Social conflict—competition over resources, ideas, and interests among people who are interdependent—is ubiquitous. Conflict occurs within individuals, as well as between individuals, groups, departments, organizations, and nations. It occurs among bees, ants, and other insect communities (Tóth, Strassmann, Nogueira-Neto, Imperatriz-Fonesca, & Queller, 2002; Trivers & Hare, 1976), crayfish (Huber, Panksepp, Yue, Delago, & Moore, 2001; Issa, Adamson, & Edwards, 1999), and chimpanzees (de Waal, 2001, 2004), among others. Whether it is concerning where to go on vacation among spouses, division of tasks in organizations, ownership of land internationally, or feeding behavior among primates (Aureli & de Waal, 2000), understanding, predicting, and managing conflict are arguably among the most important challenges facing the globe (see chap. 15, this volume).

Fortunately, much theory and research, spanning many disciplines, has illustrated the power of negotiation as an important mechanism to manage conflict. Negotiation can broadly be defined as the ways in which individuals manage their interdependence (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Negotiation is a pervasive form of social interaction that is conducted frequently in formal arenas, such as international relations, industrial relations, and manager–subordinate relations, as well as informal arenas, such as interpersonal relations and marital decision making (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Negotiation is arguably one of the most complex social processes to study. It involves individual-level psychological processes: cognition, emotion, and motivation; it involves multiple social processes: persuasion, communication, cooperation, competition, and power; and it is always socially situated and thus can involve a wide range of social contextual factors—for example, it can involve different kinds of relationships, issues, temporal perspectives, and technological contexts. Moreover, negotiations take place globally, making the cultural context critical to model and explain.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the advancements in the field of negotiation and its close cousin, mediation. In what follows, we first discuss basic terminology and definitions within negotiation research that help set the stage to understand and evaluate the research reviewed in this chapter. Thereafter, we discuss negotiation theory and research from a levels-of-analysis perspective, first reviewing research on basic psychological processes in negotiation (e.g., cognition, motivation, and emotion) and then discussing social and contextual factors (e.g., power and influence, relationships and teams, technology, and culture), followed by a discussion of mediation. We conclude with cutting edge developments and suggestions for future research.

**KEY TERMS AND DISTINCTIONS**

Although the arenas in which negotiation may occur are quite diverse, there are some common elements of negotiation that are applicable across contexts. Specifically, negotiation situations have at least six
core characteristics: (a) Parties have, or perceive that they have, a conflict of interest; (b) parties are engaged in communication; (c) compromises are possible; (d) parties can make provisional offers and counteroffers to each other; (e) parties are temporarily joined together voluntarily, and their outcomes are determined jointly (Chertkoff & Esser, 1976; Cross, 1965; Rubin & Brown, 1975); and (f) negotiation situations are mixed motive in that they involve the motivation to compete in order to further self-interest but also the motivation to cooperate (Schelling, 1960).

Critical to the theory and research on negotiation is the structure of the situation. Researchers often make a distinction between what is referred to as distributive negotiation structures and those that are integrative in nature. In distributive tasks, negotiators' interests are diametrically opposed, resulting in the fact that a gain for one party is a loss for the other. For example, two individuals negotiating over one issue—price—for the sale of a car represents a distributive negotiation situation. However, in integrative structures, there are typically multiple issues that need to be negotiated, and though negotiators' interests are opposed, they also have differences in priorities on the issues, resulting in the possibility of trade-offs (Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965).

As an example of an integrative negotiation structure, imagine a negotiation between a married couple over where to go on vacation (Pruitt, 1986). The husband insists on going to the mountains and staying in a log cabin, whereas his wife demands to go to a luxury hotel on the beach. At first glance, their interests appear to be of a fixed-sum nature—one party's gain (going to the mountains and staying in a log cabin) is the other party's loss (going to a luxury hotel on the beach)—and therefore one party will have to sacrifice his or her preferences completely in order to reach an agreement. However, with further discussion, the parties discover that there are two issues at stake in the negotiation, location and accommodations, and that they differ on the extent to which they prioritize these issues. Suppose that the husband reveals that his priority is the location (i.e., the mountains), and the wife reveals that her primary concern is the accommodation (i.e., the luxury hotel). By recognizing such differences in priorities, the couple can make trade-offs that provide mutually beneficial outcomes (i.e., go to a luxury hotel in the mountains).

One of the key methodological advancements in the study of negotiation has been to develop tasks that reflect different negotiation structures and model the processes through which individuals reach agreement and the quality of agreements reached (see Kelley, 1966; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Siegal & Fouraker, 1960). Exhibit 14.1 illustrates a classic example of a mixed-motive integrative bargaining task (adapted from Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993) between two individuals who are interested in opening a joint multifunctional market. One party is assigned the role of grocery shop owner and the other is assigned the role of wine shop owner. Of particular note is that there are multiple issues on which individuals need to agree, and within each issue, there are multiple settlement levels. Moreover, each settlement level has a number of points associated with it, indicating the amount of value of that level of settlement to the negotiator.

A close inspection of Exhibit 14.1 illustrates further that there are multiple ways in which parties' interests are interrelated. Floor space is a compatible issue in that the parties have identical interests. Hours of operation and temperature are distributive issues in which one party's gain is the other's exact loss. Finally, grand opening date and renovation costs are integrative issues in that the parties want different things but they have very different priorities on the issues, and thus, if they trade off on their highest and lowest priorities, they can have considerable gain. A critical feature of this task is that multiple outcomes are possible; for example, parties that just split the difference on all issues would each receive 520 points (and a joint profit of 1,040). By contrast, parties that split the difference on the distributive issues, recognize the compatible issue, and trade off on the integrative issues each would receive 740 points (and a joint profit of 1,480). It is important to recognize that this task is highly flexible: The number and the types of issues can be varied, and the context in which the negotiation is taking place (e.g., negotiation at the marketplace, between
Exhibit 14.1
Negotiator Payoff Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours of operation</th>
<th>Renovation costs</th>
<th>Floor space</th>
<th>Temperature</th>
<th>Grand opening date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6:30 a.m.–6:30 p.m. (240)</td>
<td>$10,000 (80)</td>
<td>60% for grocery (120)</td>
<td>73 degrees (200)</td>
<td>September 1 (400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:30 a.m.–7:30 p.m. (180)</td>
<td>$15,000 (60)</td>
<td>70% for grocery (90)</td>
<td>71 degrees (150)</td>
<td>August 1 (300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:30 a.m.–8:30 p.m. (120)</td>
<td>$20,000 (40)</td>
<td>50% for grocery (60)</td>
<td>69 degrees (100)</td>
<td>July 1 (200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:30 a.m.–9:30 p.m. (60)</td>
<td>$25,000 (20)</td>
<td>40% for grocery (30)</td>
<td>67 degrees (50)</td>
<td>June 1 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 a.m.–10:30 p.m. (0)</td>
<td>$30,000 (0)</td>
<td>30% for grocery (0)</td>
<td>65 degrees (0)</td>
<td>May 1 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Payoff schedule for wine shop owner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours of operation</th>
<th>Renovation costs</th>
<th>Floor space</th>
<th>Temperature</th>
<th>Grand opening date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30 a.m.–10:30 p.m. (240)</td>
<td>$30,000 (400)</td>
<td>40% for wine (120)</td>
<td>65 degrees (200)</td>
<td>May 1 (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:30 a.m.–9:30 p.m. (180)</td>
<td>$25,000 (300)</td>
<td>30% for wine (90)</td>
<td>67 degrees (150)</td>
<td>June 1 (60)</td>
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<td>71 degrees (50)</td>
<td>August 1 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:30 a.m.–6:30 p.m. (0)</td>
<td>$10,000 (0)</td>
<td>70% for wine (0)</td>
<td>73 degrees (0)</td>
<td>September 1 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


students, spouses, etc.) can be easily adapted even though the underlying structure is the same (see http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/drrc/ for a wide variety of negotiation tasks; see Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006a, for an in-depth review of negotiation research methods).

Negotiation tasks such as that described above have the advantage of assessing the objective quality of negotiated agreements at the individual level (one's own gain) and the dyadic or group level (joint gain). Many agreements are possible, yet some are Pareto efficient (i.e., there is no other agreement that would make any party better off without decreasing outcomes to any other party), whereas others are Pareto inefficient (i.e., an alternative exists that would benefit at least one party without injuring another). Additionally, outcomes can be assessed for their subjective value (Curhan, Ellfenbein, & Xu, 2006), which can often predict future implementation of agreements (Gelfand, Smith Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006) as well as job-related outcomes such as turnover intentions and job satisfaction (Curhan, Ellfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009). In addition, communication processes through which negotiated agreements are reached can also be assessed. Much of this research codes verbal (and to a lesser extent nonverbal) negotiation behavior for a wide variety of processes, which can be subsumed under general integrative strategies (e.g., exchange of information, multi-issue offers, and cooperative behaviors) and distributive strategies (e.g., threats, warnings, and positional commitments). Communication processes can be further analyzed in terms of their frequencies, sequences, and phases and examined for their antecedents as well as their impact on negotiated outcomes (see Weingart & Olekalns, 2004, for a review).

The social context of the negotiation, or the "social and organizational environments within which [negotiation] phenomena are . . . inevitably embedded" (Kramer & Messick, 1995, p. 11), is also a key distinction in negotiation theory and research. Negotiations can be examined at the dyadic level (i.e., between two individuals), at the team level (i.e., negotiations between two teams made up of two or more individuals), or at the multiparty level (i.e., negotiations between three or more parties that each have different but related interests). Individuals

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may also negotiate on behalf of constituents, as in representative negotiations, or may assist as third parties who help to broker agreements between different parties. Negotiations can be intracultural (i.e., between individuals of the same culture) or intercultural (i.e., between individuals from different cultures). As reviewed in this chapter, the immediate situational features can vary dramatically in negotiations, including time pressure, power asymmetries, nature of the negotiation issues (e.g., interests vs. values, deal making or dispute resolution), communication media, culture, and gender, among many features.

Finally, negotiation research is inherently based within a science-practitioner model. Descriptive research is critical for understanding the processes through which individuals reach agreements. Indeed, research using the above task and its variants has consistently indicated that negotiated agreements are often suboptimal (Raiffa, 1982), and there is wide variability in the outcomes reached even when individuals are engaged in the identical task. Much of the literature on negotiation in social and organizational psychology and organizational behavior has been conducted to understand and predict why negotiators fail to reach optimal outcomes across a wide range of settings and contexts. Negotiation research is also inherently prescriptive; it is driven by critical practical concerns and aims to identify what negotiators should do to achieve high outcomes.

In what follows, we review extant negotiation theory and research, highlighting different traditions, important constructs, and key results. We limit our scope to research emanating from social and organizational psychology and organizational behavior for issues of length (for other reviews of the negotiation literature, see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Brett & Gelfand, 2006; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007; Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Thompson, 1990; for treatments in other disciplines, see Aureli & de Waal, 2000; Imai & Gelfand, 2009a; Raiffa, 1982; Rapoport, 1960; Roth, 1994). We conclude the chapter with discussions of a number of future directions at the frontiers of negotiation theory and research.

**BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES: N**

egotiator Cognition, Motivation, And Emotion

In this section, we review classic and contemporary research on negotiators' psychological processes, including negotiator cognition, how negotiators think and their deviations from rationality; motivation, what motivates negotiators and how this influences their strategic choices; and emotion, how emotions of both the self and others influence negotiation processes. Collectively, research on negotiators' psychological processes provides a window into negotiators' hearts and minds, and is a basic building block of understanding negotiation phenomena at higher levels of analysis.

**Negotiator Cognition**

Research on negotiator cognition, marshaled in large part by Bazerman and Neale's (1983) landmark chapter, "Heuristics in Negotiation: Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution," has been a cornerstone of both theory and practice in the field of negotiation. Historically, economists and game theorists focused on the development of mathematical modeling of rational decision making (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Raiffa, 1982; Rapoport, 1960), providing a largely prescriptive approach to negotiation. Raiffa (1982) thereafter argued that in order to best prescribe what negotiators should do, it is critical to understand what they actually do, paving the way for decades of research on what is now commonly referred to as a descriptive tradition in negotiation research.

Much of the cognitive tradition in negotiation is predicated on the seminal work of March and Simon (1958) and the notion that decision makers have bounded rationality (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, 1979) and fall victim to a wider range of decision biases. Negotiation research has extended this work by illustrating how these biases affect negotiated agreements and also by documenting unique biases that are particular to negotiation contexts. Below we discuss how classic information-processing biases, such as framing, anchoring, and availability, affect negotiators' behaviors. Next, we review novel social perception biases that can influence negotiation,
including the fixed-pie perceptions, attributional biases, and reactive devaluation. We also examine how negotiators are implicitly influenced by their existing schemas of negotiation, including mental models and perceptual frames. As will be seen, although cognitive shortcuts are useful for dealing with the invariable complexity and ambiguity of negotiation situations (Fobian & Christensen-Szalanski, 1993), these cognitive shortcuts can often hamper negotiation outcomes.

**Information-processing biases.** Negotiators have been found to fall victim to a number of cognitive biases stemming from the limitations of information processing, including framing, anchoring, and availability.

*Framing.* Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory argues that individuals make evaluations of a prospect based on reference points—as losses or gains—rather than simply on their expected value. Much of their research on framing effects has shown that people are risk seeking in the domain of losses but are risk averse in the domain of gains. Likewise, in negotiations, research has shown that framing identical outcomes positively (as gains; e.g., “What will be my net profit from the transaction?”) versus negatively (as losses; e.g., “What will be my expenses on this transaction?”) produces highly divergent behavioral patterns (Bazerman, Magliozi, & Neale, 1985). For example, Bazerman and colleagues (1985) found that negotiators who had a gain frame adopted less risky strategies and reached more agreements and better outcomes than negotiators with a loss frame. In contrast, loss frames have been found to lower concession making, produce more contentious behavior, increase the likelihood of an impasse, and reduce the number of agreements reached in negotiations (Bottom, 1998; De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 1994; Kristensen & Gärling, 1997b; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Neale, Huber, & Northcraft, 1987; Witte, Grünhagen, & Gentry, 2008).

Negative frames have also been shown to loom large at an interpersonal level in negotiations, often favoring the negatively framed negotiator. For example, frames tend to be contagious within negotiation dyads, yet the contagion is asymmetrical: De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, and Van de Vliert (1995) found that positively framed negotiators tend to “catch” their opponents’ negative frame through communication rather than vice versa. Moreover, negatively framed negotiators tend to achieve better outcomes than positively framed negotiators in mixed-frame negotiations, particularly in the absence of role information (Neale et al., 1987) and regardless of whether the task is distributive or integrative (Bottom & Studt, 1993). Even mediators are more influenced by negotiators’ negative frames as compared with positive frames. Mediators offer more integrative outcomes when both negotiators have negative frames and have been found to favor negatively framed negotiators in mixed-frame negotiations (Lim & Carnevale, 1995).

More recent research has begun to examine the interaction of gain and loss frames and motivational and situational factors (Bottom, 1998; Carnevale & Keenan, 1990; De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Olekalns, 1997; Trötschel & Gollwitzer, 2007). For example, when negotiators are concerned with opponents’ outcomes, negative frames can lead to higher joint outcomes (Bottom, 1998; Carnevale & Keenan, 1990). Similarly, negotiators’ frames interact with their opponents’ frames, payoff structures, and negotiation instructions (Olekalns, 1997). Negatively framed negotiators are more successful when an opponent has a positive frame, the instruction is cooperative, and the task is distributive. In contrast, negatively framed negotiators are the least successful when an opponent also has a negative frame, the instruction is individualistic, and the task is integrative (Olekalns, 1997). De Dreu and McCusker (1997) also found that under a negative frame, individuals behaved more closely to their social motives. Consequently, a negative frame decreased cooperation among individualists but increased cooperation among cooperators. In all, research clearly shows the impact of gain and loss frames within negotiation contexts and highlights the additional social complexity that moderates the effects in this context.

*Anchoring.* Anchoring is a classic bias identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) wherein individu-
uals rely on irrelevant values (i.e., an “anchor”) and fail to adjust their evaluations sufficiently in subsequent decision making. Research has found that information provided prior to or at the beginning of negotiations influences negotiators’ initial offers, aspiration levels, bottom lines, and estimates of opponents’ bottom lines (Kristensen & Gärling, 1997a; Whyte & Sebenius, 1997). Further, these effects have been observed among both professional and novice negotiators (Northcraft & Neale, 1987) and in group and individual negotiations (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997). For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) found that experienced real estate agents failed to sufficiently adjust for arbitrary listing price in their pricing estimates. Opponents’ bottom lines (e.g., reservation prices) can similarly dominate negotiations as they are weighted more heavily than other, more objective heuristics such as market information (Blount, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996; S. B. White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peck, 1994).

Like listing prices and reservation prices, opening offers from opponents have also been found to affect negotiators’ reference points, counteroffers, satisfaction with outcomes, and objective negotiation outcomes (Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec, 2002; Kristensen & Gärling, 1997b; Korhonen, Oreetsky, Teich, & Wallenius, 1995; Moran & Ritov, 2002). Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) found that regardless of the negotiators’ roles, the party who made the first offer outperformed the opponent, and that the first offers strongly predicted the final outcomes. In fact, Ritov (1996) concluded that opening offers are one of the most influential factors on final outcomes in negotiations. However, when noninitiators focus on information inconsistent with the opening offers, they are able to remove this advantage of the opening offers (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).

Availability. Availability occurs when negotiators overuse information that is most salient (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Nisbett and Ross (1980) provided a definition for information vividness: “to attract and hold our attention and to excite the imagination to the extent that it is 1) emotionally interesting, 2) concrete and imagery-provoking, and 3) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way” (p. 45). Northcraft and Neale (1986) illustrated that information that is less concrete (such as opportunity costs as compared with out-of-pocket sunk costs) is less likely to be included in decision making in negotiations. Neale (1984) found that when the personal costs of reaching a poor agreement were made salient—for example, when one is accountable to constituents—negotiators were less likely to come to an agreement. Extending this to the realm of persuasion, Thompson, Neale, and Sinaceur (2004) proposed that negotiators’ arguments will be more persuasive if they are more vivid (see also Borgida & Nisbett, 1977).

Social perception biases. Other types of biases in negotiation cognition stem from social perception biases, or biases that emanate from negotiators’ construals of the social context, including fixed-pie perception, attributional biases, and reactive devaluation.

Fixed-pie perceptions. A decision bias unique to the negotiation context is the phenomenon wherein negotiators assume negotiations to be a fixed-pie and zero-sum situation (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Schelling, 1960). The fixed-pie bias occurs when negotiators erroneously perceive the opponent’s interests to be opposite to their own and thus underestimate the bargaining zone (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Larrick & Wu, 2007; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). This perception is a result of the false consensus effect, in which people believe others share the same views and desire the same things as themselves (Sherman, Judd, & Park, 1989). Fixed-pie perceptions are often erroneous because in real-world, multi-issue negotiations, parties’ preferences can often vary dramatically (as shown in Exhibit 14.1). Moreover, fixed-pie biases significantly impede agreements. In a seminal demonstration of the effect, Thompson and Hastie (1990) showed that fixed-pie perceptions at the beginning of the negotiation significantly and negatively affected individual and joint gains. Negotiators that learned early on that their counterparts’ interests were not diametrically opposed reached higher quality agreements. Other research has similarly demonstrated that fixed-pie biases increase distributive behaviors and decreases the
likelihood of reaching integrative outcomes (Harinck, De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000; Moran & Ritov, 2007; Thompson & Hrebéc, 1996). Polzer and Neale (1995) showed that negotiators who had subordinate goals (i.e., goals that are separate for each issue) were much more likely to have fixed biases, use distributive strategies, and achieve sub-optimal outcomes, as compared with negotiators with superordinate goals (i.e., goals that include consideration for all issues). Moran and Ritov (2007) also showed that the more negotiators knew the specific gains for others for each issue (rather than their general priorities), the better they performed. Fixed-pie perceptions are difficult to debias. Pinkley, Griffith, and Northcraft (1995) illustrated that the fixed-pie bias persisted even when negotiators were given full information. They also illustrated that fixed-pie biases exert effects through two different mechanisms: faulty information-processing search and biased processing of available information. These biases are particularly likely to be found in Western cultures (Fukuno & Ohbuchi, 1997; Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999).

Attributional biases. As in other contexts, research has shown that negotiators often make the fundamental attribution error, in that they attribute opponent behaviors to internal factors as compared with situational factors. Morris, Larrick, and Su (1999), for example, found that negotiators tend to see others’ actions as a result of their personality, such as disagreeableness and emotional instability, which can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy in which negotiators’ behaviors confirm responses from their opponents (Morris et al., 1999). Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman (2006) found that perspective taking actually exacerbated attribution biases in competitive contexts because negotiators assumed that others would behave competitively and egocentrically. This expectation then leads to more competitive and selfish behaviors among those who considered others’ perspectives than among those who did not. Others have shown that when people disagree with one another in conflicts, they have negative attributions and believe their opponent has different information, is lazy, or is biased by ideology or self-interest (Pronin, 2008; L. Ross & Ward, 1993). In all, attributional biases can produce competitive processes and hinder negotiation agreements.

