. Pertinent individuals and situations can be targeted to manage violations and promote trust relationships. These trust patterns extend the current knowledge about trust behaviors. Our theorized trust dynamics across phases indicate that the seemingly divergent trust patterns individuals exhibit are governed by logics rational to the individuals and situations involved.

Finally, this chapter also focuses on the significant role that culture plays in trust dynamics. The trust field as a whole is limited by its lack of cross-cultural and intercultural research (Schoorman et al., 2007). Specifically, we identified the effects of five cultural dimensions—honor, dignity, collectivism, power distance, and performance orientation—on the trust phases. Our analysis suggests that trust patterns can at times vary dramatically across cultures. In the age of globalization (Ashkanasy, Härtel, & Daus, 2002), trust is increasingly important in determining our societal and global well-being. The proposed framework provides an initial roadmap to facilitate understanding about trust in the cross-cultural and intercultural context. The framework also provides guidance for individuals to utilize a variety of individual and social-contextual factors to manage trust in a particular cultural context.

5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we proposed a framework that examines six distinct profiles of trust trajectories across three trust phases. We further identified the individual and social contextual factors unique to each trust profile. Combined with rigorous and appropriate methodology that we recommended, this theory holds the potential to provide researchers a holistic and dynamic understanding of trust in social relationships with implications to positively impact the field of trust research and the future of our society.

References

Trust Decisions


Trust Decisions


Foreword

Over the last five decades the corporate world has increasingly seen the value in expanding their reach across international borders. Organizations have worked to enter new markets overseas, gain access to cheaper labor pools, and take advantage of potential synergies and new ideas through mergers with similar organizations in other nations. In doing so, they have encountered, and worked to solve, the variety of problems that stem from interacting and working across national and cultural boundaries. In the last decade, the military community has similarly encountered and begun work to solve many of these problems. In 2008 the Department of the Army requested that a consortium of universities led by Dr. Michele Gelfand at the University of Maryland and Dr. Katia Sycara at Carnegie Mellon University, undertake a line of research examining critical social processes across cultural boundaries. This research has focused on understanding collaboration and negotiation in cross-cultural contexts. The consortium is composed of two research teams led respectively by Drs. Gelfand and Sycara, with each team approaching these research problems from two complementary perspectives. One team has begun from a psychological perspective building grounded theory to explain observed behavior in negotiation and collaboration activity. A separate team has worked from a computational modeling perspective to model the observed computationally and thus inform theory on negotiation and collaboration. These complementary approaches, combining a psychologically-grounded approach with computational modeling, hold great promise for making significant strides forward in our understanding of these critical social processes in cross-cultural contexts.

As the reader makes their way through this volume, they will note the tension between the reductionism necessary for computational models to capture behavior with some measure of accuracy and the contextualization necessary for fully understanding behavior in the real world. Balancing this tension is both intentional in the design of the research effort and necessary to achieving the knowledge desired. The research teams represented in these chapters have provided an excellent example of how these two fields can cooperatively – indeed collaboratively – work together to achieve more than either could in isolation.