Reactive devaluation. Thompson et al. (2004) described reactive devaluation as a phenomenon where “negotiators discount or dismiss concessions made by the other party merely as a function of who is offering them” (p. 20). In his seminal study, Oskamp (1965) found that U.S. college students evaluating military actions between the United States and the former Soviet Union consistently viewed the actions ostensibly made by the Soviet Union more negatively than when the same actions were attributed to the United States (see also L. Ross & Ward, 1995). Linking to the prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), L. Ross and Stillinger (1991) proposed that because negotiators are averse to losses, they are reluctant to make concessions and believe that the opponent’s offers are more profitable for the opponent. In a later study by L. Ross (1995), students evaluated two identical proposals for their university, one of which was randomly selected to be identified as adopted versus under consideration. Students consistently rated the adopted proposal lower than the alternative, suggesting that people devalue options perceived to be forced on them. Reactive devaluation also stems from self-serving biases; in situations where individuals question their counterpart’s motives, they will be more likely to have reactive devaluation (see Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2003). Curhan, Neale, and Ross (2004), however, found that negotiators who had a prior discussion about their needs and preferences were less likely to devalue later proposals that facilitated agreement. Finally, research has shown that negotiators can be affected by reactive devaluation even when they are the proposers. Galinsky et al. (2002) found that when others accepted their offers immediately, they devalued the agreement, engaged in counterfactual thinking, and wondered whether they could have done better. In addition, this counterfactual thinking lowered proposers’ negotiation satisfaction, increased preparation for future negotiations, and decreased the likelihood that they would make the first offers in subsequent negotiations.
Negotiation perceptual frames and mental models. Other research on negotiator cognition has examined how negotiators' schemas, perceptual frames, and mental models can dramatically affect negotiation processes and outcomes. Because negotiators generally do not have complete information, they need to rely on their prior knowledge and perceptions of the situations. Klar, Bar-Tal, and Kruglanski (1987) stated that individuals develop conflict schemata from past experience and socialization, and use them to approach current conflicts. Similarly, negotiators are influenced by their implicit theories of bargaining, negotiation, and conflict (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Carroll & Payne, 1991). Pinkley (1990) was one of the first to empirically document dimensions of conflict frames. Using multidimensional scaling, she illustrated three dimensions of conflict construals: relationship versus task frames (i.e., the degree to which people consider conflicts to be problems in relationships or tasks at hand); emotional versus intellectual frames (i.e., the degree to which people consider the conflict to be about emotions versus intellectual); and compromise versus win frames (i.e., the way people in conflicts assign blame, with either one party to blame or both to blame).

It is important to note that perceptual frames are not merely food for thought—they are "food for action" and have direct effects on negotiation processes and outcomes. For example, Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) found that negotiators with both task and cooperation frames achieved higher outcomes. Liberman, Samuels, and Ross (2004) found that behavior was much more cooperative when the situation was framed as a "community game" versus a "Wall Street game" (see also Larrick & Blount, 1997; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1998). Harinck and De Dreu (2008) found that negotiators reached higher joint outcome after a break from negotiation (e.g., doing a distraction task), arguing that the break allowed negotiators to move away from the competition mindset. Small, Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman (2007) found that changing the frame of the situation from "negotiating" to "asking" increased the propensity for women to negotiate. Pillutla and Murnighan (1995) found that assuming the role of offerer or receiver evoked different moral frames. Whereas the offerer was more likely to construe the negotiation as an economic opportunity for oneself, the receiver was more likely to emphasize an equal distribution, thus maximizing fairness over personal gain. In a similar vein, Kronzon and Darley (1999) examined negotiator perspective on judgments of ethical behavior. Participants were asked to view a video of two individuals negotiating and to adopt the perspective of the victim or the perpetrator of an ethically ambiguous negotiation. Results showed that individuals who adopted the perpetrator perspective rated behavior as significantly more ethical than did those who adopted the victim perspective. This study demonstrates how the perceived ethicality of negotiation behavior can vary greatly depending on frame.

More generally, the perceptual frames and mental models that negotiators bring to the table can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, and Galinsky (2003) found that when negotiators thought they were facing a competitive opponent, they behaved less competitively and reached lower outcomes. Likewise, when facing an opponent with a distributive reputation, negotiators adopt more distributive and fewer integrative tactics that lead to lower joint gains (Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). The opponents' reputation even prevents experienced negotiators from reaching a higher individual outcome.

Research has also examined shared mental models in negotiation. In their qualitative review of transaction transcripts, McGinn and Keros (2002) found that early in negotiations, pairs of negotiators quickly developed shared norms for behavior in the negotiation interaction, namely competitive, cooperative, and full honesty norms. The choice of norms that negotiators adopted depended on the social ties they shared. For example, negotiators who were friends developed a shared understanding faster and were more likely to have cooperative or full honesty norms than negotiators who were strangers. Moreover, negotiators who shared the same norms were better able to reach higher agreements than those with mismatching norms, illustrating the importance of socially shared cognition in negotiation.
Negotiator Motivation

Several decades of research has been devoted to the fundamental question of what motivates negotiators. As noted by De Dreu (2004), “it is difficult, if not impossible to imagine an individual entering a negotiation without some motivational goal that he or she is pursuing, implicitly or explicitly, unconsciously or consciously” (p. 114). In this section we review theories and research on a variety of negotiator motives and their impact on negotiation processes and outcomes. We also review recent work on the interface of cognition and motivation, along with research on motivational biases that can affect the quality of negotiated agreements (see chap. 3, this volume).

Social motivation. One of the most well examined dimensions of motivation in negotiation is cooperation and competition. Deutsch (1949, 1973) was one of the first to discuss the motivation of cooperation and competition, proposing that integrative outcomes are more likely for cooperative negotiators than for competitive negotiators. He further distinguished three types of motivation—cooperative, competitive, and individualistic—defining cooperative motivation as “a positive interest in the welfare of the other as well as one’s own,” competitive motivation as “an interest in doing better than the other as well as doing as well as it can for oneself,” and individualistic motivation as “an interest in doing as well for oneself and is unconcerned about the welfare of the other” (Deutsch, 1994, p. 14). Extending Deutsch’s work on cooperative and competitive motives, Messick and McClintock (1968) advanced a typology of four social motives—altruistic, cooperative, individualistic, and competitive—which differentiate individuals’ preferences for particular outcome distributions between oneself and one’s opponents. Related work can also be found in the dual concern model (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; see also Blake & Mouton, 1964). In this model, self concern (also referred to as resistance to yielding) and concern for others are independent dimensions that can each range from low to high, and which jointly predict four different strategies: problem solving, contending, yielding, and inaction. According to the theory, high self and high other concern predicts the use of problem-solving strategies; high self and low other concern produces contending; low self and high other concern predicts the use of yielding; and low self and low other concern produces inaction.

Negotiation research has indeed shown that these motivational distinctions—generally referred to as prosocial versus proself (De Dreu, 2004)—reliably predict negotiation tactics and outcomes. Compared with proself negotiators, prosocial negotiators are found to make smaller demands and more concessions (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995), perceive opponents as more fair and considerate (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995), have higher trust in opponents (Brooks & Rose, 2008), have less fear of being exploited (Zhang & Han, 2007), exhibit more integrative and problem-solving behaviors (Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2000), be less likely to deceive their partner or misrepresent their motivation and preferences (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Olekalns & Smith, 2007), be more satisfied with negotiation agreements (Brooks & Rose, 2008), and achieve higher joint outcomes, particularly when both negotiators are prosocial compared with when at least one negotiator is proself (Giebels et al., 2000). This also applies to groups of negotiators. Studies have found that prosocial groups reach higher joint outcomes than proself groups owing to a higher level of trust, less contentious behavior, better group decision making, and more integrative and problem-solving behavior (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999, 2002; Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, 2000; Nauta, De Dreu, & Van der Vaart, 2002; Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, 2007; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). In their meta-analysis, De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon (2000) showed that across the board, prosocial negotiators tend to have less contention ($d = -0.58$), more problem solving ($d = 0.55$), and higher joint outcomes ($d = -0.29$) than proself negotiators. However, this difference occurs only when the prosocial negotiators have high resistance to yielding (i.e., low willingness to make concessions), supporting the dual concern model. Specifically, the effect size is $-0.62$ for contentious behavior, $0.57$ for problem solving, and $0.56$ for joint outcome when resistance to yielding is high.
Notably, prosel and prosocial motivations can be dispositional or temporarily made salient by situations. For example, a cooperative motive can be induced when individuals are instructed to view others as partners, whereas a competitive motive can be induced when individuals are motivated to maximize personal benefits (Deutsch, 1958). Incentives can also activate prosocial and prosel motivations. For example, a prosocial motivation can be activated by rewarding group performance, whereas a prosel motivation can be activated by rewarding individual performance. Likewise, self and other concern can also be made salient by situational factors. For example, Ben-Yoav and Pruitt (1984) found that accountability raised self concern, which in turn increased the likelihood that negotiators would engage in contentious behaviors and have lower joint outcomes. However, when negotiators expected future interaction with each other, accountability raised both self and other concern and more problem-solving behaviors. Regardless of the way that social motives are manipulated, the results appear to be robust. A meta-analysis of 28 studies revealed that methodological factors, such as task complexity (d = 0.10–0.34), negotiation scenarios (d = 0.07–0.38), and operationalization of social motives (d = 0.21–0.56), have no effect on the relationship between negotiators’ social motives and outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000).

Research has also examined how dyads with mixed social motives perform in negotiation. In general, negotiators with the same social value orientation, whether it is competitive or cooperative, appear to fare better in terms of negotiation experience and outcomes than negotiators with divergent social orientations. For example, Olekalns and Smith (2005) found that negotiators with matching orientation (i.e., both either cooperative or competitive) experienced more cooperation, flexibility, and trust than negotiators with mixed orientations, where one was cooperative and the other competitive. They also found that dyads with the same orientation reported a higher level of perceived fairness and willingness to interact with the same partner in the future than mixed dyads. In group negotiations, if members have mismatching social orientations, this disparity tends to lead to unequal resource distribution (Schei & Rognes, 2005). Other work has shown that although prosocial negotiators are generally cooperative, when facing a competitive opponent, prosocials are more likely to withhold information or give inaccurate information than prosels (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). Mixed dyads can face even more challenges in negotiation because of what Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) described as the mismatching phenomenon, where negotiators make small demands in the face of a competitive opponent and large demands in the face of a cooperative opponent. It is possible that negotiators with divergent social orientations fall prey to mismatching strategies and behaviors, which further impedes the likelihood of achieving high joint outcomes.

More recent research has illustrated that prosocial and prosel motivation can influence types of information negotiators seek, utilize, perceive, interpret, and provide (Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006b). For example, social motivation influences the type of questions negotiators ask: Prosocial negotiators tend to ask their opponent questions about cooperation, whereas prosel negotiators ask questions about competition (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002). Similarly, motivation affects information recall. After learning various strategies for negotiation, prosocial negotiators recall more cooperative heuristics (e.g., share and share alike), whereas individualistic and competitive negotiators recall more competitive heuristics (e.g., your loss is my gain) (De Dreu & Boles, 1998). Motivation can affect how negotiators utilize information about their partner. Carnevale and De Dreu (2006b) found that individualistic negotiators benefited the most from information about their opponent’s position. Cooperators tended to do well in negotiation regardless of the information, and competitors performed better without knowing the opponent’s position.

Finally, social value orientation also influences negotiators’ cognitive processing. Competitors have restricted cognitive organization when they expect cooperation and have expanded cognitive organization when they expect conflict. However, cooperators exhibit the opposite pattern, having expanded cognitive organization when they expect cooperation (Carnevale & Probst, 1998). Prosel
negotiators performed better in divergent group tasks (e.g., a creativity task) after negotiations as compared with prosocial negotiators. Prosocial negotiators, on the other hand, outperformed prosel (prosocial) negotiators in convergent tasks (e.g., planning) (Beersma & De Dreu, 2005). In all, these studies illustrate that motivation can clearly drive a variety of cognitive processes.

**Epistemic motives: Need for closure.** In addition to the social motivation, recent work has examined the role of epistemic motivation, or the need for cognitive closure (NFC), on negotiation processes and outcomes. Kruglanski and Webster (1996) further defined NFC as “individuals’ desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward ambiguity” (p. 264). NFC includes a number of facets, including a desire for predictability, a preference for order and structure, a discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and close-mindedness. People with high NFC tend to reach closure quickly and maintain it over time: They “freeze” on their initial position and ignore contradictory information, which helps to reduce ambiguity but impedes their ability to anticipate and react properly in a crisis (Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski, 2003).

NFC has been found to have wide-ranging consequences for negotiation, and, like social motivation, it can be either a stable individual characteristic or a situationally induced state. Mental fatigue and depletion of cognitive resources can lower systemic information processing and heighten NFC (Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). In negotiation contexts, time pressure has been shown to raise the level of NFC, with detrimental results: High-NFC negotiators are more likely to use heuristics and stereotypical information than low-NFC negotiators (De Dreu, 2003; De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999). Other factors lower NFC among negotiators. For example, accountability for the negotiation process increases accuracy motivation and systematic information processing among negotiators (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000). Temporary impasses that occur early in negotiation can also lower negotiators’ NFC levels, causing them to engage in more integrative behaviors and increase the likelihood of higher joint outcomes (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). Some situational factors enhance the impact of NFC.

For example, Schei, Rognes, and Mykland (2006) found that the effects of epistemic motivation depended on negotiators’ roles. They found that only sellers’ NFC had an impact on negotiation outcomes, presumably because buyers had more power and were less active than sellers.

Recent research has combined epistemic motivation with social motivation. These motives are largely independent (De Dreu et al., 1999) and, in combination, produce interesting effects. In their motivated information-processing model, De Dreu and Carnevale (2003) proposed four archetypical strategies in negotiation—prosel (prosocial) thinker, prosel (prosocial) miser, and prosocial thinker—which are derived from the combination of prosocial and prosel (prosocial) motivation crossed with high versus low epistemic motivation. The four archetypes illustrate that social motivation affects the type of strategies and foci negotiators have, whereas epistemic motivation affects the way negotiators search for and process information (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). For example, both prosel (prosocial) misers and prosel (prosocial) thinkers have competitive social motives, yet the former is higher on NFC. Likewise, both prosocial misers and prosocial thinkers have cooperative social motives, yet the former is also higher on NFC than the latter. In support of the theory, De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, and Euwema (2006) found that when epistemic motivation was high, prosocial negotiators recalled more cooperative tactics than competitive ones and achieved higher joint outcomes than prosel (prosocial) negotiators high on NFC. They also showed that cooperative tactics led to higher joint outcomes when negotiators had low rather than high NFC. Carnevale and Lawler (1986) also found evidence consistent with the model. They found that the effect of time pressure on negotiations depended on negotiators’ social motivation. Under high time pressure, cooperative negotiators had lower aspirations and were much more cooperative whereas individualistic negotiators were much more competitive.

**Motivational biases.** Just as negotiators can have cognitive biases, they can also be subject to motivational biases. The motivation to maintain a positive image, in particular, is a common motive that results in a number of negotiation biases that can hinder agreements.
Self-enhancement biases. Dating back to Miller and Ross’s (1975) discussion of self-serving biases in the attribution of causality, research has found that people have a pervasive tendency to see themselves as better than others, in terms of fairness (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985), competence (Yan & Gaier, 1994), success (Urban & Witt, 1990), and social responsibility (J. A. White & Plous, 1995), among many attributes. Not only are these judgments probabilistically impossible (i.e., it is impossible for most people to be better than others), but self-estimates often are much inflated as compared with neutral raters’ observations (Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980).

Just as individuals perceive themselves positively in other contexts, negotiators tend to have self-serving biases. Neale and Bazerman (1983) found that most people unrealistically believed that an arbiter would favor their proposal over their opponent’s. Kramer, Newton, and Pommerenke (1993) found that negotiators in the United States had overly positive evaluations of themselves as compared with their evaluations of their counterparts (e.g., they believed they were more fair, trustworthy, and cooperative), and the magnitude of such biases was related to the strength of the conflict. Similarly, Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) found that negotiators’ self-serving conceptions of fairness were related to the length of strikes during simulated negotiations. Self-serving biases are not limited to laboratory negotiations; professional negotiators fall victim to self-serving biases, with consequent impasses (Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, & Babcock, 1993), longer strikes (Babcock, Wang, & Loewenstein, 1996), and reduced problem solving and feelings of frustration (De Dreu, Nauta, & Van de Vliert, 1995). Self-serving biases are especially pronounced in conflicts with an asymmetrical structure (De Dreu, 1996), among individuals with pro-self orientation (W. D. Anderson & Patterson, 2008), and in cultures that emphasize individualism (Gelfand et al., 2002). In summarizing this literature, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) concluded that negotiators’ tendency to equate what is fair with what benefits themselves impedes negotiations by reducing the potential zone of agreement, creating cynical perceptions of the other party, and inflating perceptions of the minimum settlement point that is seen as fair. Paese and Yonker (2001) also concluded that egocentric bias in fairness perception in negotiation occurs when selective encoding, differential weighting, and selective retrieval are available.

Research has shown that it is difficult to reduce self-serving biases. Friedrich (1996), for example, showed that even after people were trained to understand the existence of self-serving biases, they still reported being less likely to engage in the self-serving bias than others! In addition, background information about the negotiation can worsen negotiators’ egocentric perception of fairness. Contrary to what was previously assumed, sharing information about negotiation materials may lead to divergent expectations of fairness rather than convergent expectations between disputants, which increases the likelihood of impasses (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995). However, if people can distance themselves from a conflict, they may be able to obtain more balanced judgments. Kemmelmeier and Winter (2000) found that individuals who reviewed accounts of conflicts as a historian had less perceptual distortion than those who reviewed them as one of the parties involved. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) also found that asking individuals to identify weaknesses in their own cases could reduce self-serving biases in conflict.

Mere ownership effect. Another common bias generated from the self-enhancing motivation is the mere ownership effect, which is defined as “the tendency of an owner to evaluate an object more favorably than a nonowner” (Nesselroade, Beggin, & Allison, 1999, p. 21). Mere ownership effects often occur because people extend their own self-identity to items they own (Beggan, 1992). In negotiation contexts, individuals tend to develop ownership of their positions and view opposition to their positions as threats to the self, leading to detrimental behavior, including competitive communication, retaliatory responses, negative perceptions of the partner, and attitude polarization (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005). However, mere ownership effects can be reduced when people are held accountable or have a clear self-identity (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005). Similar to the motivation
to maintain self-identity, Ledgerwood, Liviatan, and Carnevale (2007) found that the value individuals placed on an object symbolic to the group (e.g., a building rich with group history) increased when their commitment to group identity was high, and they were motivated to maintain positive group identity when it was threatened.

Negotiator Emotion
Anyone who has negotiated—whether in informal settings with a spouse, friend, neighbor, or child or in formal settings with a boss, colleague, buyer, or supplier—recognizes that negotiations can be highly charged emotional contexts, both intrapersonally and interpersonally. Negotiation research, historically dominated by rational approaches and laboratory methods that arguably make it more difficult to study naturally occurring emotions (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004), generally ignored the role of emotion in negotiation. Starting in the early 1990s, however, negotiation scholars began to question the exclusion of emotion (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Jones & Bodtker, 2001; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999), and the number of studies on emotion and negotiation has since then increased exponentially. In what follows, we provide a review of the research on the intrapersonal consequences of emotions, in which we consider how negotiators’ emotion influences their own perceptions and behaviors, as well as interpersonal consequences of emotions, in which we consider how negotiators’ emotion affects their opponent’s perceptions and behaviors (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Finally, we consider how emotions can be a consequence of negotiation itself. For each of these processes, we review a range of conceptualizations of emotion, including positive affect, negative affect, and discrete emotions such as anger, sadness, and happiness.¹

Emotion as an intrapersonal predictor of negotiation. In their seminal article, Barry and Oliver (1996) argued that negotiators’ emotions influence every stage of dyadic negotiations, including the decision to negotiate; the selection of one’s counterpart; one’s expectation, offers, and tactics; and ultimately outcomes and compliance with settlements. Research has generally shown that both positive and negative emotions do in fact affect various stages of negotiation. Positive emotions have been found to increase positive expectations (Forgas, 1998b; Kramer et al., 1993), cooperation (R. A. Baron, 1990; Forgas, 1998b), understanding of each other’s priorities (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), joint outcomes (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and evaluation of outcomes postnegotiation (Kramer et al., 1993). Positive affect of negotiators with high power is particularly influential on the development of trust and the extent to which dyads reach integrative agreements (C. Anderson & Thompson, 2004). Positive affect, however, can also have a negative impact on negotiation. Kramer and colleagues (1993) found that positive mood could increase negotiators’ overconfidence. Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, and Kerr (2000) found that happy individuals relied more heavily on heuristics and made decisions faster, whereas sad individuals engaged in more systematic information processing.

Not surprisingly, negative emotions have generally been shown to hinder negotiations. For example, negative moods generate more critical reactions and less compliance than positive moods (Forgas, 1998a). Alred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia (1997) found that anger led to lower judgment accuracy, lower joint gains, and a reduced desire for future interaction. Forgas and Cromer (2004) showed that sadness led to more evasiveness and equivocation in verbal communication, especially when the level of conflict in a situation was high. However, just as positive emotion is not always beneficial in negotiation, negative emotion is not always harmful either. Sanna, Parks, and Chang (2003) found that the effect of negative emotion depended on negotiators’ goals. When individuals had cooperative goals, negative affect (rather than positive affect) actually led to more cooperation. When individuals had competitive goals, it was negotiators’ negative affect (and not

¹Under the broadest umbrella, emotion includes mood, affect, feelings, and discrete emotions. Generally speaking, emotions and feelings are more transitory and intense than affect and mood (Forgas, 1992), but the exact definitions of these terms vary across studies. Because researchers have used these terms interchangeably (Barry & Oliver, 1996), we review research on emotion that covers all of these conceptualizations.
positive affect) that prompted them to behave more competitively.

More recent work on intrapersonal effects of emotions has considered both the valence and the agency of emotions simultaneously, offering more nuanced predictions regarding emotions in negotiation. Butt and Choi (2006), for example, discussed four types of emotion: pride, gratitude, guilt–shame, and anger. Although pride and gratitude both have a positive valence, they each have different agency, focusing on the self and others, respectively. In their study, the authors found that pride increases competitive processes and reduces joint outcomes, whereas gratitude increases cooperative processes and enhances joint outcomes (Butt & Choi, 2006; Butt, Choi, & Jaeger, 2005). Others have similarly found that pride can adversely impact negotiation and give rise to “irrationally hard” negotiating positions (Lea & Webley, 1997). Other emotions that have the same valence but different agency (anger and shame) also have been found to have different effects in negotiation. Anger tends to produce more competitive and aggressive behaviors, whereas guilt–shame tends to produce more passive behaviors that are neither cooperative nor competitive, so that negotiators try to end a negotiation as quickly as possible without considering integrative possibilities (Butt et al., 2005; Butt & Choi, 2006).

Emotion as an interpersonal predictor of negotiation. Research has also shown that emotions can have interpersonal effects in negotiation. Morris and Keltner (2000) proposed that in the face of interpersonal problems, emotional expressions signal the sender’s intentions to the receiver and elicit complementary emotions, which in turn shape the receiver’s responses toward the sender and ultimately serve to solve the problem. Empirical research has indeed supported this theory. For example, McGinn and Keros (2002) found that dissatisfied negotiators sometimes expressed sudden emotional statements that prompted the opponent to be more open and see the frustrated party’s point of view. Pietroni, Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Pagliaro (2008) demonstrated similar informational effects of emotions in negotiations. In their study, when negotiators expressed unexpected feelings toward priority issues (e.g., happiness about a high-priority issue and anger about a low-priority issue), their counterparts adjusted their perceptions accordingly, had fewer fixed-pie biases, and engaged in more integrative behavior.

Overall, expressions of positive emotions have been shown to increase the likelihood of dispute resolution, because these emotions help to confirm the opponents’ face, whereas negative emotions decrease the likelihood of dispute resolution because they attack opponents’ face and disconfirm their identity (Brett et al., 2007). Other work, however, has shown that the impact of expressions of anger is inconsistent, with expressions of anger sometimes leading to favorable outcomes and sometimes leading to unfavorable outcomes for the focal negotiator (Van Kleef, Van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck, & Van Beest, 2008). Summarizing the literature, Van Kleef and his colleagues (2008) argued that anger can have differential effects depending on the level of interdependence of the parties, the degree to which the counterpart is motivated to process information provided by the emotion (e.g., whether the counterpart has high vs. low NFC), and whether the counterpart perceives the angry expression as justifiable. For example, on the basis of prior empirical studies, they showed that anger is more likely to lead to favorable interpersonal outcomes for a negotiator (e.g., more concession making from the counterpart) if the counterpart is dependent or has less power than the expresser (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006), if the counterpart has the opportunity and motivation to consider the information conveyed by the emotion (e.g., in a negotiation with low time pressure; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a), and if the counterpart perceives the negotiator’s angry expressions as appropriate for the situation (e.g., when experiment instructions allow for the expression of negative emotion; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007).

Others have found that interdependence moderates the effect of expressed anger on negotiation. For example, Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) found that when opponents had poor alternatives, expressing anger increased a negotiator’s ability to claim value. Likewise, when opponents are in an unfavorable position, such as having a bad reputation, a negotiator’s expressed anger does not undermine the
likelihood of settlement, nor does it elicit similar responses in the opponents (Friedman et al., 2004). In multiparty negotiation, Van Beest, Van Kleef, and Van Dijk (2008) found that although negotiators would exclude angry negotiators from coalitions and sharing payoffs, when it was necessary to include the angry party, anger led to large concessions among the coalition members to the angry party. Finally, similar to interdependence, power has also been demonstrated as a moderator in the relationship between expressed anger and negotiation behavior. Expressed anger only leads opponents with low power to make more concessions, regardless of the appropriateness of the emotion (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). In contrast, high-power negotiators make more demands when the opponent’s anger is inappropriate (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007).

Research has also begun to examine the interpersonal effects of other discrete emotions. Happy negotiators make fewer concessions and are less cooperative, especially among negotiators who have high NFC, are under high time pressure, or have low power (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Negotiators have been found to concede more to a disappointed or worried opponent than to a guilty or regretful opponent, particularly among trusting negotiators (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). Negotiators’ motivational state also affects how they react to opponents’ emotions. Van Kleef and Van Lange (2008) found that prosely negotiators surprisingly conceded more to a disappointed opponent than to an angry one as compared with prosocial negotiators. Their mediation analysis showed that the opponent’s disappointment raises prosely negotiators’ strong motivation to satisfy the opponent’s needs.

Research has also shown that negotiators strategically use emotion to achieve certain objectives, or in others words, deliberately manipulate their emotional expressions in negotiation to achieve their objectives (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). Kopelman et al. (2006) found that positive emotional displays concerned with the opponent’s feelings and relationship increased the likelihood of gaining concessions and reaching an agreement. However, the effectiveness of emotion as a strategy depends on contextual variables. Steinle, Van Kleef, and Harinck (2008) found that whether intentional expressions of anger could successfully evoke concession making from the opponent depended on the target of the emotion. Anger directed toward the opponent’s behavior (e.g., “This offer makes me angry”) led to larger concessions than anger directed toward the opponent personally (e.g., “This person makes me angry”). The difference occurs because negotiators perceived more strategic implications in behavior-directed anger than in person-directed anger, which in turn raised their estimate of the angry negotiator’s limits and caused them to cooperate more. It is important to note that the strategic use of emotion can backfire. When it is possible for negotiators to provide incorrect information to deceive an angry opponent or when the consequences of rejecting an angry opponent’s offers are low, expressing anger in negotiation can lead to poor individual outcomes for the expresser (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinle, & Van Beest, 2008).

More generally, as emotion is a fundamental aspect of negotiation, it is to the negotiator’s advantage to be able to understand emotion in both one’s opponent and oneself (Thompson et al., 1999). Fulmer and Barry (2004) proposed that emotional intelligence (the ability to perceive, understand, manage, and utilize emotion; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) would allow negotiators to gather richer information about opponents’ interests, make more accurate judgments, and adopt more suitable strategies to the situation and opponent. Indeed, Elfenbein, Der Foo, White, Tan, and Aik (2007) found that negotiators’ higher emotional recognition of facial expressions predicted better negotiation performance, including creating and claiming value in negotiation. Emotional intelligence also has social consequences in negotiation. Mueller and Curhan (2006) found that negotiators with emotionally intelligent opponents were more satisfied with the negotiation outcome, liked their partners better, and were more willing to engage in future negotiations with the same partner than those negotiators with opponents who did not understand emotion as well, highlighting the potential long-term instrumental benefits of emotional intelligence. Finally, Sevdalis, Petrides, and Harvey (2007) found that after an unsuccessful
negotiation, negotiators high on emotional intelligence experienced less regret and disappointment 5 days later than their counterparts low on emotional intelligence. In all, having emotional abilities in negotiation is highly beneficial in both the short and long term.

**Emotion as a consequence of negotiation.** Finally, a number of studies have considered how the outcomes of negotiation influence negotiators' emotions. Barry and Oliver (1996) proposed that negotiators experience positive affect when negotiation outcomes exceed their expectations. Others have argued that positive emotions experienced after negotiations depend on the attributions made for outcomes (Weiner, 1985). For example, Weiner (1985) concluded that when negotiators attribute success to the self, pride would be the resulting emotion. On the other hand, when negotiators attribute success to the opponent, gratitude arises. Researchers have also theorized that negotiators can derive positive feelings from repeated interactions, which in turn raise negotiators' affective commitment to each other (Lawler & Yoon, 1995).

In contrast, negotiation can also yield negative emotions, especially when negotiation outcomes fail to meet negotiators' expectations (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Again, types of negative emotions depend on attribution of the outcome (Weiner, 1985). Weiner (1985) argued that when individuals attribute failures to the self, they feel shame and guilt, whereas when they attribute failures to others, they experience anger. Negotiation processes can similarly cause negative emotions. When negotiations reach impasses, negotiators experience negative emotions, including anger, frustration, disappointment, and spite. Impasses also have long-term consequences. For example, negotiators who experience impasses become less willing to work with the same partner again, plan to be less cooperative in future negotiations, and believe negotiation to be a less effective means of conflict management than those who do not (O'Connor & Arnold, 2001).

In addition to objective outcomes, the perceived fairness of outcomes has a powerful influence on negotiators' emotions (Hegvedt & Killian, 1999; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; see chap. 8, this volume). Procedural justice, namely fairness of the manner in which outcomes are allocated, tends to increase negotiators' positive feelings and decrease negative feelings about the negotiation. Similarly, Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) found that individuals became angry and spiteful once they perceived offers as unfair, and ultimately rejected offers despite the offers' objective profitability. Distributive fairness (i.e., fairness in allocation of outcomes) to self only and not to the opponent increases satisfaction with self outcome but also increases guilt over the opponent's outcome (Hegvedt & Killian, 1999). Ketelaar and Au (2003) even found that individuals who experienced guilt for their selfish offers behaved more cooperatively in future negotiations, even after a week delay. The notion that perceived fairness of negotiations has long-ranging effects was also found by Curhan and his colleagues (2009).

Using a longitudinal survey study, they demonstrated that subjective value formed during job offer negotiations is a stronger predictor of compensation satisfaction, job satisfaction, and turnover intentions 1 year later than economic value achieved in the negotiations.

**THE SOCIAL CONTEXT IN NEGOTIATION**

Moving beyond basic psychological processes, we next examine negotiation as a socially situated process wherein the negotiation context plays a critical role in shaping negotiation dynamics and outcomes (Kramer & Messick, 1995). A central assumption underlying this research is that negotiators are not isolated actors attempting to reach agreement; rather negotiators’ issues, relationships, power roles, constituencies, and networks are seen as critical sources of influence within negotiations. We first explore how the nature of the issues being negotiated affects negotiation processes and outcomes. We next turn to how negotiators’ power shapes the dynamics of negotiation, followed by a review of how negotiators’ relationships affect negotiation. We consider how dyadic relationships affect negotiations and then consider more complex relationships both within and between negotiation teams and coalitions. We consider how the nature of the temporal context and technological context shape
negotiation dynamics. Finally, we discuss how the cultural and gender context affects negotiations.

**Issue Context of Negotiations**

Research has shown that the nature of the negotiation issues dramatically affects the dynamics of negotiations. A critical distinction is whether negotiations are about values and ideologies versus interests (e.g., Druckman, Rozelle, & Zechmeister, 1977; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002). Value-based negotiations, such as those involving societal issues (e.g., environmental issues, civil rights, abortion), invariably invoke deeper ideological values that are closely associated with negotiators’ identities and, consequently, are particularly likely to activate self-enhancement and defensive and biased information processing. Indeed, research has found that negotiations over values have much more competitive dynamics than those linked to interests (Druckman et al., 1977; Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1988; Druckman, Rozelle, Krause, & Mahoney, 1974; Druckman & Zechmeister, 1970, 1973; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000). For example, Harinck et al. (2000) found that individuals negotiating about values made fewer trade-offs and reached lower joint outcomes than those negotiating about interests. Harinck and De Dreu (2004) found similar results. Participants were asked to assume the role of a district attorney or a lawyer who had to agree on a jail sentence for an offender. In the interests condition, participants were told to argue for a given jail sentence because this would help their career. In the values condition, participants were told to argue for a given jail sentence because this is what is considered most just. Individuals negotiating over interests (rather than values) achieved more integrative agreements, particularly under less (rather than more) time pressure. The authors attributed the decreased integrativeness of value-based negotiations to individuals’ hesitation to compromise on moral issues.

Negotiations over values become particularly intractable the more central they are to individuals’ identities, or in other words, the more sacred they become (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002). Sacred values, such as honor, justice, and love (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), are tied to moral beliefs and are particularly resistant to negotiation. Tetlock et al. (2000) asked participants to evaluate taboo trade-offs (e.g., a proposed negotiation over sacred values such as human life or one’s dignity) including the buying and selling of entities such as organs, votes in election for political office, and sexual favors, among others. Two common reactions to taboo trade-offs were moral cleansing—acting in a way to reaffirm one’s values and loyalties that have been undercut by a transgression—and moral outrage. Making economic trade-offs for sacred values is particularly problematic (Atran & Axelrod, 2008; J. Baron & Spanca, 1997). Of interest, recent research by Atran, Axelrod, and Davis (2007) demonstrated that when negotiators offer material incentives as compensation for compromising sacred values, this results in noncooperative and often violent responses. Likewise, in a study of supporters of Palestinian suicide bombers, Atran and Axelrod (2008) inquired about the amount of compensation society should give to the family of a suicide bomber. People responded that they would be less willing to accept compensation as the value increased, indicating that the acceptance of a large value would convey a materialistic motivation, as opposed to dedication to a moral cause. Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni (2008) explained that sacredness challenges negotiators because of the assumption that trade-offs are always inevitable; however, sacred values remain impervious to such trade-offs, hence making them impossible negotiation material. In recent work, however, Atran and Axelrod (2008) argued that understanding and acknowledging an opponent’s sacred values can ultimately contribute to conflict resolution and peace. In particular, making a symbolic gesture to show recognition of the other party’s sacred values may facilitate cooperation (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007).

**Negotiator Power**

Another important dimension of the social context of negotiation is power. Invariably, the interdependent structure of negotiation provides a basis for influence and the establishment of power dynamics between negotiating parties (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Power has been
broadly defined as “an individual's relative capacity to modify others' states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments” (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003, p. 265). Numerous sources of power are relevant to negotiation, including the classic distinctions of coercive, reward, legitimate, expert, and referent power (French & Raven, 1959). Power in negotiation can be examined at the independent level (e.g., the amount of power one party has based on their resources, such as their best alternative to negotiated agreement, or BATNA) or can be seen as relative (the amount of power one has vis-à-vis another negotiator) (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). Other relevant distinctions of power in negotiation are strategic power, which stems from availability of external resources, versus normative power, which stems from a negotiator’s beliefs about what constitutes a fair division (Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1995), as well as relational power (e.g., compatibility of negotiation preferences, relationship strength, and interdependencies that exist within networks; Greenhalgh, 1987; Lawler & Yoon, 1995; Mannix, Polzer, & Neale, 1994; Sondak & Bazerman, 1989; Thompson, 1995). Other power distinctions include potential power (i.e., the underlying capacity of negotiators to obtain benefits from their agreement), perceived power (i.e., negotiators’ assessments of each party’s potential power), power tactics (i.e., behaviors designed to use or change the power relationship), and realized power (i.e., the extent to which negotiators have actually claimed benefits from the interaction; P. H. Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005).

Regardless of the source of power, general psychological theory has illustrated that high power generally activates an approach orientation and low power activates an inhibition system (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; see also C. Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Power increases action orientation in individuals (Galinsky et al., 2003), which implies more proactive or aggressive negotiation behavior on the part of powerful actors. Indeed, Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld (2007) demonstrated that feeling powerful increases one’s likelihood to initiate negotiation and also to make the first offer once negotiation begins. Power has also been linked to negotiators’ increased aspirations (Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002); decreased tendency to consider others’ perspectives, including how others feel and what others know (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006); decreased influence of others’ emotional states on one’s own behavior (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006); and increased ability to be seen as convincing in their messages (Levine & Boster, 2001). Power is also linked to a number of judgment phenomena. Power can lead to overconfidence on the part of the negotiator, which can ultimately lead to behavior producing detrimental results. For example, Sivanathan and Galinsky (2007) found that participants primed with power were more inclined to say that they were better than average when compared with similar others across a variety of attributes. In a related study, they found that high-power individuals claimed to have a greater illusion of control than did low-power individuals. Ironically, people with a greater sense of power showed greater confidence in achieving a positive negotiated outcome compared with those with less power, yet this overconfidence actually had a negative impact on negotiator outcomes.

Relative power between the negotiators also affects numerous negotiation processes. Negotiators base their opening offers largely on cues regarding the power structure within a dyad, such as BATNA (Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004). Generally speaking, research has shown that similarity in negotiators’ level of power tends to lead to more cooperative negotiations (Baranowski & Summers, 1972; Deignan, 1970; McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman, & Campos, 1973; Pepitone, 1970; Rekosh & Feigenbaum, 1966; Sheposh & Gallo, 1973; Solomon, 1960; Swingle, 1970). For example, Komorita and Barnes (1969) examined the effects of relative power using a bilateral monopoly game, in which players have to divide a sum between them in order to reach agreement. Results showed that pairs with equal power reached agreement more often, required fewer trials to do so, and made larger concessions than pairs with unequal power. Interesting as well is the fact that pairs with low yet equal levels of power functioned the most effectively. Other studies similarly have found that negotiators with equal power tend to achieve higher integrative agreements (Mannix & Neale, 1993; McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986).
For example, Wolfe and McGinn (2005) used a candidate-recruiter negotiation paradigm to examine the importance of perceived power between negotiating parties. Results showed that parties who perceived relatively equal power reached more integrative agreements than did those who perceived unequal power. Nevertheless, despite the strong evidence for more cooperative and integrative bargaining among individuals of equal power, several studies have found the reverse (Komorita, Shephos, & Braver, 1968; Sondak & Bazerman, 1991; Tedeschi, Bonoma, & Novinson, 1970) or no differences at all between negotiating pairs with symmetrical and asymmetrical power (Hornstein, 1965; Kelley, 1973, Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; Schellenberg, 1964, 1970).

Substantially more work has focused on relationships of asymmetrical power in negotiation. High-power parties generally tend to demand more, concede less, and behave more aggressively than do low-power parties (De Dreu, 1995; Hermann & Kogan, 1968; Kelley, 1973; Lawler, 1992). Power also affects information-seeking behaviors. De Dreu and Van Kleef (2004) found that less powerful negotiators tended to ask more diagnostic (rather than leading) questions and more belief-congruent (rather than belief-incongruent) questions. This is consistent with studies demonstrating that high-power individuals generally express less of an interest in opponents' underlying concerns than do low-power parties (P. H. Kim, 1997; Mannix & Neale, 1993, Sondak & Bazerman, 1991). These findings suggest that high-power individuals often anchor too much on their own vantage point, failing to take into account others' points of view. In contrast, lower power parties are more likely to discover mutually beneficial solutions than are high-power parties (Larson, 2003).

However, low-power parties often react to high-power parties in ways that lead to less effective negotiation outcomes. Donohue and Taylor (2007) discussed the "one-down effect," which emerges when low-power individuals assume aggressive negotiation strategies, which consequently hinder the achievement of desired outcomes. Other work shows that low-power negotiators, not surprisingly, are more vulnerable and have more pessimistic attitudes toward risk in negotiation. For example, C. Anderson and Galinsky (2006) showed that individuals with a higher sense of power were likely to take bigger risks, and this tendency was predicted by optimistic perceptions of risk. Furthermore, individuals with low perceived power, and who have low self-efficacy, have been found to use avoidance strategies to deal with conflict, whereas individuals with high perceived power and high self-efficacy are likely to use compromising strategies (Aloni & Desivilya, 2007).

The extent of the power discrepancy between individuals is crucial to examine as well. Exactly how unequal do parties have to be for a certain dynamic to ensue? In an experimental study, Aranoff and Tedeschi (1968) found that as the size of the power discrepancy between two individuals decreased, the frequency of mutual cooperation increased. Similarly, Solomon (1960) found that expectations of trustworthy behavior from the other party increased as power discrepancy decreased. Vitz and Kite (1970) suggested that the amount of conflict resulting from any given power discrepancy is a function of both the importance of the discrepancy and the pressure to reduce the discrepancy, illustrating the role of multiple factors in determining the effects of power in negotiation.

Although we have thus far largely discussed situational differences in power and their impact on negotiation dynamics, research has also examined stable individual differences related to power. Rubin and Brown (1975) discussed the need for power as the need to exert control over others. Terhune (1968) found that individuals who were high in need for power behaved noncooperatively in a prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, these individuals are more likely to lie and exploit their partner when possible in comparison with other players. Individuals high in need for power are particularly reactive to the other player's behavior and sensitive to variations in the other party's behavior. In an examination of international crises, Langner and Winter (2001) demonstrated that power motivation, as opposed to affiliation motivation, is negatively related to concession making. Power motivation is also linked to increased verbal and physical aggression (Winter, 1996).
Finally, like almost all factors that play a role in negotiation, power is not a static construct. In contrast, it is a dynamic force whose expression and effects are moderated by numerous contextual and individual-differences variables. For example, power tends to produce cooperation, particularly among individuals with an interdependent self-construal (Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007; Zhong, Galinsky, Magee, & Maddux, 2009). Demographic factors, such as gender, also moderate the impact of power on negotiation. Kray, Reb, Galinsky, and Thompson (2004) found that high-power negotiators enjoyed a greater amount of resources when masculine stereotypes were tied to negotiation success, regardless of the gender of the power holder. In contrast, when feminine stereotypes were activated, individuals behaved more cooperatively and reached more integrative negotiation outcomes.

**Negotiator Relationships**

Negotiation is an interdependent phenomenon (Greenhalgh, 1987), and as such, negotiations always exist within a relational context. Negotiations can take place between two individuals, also known as dyadic negotiations. Negotiation may also take place between teams of individuals, wherein within-team negotiation dynamics and between-team dynamics affect negotiated agreements. Negotiations can also be conducted through representatives (commonly referred to as boundary role players; Adams, 1976), adding further relational complexity to the negotiation table. Negotiator coalitions can be formed during multiparty negotiations when certain parties (individuals, teams, or both) come together to negotiate as a unit against another negotiation party or group of parties. Each of these areas is reviewed in turn below.

**Dyadic relationships in negotiations.** The nature of relationships in dyadic negotiations has been a topic of much exploration within the literature (Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983; Gruder, 1971; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1979; Lamm & Schwinger, 1980; O’Connell, 1984; Thompson & De Harppoort, 1998; Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996; for reviews, see McGinn, 2006; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995). For example, classic social psychological experiments show that identification with an in-group fosters cooperation with fellow members and hostility toward members of an out-group (Sherif, 1951; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Kramer (1991) and Polzer, Neale, and Glenn (1993) extended these findings to a negotiation context and found that negotiators were more likely to share information with in-group members than with out-group members. Negotiators are also more likely to cooperate when they expect future interaction with other negotiators (Gruder, 1971; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Other studies have found that positive relationships tend to foster cooperation, whereas negative relationships foster competition (Druckman & Broome, 1991; Valley et al., 1995). Drolet, Larrick, and Morris (1998) found that individuals with a negative relationship ultimately care more about distributive outcomes, whereas individuals with a positive relationship care about fairness in the negotiation.

Early work illustrated that opponent needs are more likely to be considered in negotiations among friends versus strangers (Lamm & Schwinger, 1980) and that friends are more tolerant of unbalanced negotiation exchanges as compared with strangers (O’Connell, 1984). However, close relationships can also hinder negotiation outcomes. Fry, Firestone, and Williams (1983) found that dyads composed of strangers had higher outcome aspirations, more frequently exchanged information pertinent to the negotiation task at hand, and earned higher total profit than did dyads of couples. Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt (1996) also found that teams of friends made less accurate judgments and reached fewer integrative agreements than teams of strangers (see also Thompson & De Harppoort, 1998). Gelfand et al. (2006) provided a theoretical synthesis regarding this literature, arguing that negotiators who have a relational self-construal activated (either situationally, based on close relationships, or chronically, based on gender or culture) may engage in relational satisficing and fail to achieve optimal economic agreements even though they attain high relational capital. Indeed, Currin, Neale, Ross, and Rosencrans-Engelmann (2008) found that in contexts where the relational self is activated (e.g., egalitarian organizational cultures), dyads attain lower joint outcomes but higher relational outcomes. Individual differences in unmitigated communion (a focus on others to
the exclusion of the self) is a related factor underlying relational accommodation in negotiations (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008).

Recent work has illustrated conditions under which preexisting relationships might not be detrimental. Kray, Thompson, and Lind (2005) examined the joint effect of accountability to outside individuals and preexisting negotiation relationship on the realization of mutually beneficial agreements. Their results showed that pairs of individuals who had a previous relationship were more likely to reach agreement under conditions of high, as opposed to low, accountability, whereas pairs of strangers were more likely to reach agreement under conditions of low, as opposed to high, accountability. This study provides evidence for the joint influence of relational and external factors on negotiation dynamics.

**Team negotiations.** Negotiations occur not only between dyads but also through teams. Brodt and Thompson (2001) defined a negotiating team as “a group of two or more interdependent persons who join together as a single negotiating party because of their similar interests and objectives related to the negotiation and who are all present at the bargaining table” (p. 209). Given the additional number of individuals involved in such negotiations, the informational, social, procedural, and strategic complexity of team negotiations far surpasses that of dyadic negotiations (Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1997), and much research has been dedicated to understanding the specific advantages and disadvantages that teams offer to negotiation.

Scholars have long argued that teams can perform tasks more effectively than individuals—in effect, two heads are better than one (e.g., Hastie, 1986; Hill, 1982; Laughlin, 1980). Teams have cognitive advantages in that they have greater expertise to solve problems (Hill, 1982; Hinzs, 1990; Kaplan, 1987; Maier, 1967; Stasser, 1988; see Vol. 1, chaps. 19 and 20, this handbook), improved problem-solving ability and a broader variety of perspectives (Hastie, 1986; Hill, 1982; Keenan & Carnevale, 1992; Laughlin, 1980; Rubin & Sander, 1988), improved ability to synthesize information from a variety of sources (Brodt & Dietz, 1999; Henry, 1995; Laughlin, VanderStoep, & Hollingshead, 1991; Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995), better ability to correct each other’s biases, and more accuracy in judgment (Hastie, 1986; Hinzs, 1990; Laughlin, 1980). From a motivational perspective, teams often have higher aspirations and goal commitment and have higher accountability than do their solo counterparts (Brodt & Thompson, 2001; but see O’Connor, 1997). Moreover, as compared with representative negotiations (discussed below), teams can also reduce the role conflict caused by boundary spanning, as team members can adopt different responsibilities in communicating with other parties, decreasing the strain on any one individual (Friedman & Podolny, 1992). Teams also have a greater repertoire of strategies at their disposal than individuals (e.g., the “good cop/bad cop” strategy), which can help foster agreements (Brodt & Tuchinsky, 2000; see also Hilty & Carnevale, 1992). Finally, opposing parties are more likely to be persuaded by teams, and teams exert more social influence than do individuals (Brodt & Thompson, 2001; Thompson et al., 1996). Indeed, a number of studies have found support for the notion that teams outperform solos. For example, Thompson et al. (1996) compared team–team, team–solo, and solo–solo negotiations and found that when at least one party to a negotiation was a team, joint profit increased. Teams negotiated higher joint gains, had greater information exchange, and demonstrated greater judgment accuracy as compared with solos (see also Morgan & Tindale, 2002; O’Connor, 1997; Peterson & Thompson, 1997; Thompson et al., 1996).

Although teams often possess an advantage over individuals, they also incur numerous costs (Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). For example, teams can take longer to reach agreement, particularly as the number of issues increases, and accountability exists to a broad range of parties (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Team negotiations can become much more competitive than interindividual interactions (Komorita & Lapworth, 1982; Lindskold, McElwain, & Wayner, 1977; Peirce, Pruitt, & Czaja, 1993), resulting in lower individual and joint outcomes—a phenomenon known as the “interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect” (Insko et al., 1992). Polzer (1996) found that solo–solo negotiators perceived more trust and cooperation between parties than did solo–group
negotiators, who perceived more trust and cooperation than intergroup negotiators. Team interactions can become more competitive than interindividual interactions, because teams are greedier than individuals and/or because teams become more defensive than individuals (Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Wildschut et al., 1996; Winquist & Larson, 2004). At the opposite extreme, when relational concerns loom large in teams—as when teams are composed of friends—team members can become hypercooperative and achieve lower outcomes. For example, Thompson et al. (1996) found that teams of friends negotiated lower joint gains than teams of nonfriends (see also Peterson & Thompson, 1997). Thus, when teams either become too relational or too competitive, they can perform worse than solos.

Other research on team negotiation has examined how within-team dynamics affect between-team negotiations. Key variables in within-team relations include group identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987), cooperation (Keenan & Carnevale, 1992; Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988), and trust (Marwell & Schmitt, 1972). Cooperation within the team has been found to carry over to between-group negotiations, and likewise, competition within groups also carries over to between-group negotiations (Bornstein, Rapoport, Kerpel, & Katz, 1989; Dion, 1979; Fisher, 1989; Friedman & Gal, 1991; Keenan & Carnevale, 1989; Rabbie, 1982). Strong within-group identification can also lead to competitive behavior toward the other team (Keenan & Carnevale, 1992; Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988). In contrast, behaving cooperatively toward an out-group member, such as a negotiation opponent, is often viewed as disloyal and cowardly (Bornstein, 2003). Position in a group interacts with group identification to affect negotiation behavior as well. Van Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, and Svensson (2007) found that group members who occupied a marginal position in the group adopted a tougher negotiation stance than did group members with more central positions, likely in an attempt to impress more influential group members.

Finally, recent research has examined how situational factors affect team negotiations. Teams have been found to be particularly competitive with other teams when they are primed with power and have members who are primed with interdependent versus independent self-construals, suggesting that an interdependent self-construal may lead to an exploitive use of power in team negotiations (Howard et al., 2007). Team negotiation processes also vary depending on the task structure, decision rule, and social motivation of team members (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002). In an asymmetrical task, prosocial groups, as well as groups operating under a unanimity rule, achieved higher joint outcomes than egoistically motivated groups and those that were using a majority rule. Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, and Smith (2007) also examined social motives and strategies in team negotiation and found that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social-motive composition of the group, but that individualistic negotiators did not.

**Representative negotiations.** Teams can also rely on individual agents to represent their interests and to conduct transactions that affect the team's welfare (Rubin & Sander, 1988). For example, in business contexts, negotiations often take place between representatives of different committees, departments, and even organizations. Spouses may rely on agents in divorce negotiations. In an international context, negotiations often take place between diplomats and spokespersons who represent different nations. Such negotiations are often referred to as representative negotiations, and a large literature, starting with classic work in industrial relations (Walton & McKersie, 1965), has examined the unique circumstances faced by group representatives.

In particular, Adams's (1976) boundary role model illustrates that representatives often face conflicting pressures from their own teams as well as their opponents. For example, boundary role players (BRPs) need to show their loyalty to their own group, who often demand that the BRPs be firm in their position, yet also need to demonstrate sensitivity and flexibility and develop a relationship with their opponents in order to be able to reach high-quality agreements for their group. However, constituents may become suspicious of friendly relationships between BRPs and opponents, and become less trustful of BRPs to represent their interests, which is ultimately detrimental to the
negotiation process (Adams, 1976). For example, Frey and Adams (1972) found that constituent distrust of the BRP increases the toughness of BRP behavior toward an opposing party in subsequent negotiations. Consequently, such tough behavior often decreases the likelihood of opponent cooperation, hence lowering negotiation outcomes. In a cyclical fashion, these depressed outcomes increase BRP distrust, again contributing to more aggressive behavior on the part of the BRP (Adams, 1976; Maruyama, 1963). Likewise, owing to their distance from the negotiation process, constituents might have unrealistic expectations for the negotiation. For example, a BRP may have to take action that is unsatisfactory to the constituent in order to reach an agreement with an opposing party. This dissatisfaction on the part of the constituent often results in negative consequences for the BRP, despite their best intentions. Wall (1974) found that salesmen who lost money were perceived as less loyal by constituents than salesmen who made money.

Other research has illustrated that representative accountability and surveillance typically have negative effects on representatives' ability to reach high-quality agreements (but see Gelfand & Realo, 1999). Constituent surveillance generally reinforces perceived constituent preferences, enhances negotiator toughness, and increases competitive behavior (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979; Organ, 1970). Studies examining accountability have uncovered similar findings. Accountability is typically activated when representatives are required to justify their actions after the negotiation, when they are going to be evaluated, or when their rewards and punishments are in their constituents' control (Carnevale, 1986). Representatives are particularly motivated to please constituents and behave in ways that will gain them social approval in such conditions (Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Moreover, in the absence of other information, representatives, particularly in the United States (Gelfand & Realo, 1999), assume that their constituents want them to behave competitively. This notion was particularly apparent in a study by Benton and Druckman (1974) wherein negotiators either represented their own interests or were accountable to constituents. In the latter condition, negotiators were given either cooperative instructions, competitive instructions, or no instructions. The results demonstrated that negotiators who were given no instructions negotiated in a similar way to those representatives who were given competitive instructions and had more competitive goals and rejected more offers. Other research has illustrated that accountability to constituents enhances contentious tactics and makes it more difficult to reach integrative agreements (Benton, 1971; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale et al., 1979; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Gruder, 1971; Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 1974; Neale, 1984). In all, managing multiple relationships presents difficult dilemmas for negotiators. Behaviors intended to comply with constituent demands may ironically harm their interests in the long run (cf. Fassina, 2004).

Finally, relationships with one's fellow BRP also have an impact on negotiation. As in other negotiation relationships, expectations of future interaction between a BRP and an opposing party affect negotiator behavior. In particular, when a BRP expects a one-time interaction with an opponent, his or her demands, concessions, and overall behavior are limited only by the BRP's personal boundaries and the desires of his constituent (Adams, 1976). As future consequences, such as retaliation, are not a concern, the BRP's behavior remains relatively unconstrained. In contrast, when a BRP is responsible for maintaining a relationship with a negotiation opponent, he or she must be careful to not irreparably damage their existing relationship while participating in the negotiation. In a similar vein, perceptions of the negotiation opponent also dictate BRP behavior (Frey, 1971; Gruder, 1968; Holmes, 1971). For example, Frey and Adams (1972) and Gruder (1968) demonstrated that BRPs who viewed their opponent as exploitative made higher demands and behaved more competitively. Holmes (1971) echoed these findings by demonstrating that agreement is much more likely to be reached when BRPs perceive opponents as cooperative rather than competitive.

Coalitions. Whenever multiple individuals take part in a negotiation, there exists the potential for the development of coalitions. Negotiating parties composed of either teams or individuals can come
together in order to form a coalition in an effort to persuade another negotiation party or coalition. Rubin and Brown (1975) defined a coalition as “the unification of the power or resources (or both) of two or more parties so they stand a better chance of obtaining a desired outcome or of controlling others” (p. 64). Parties are especially likely to join forces when certain conditions exist, such as a competitive negotiation situation, self-perceptions of weakness, disadvantage, and/or insufficiency of resources. Numerous studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of weaker parties uniting to form a coalition over a stronger party, otherwise known as the “strength is weakness” effect (Bond & Vinacke, 1961; Caplow, 1956; Cole & Phillips, 1967; Gamson, 1962; Shears, 1967; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). Factors that affect one’s desirability as a coalition partner include relative power, status, ability, skill, and reputation for success and honoring of prior coalition commitments (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Individuals also take into account factors such as the extent to which exclusion from a coalition would negatively affect the payoff of a potential partner when considering potential coalition partners (Van Beest, Wilke, & Van Dijk, 2003). Polzer, Mannix, and Neale (1998) empirically demonstrated the importance of common interests in coalition formation. The authors examined resource allocation and coalitions in multiparty negotiation, suggesting that the alignment of negotiators’ preferences would affect the formation of coalitions and eventual negotiation outcomes. Results demonstrated that parties with compatible interests were more likely to form coalitions than were parties with incompatible interests. Furthermore, not only did parties with compatible interests enjoy higher outcomes on the issues about which they agreed, but they also enjoyed better outcomes on other, unrelated issues.

Temporal Context of Negotiation

Negotiations always take place within a temporal context, and this dimension of the social context is a critical determinant of negotiation processes and outcomes. Much research has focused on time pressure, which can originate from approaching contract deadlines, threatened stakes, immediate gratification, changing terms of an agreement, potential of third-party intervention, or the value of pursuing other activities (Cross, 1965). Research generally indicates that time pressure leads to lower demands and less ambitious goals (Carnevale, O’Connor, & McCusker, 1993; Druckman, 1994). A meta-analysis by Stuhlmacher, Gillespie, and Champagne (1998) found that negotiators are more likely to cooperate and make concessions under high time pressure as opposed to low time pressure (d = 0.45) (see also Druckman, 1994, for similar conclusions in a different meta-analysis). At the same time, the degree to which time pressure increases conciliatory behavior is moderated by a number of situational and individual-difference factors. For example, time pressure has a weaker effect in complex (d = 0.21) as compared with simple negotiations (d = 0.69), when incentives for good performance are offered (d = 0.67) versus when they are not (d = 0.31), and among individuals who adopt a tough (d = 0.23) as opposed to a flexible (d = 0.68) negotiation stance (Stuhlmacher et al., 1998). Time pressure is also more likely to result in cooperative behavior and higher agreements when negotiators are not accountable to constituents; when they are accountable, time pressure leads to more competitive behavior and fewer agreements (Mosterd & Rutte, 2000). In addition, time pressure has different effects when it is asymmetrical in that the party under less time pressure tends to fare better (Carnevale et al., 1993; Komorita & Barnes, 1969; Rapoport, Weg, & Felsenthal, 1990; Stuhlmacher et al., 1998). Not only are negotiators under intense time pressure less demanding and more likely to make concessions, but the other party holds the threat of delay, hence increasing its power in the negotiation. This power differential leads to suboptimal outcomes for the party under more, rather than less, pressure. Druckman’s (1994) meta-analysis also revealed that time pressure exerted a substantial influence on time to come to a decision, with increasing time pressure leading to quicker agreements (d = 0.39).

In addition to affecting demand levels and concession rates, time pressure also affects information processing and information sharing. De Dreu (2003) showed that time pressure caused negotiators to have a greater reliance on cognitive heuristics and a decreased use of the systematic processing of
information. Under high as compared with low time pressure, negotiators relied on stereotypes about their opponent more frequently and achieved lower outcomes.

Negotiators also appear to be biased in their information sharing when under high time pressure. For example, Moore (2004) examined information sharing under time pressure and found a large discrepancy between negotiator predictions and actual negotiation outcomes. Although negotiators tended to predict that revealing final deadlines in negotiation would lead to poorer outcomes, results showed that divulging this information led to better outcomes because knowledge of an impending deadline places the other party under a time constraint as well. Results showed that revealing deadlines resulted in quicker concessions made by the other party and therefore a more beneficial outcome than in the absence of deadline disclosure. Despite the fallacy of these myopic predictions, negotiators tend not to provide information about final deadlines when given the option not to. Moore (2004) explained this tendency as a failure of strategic perspective taking, as most participants did not realize that informing the other side of their deadline would increase concession rates. High time pressure has also been shown to lead to increased miscommunication between parties and more selective information use (Stuhlmacher & Champagne, 2000; Yukl, Malone, Hayslip, & Pamin, 1976) and more negative perceptions of one's opponents as being tough and dishonest as compared with low time pressure conditions (Smith, Pruitt, & Carnevale, 1982).

Although time pressure is the most studied of time-related topics in the negotiation literature, recent work has begun to examine other aspects of time, such as the timing of negotiation offers as well as the time lapse between the negotiation and the implementation of negotiation terms. In three experimental studies, Henderson, Trope, and Carnevale (2006) found that a greater amount of time before the realization of negotiation terms promoted a more structured approach toward negotiation issues. For example, negotiators considering temporally distant issues were more likely to consider various issues simultaneously as opposed to considering single issues in isolation. Furthermore, negotiating temporally distant terms also caused more concessions on low-priority items but fewer on high-priority items. Finally, negotiators with a temporally distant perspective tended to achieve greater individual and joint outcomes. Similarly, Okhuysen, Galinsky, and Uptigrove (2003) found that a longer amount of time between a negotiation and the implementation of its outcomes resulted in a less contentious and more efficient negotiation. The authors also examined negotiations over benefits (e.g., organizational success) versus burdens (e.g., paying a fine) in relation to temporal horizon. Results showed that burdens were perceived as more aversive in the present but less aversive in the future. This suggests that negotiations regarding potential burdens should take place long before their outcomes are realized. Other work has examined the impact of exogenously imposed deadlines (e.g., delays due to interruptions or interfering factors) between offers and counteroffers in negotiations. Ghosh (1996) found that exogenously imposed time delays between offers and counteroffers increased conflict, eliminated the deadline effect (the tendency to concentrate on agreements near the end of a time limit; Gneezy, Haruvy, & Roth, 2003), negated the first-mover advantage, and resulted in a greater number of impasses than in negotiations in which no time delay between offers and counteroffers was imposed. In all, numerous dimensions of time have an impact on negotiation processes and outcomes.

**Communication Media Context of Negotiation**

Negotiations are always situated in a particular communication medium that exerts effects on negotiation dynamics and outcomes. Several decades of research have compared negotiations that take place face-to-face with those that take place virtually (McGinn & Croson, 2004; Thompson & Nadler, 2002; see chap. 7, this volume). Media such as e-mail, phone, and face-to-face interactions differ dramatically in communication properties such as synchronicity, efficacy, and social awareness (McGinn & Croson, 2004); richness (Daft & Lengel, 1984, 1986); and tempo (Loewenstein, Morris, Chakravarti, Thompson, & Kopelman, 2005). In general, the social presence of others is reduced when using
media such as e-mail (McGinn & Croson, 2004; Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976; Weisband & Atwater, 1999), thereby increasing anonymity (T. L. Griffith & Northcraft, 1994; Thompson, 1997), depersonalization (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005; Trevino, Daft, & Lengel, 1990), and psychological distance between negotiating parties (Jessup & Tansik, 1991; Sproull & Kiesler, 1986).

Negotiators' psychological states are impacted by the medium in which they negotiate. For example, individuals who negotiate face-to-face tend to be more trusting (Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998) and perceive their counterparts to be more credible (Citera, Beauregard, & Mitsuya, 2005) than those who negotiate in leaner media. Negotiating via electronic media also impairs the accuracy of individuals' judgment. For example, Arunchalam and Dilla (1995) found that negotiators interacting electronically were less accurate in judging the other parties' interests, and Giordano, Stoner, Brouer, and George (2007) found that individuals involved in instant message (IM) negotiations were less able to detect deception than those involved in face-to-face negotiations. Furthermore, negotiators are more susceptible to certain biases depending on the medium. For example, in a review of the literature, Thompson and Nadler (2002) argued that during electronic interactions, negotiators are predisposed to the temporal synchrony bias (the tendency for negotiators to behave as if their counterpart will respond in a temporally similar way, e.g., returning e-mails at the same rate), the burned bridge bias (the tendency for negotiators to engage in potentially detrimental behaviors in a lean medium that they wouldn't engage in when interacting face-to-face), the squeaky wheel bias (the tendency for negotiators to adopt a negative emotional style when interacting via lean media, when the same individual would likely use a positive emotional style in face-to-face interactions), and the sinister attribution bias (the tendency for negotiators to perceive others' actions as an indication of ill will as opposed to positive intentions).

The diminished social presence that is inherent to electronic communications often results in increased self-interested behavior in negotiations (Barness & Bhappu, 2004). For example, Galin, Gross, and Gosalker (2007) found electronic negotiations involved more "hard" tactics (such as threats and intimidation) than did face-to-face negotiations. Giordano et al. (2007) found that individuals negotiating via IM used more forceful tactics and experienced more tension than did individuals negotiating face-to-face. Perhaps not surprisingly, virtual negotiations tend to be more hostile (Purdy, Nye, & Balakrishnan, 2000), result in lower profit than face-to-face negotiations (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995; Croson, 1999; Moore, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 1999; Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005; Valley et al., 1998), are more time consuming (Purdy et al., 2000), and are less conducive to future negotiations between parties (Drolet & Morris, 2000; Naquin & Paulson, 2003). The interpretation of messages during the negotiation process also varies greatly between face-to-face and electronic communication, owing in part to the absence of contextual cues (gestures, facial expressions, tones, etc.) in electronic media (Bhappu, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1997; Kiesler & Sproull, 1992; Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). By virtue of the constraint of virtual media, negotiators tend to pay more attention to message content versus social cues (Ocker & Yaveraubam, 1999) and are more likely to "bundle" their arguments in electronic negotiations, laying out all their demands and rationales in a single message (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Friedman & Currall, 2003; Rosette, Brett, Barsness, & Lytle, 2006). The constraint of virtual media also results in rigid behavior on the part of negotiators, who tend to respond in the same manner (e.g., use the same affective response) as compared with more flexible negotiation behavior in face-to-face contexts.

Inconsistencies, however, can be found in the literature (Croson, 1999; Morley & Stephenson, 1969; Sheffield, 1995; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998). For example, Croson (1999) found that final negotiation agreements reached via e-mail were more integrative than face-to-face agreements. Furthermore, agreements negotiated through e-mail tended to be significantly more equal than did face-to-face agreements, likely because the use of electronic media levels the playing field between stronger and weaker negotiators. Still other studies have found no differences between integrative agreements in face-to-face negotiation as compared with other types of media (Schweitzer, Brodt, & Croson, 2002; Shell, 2001;
Suh, 1999). Indeed, various scholars suggest that it may be better to deal with contentious negotiations by electronic media rather than in person, as the absence of negative social cues may serve to prevent further hostility (Bhappu, 2003; Carnevale et al., 1981).

As is true in many other facets of negotiation, various moderators of the effects of media on negotiation processes and outcomes have been identified. Mode of communication becomes less important when negotiators have a prior relationship (Valley et al., 1998). Moreover, hostile negotiation tactics between remotely negotiating parties (e.g., phone, e-mail) can be tempered with personal information disclosure (Moore et al., 1999; Paese, Schreiber, & Taylor, 2003) and common group affiliation (Moore et al., 1999). Rapport plays a critical role in virtual negotiations. Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, and Thompson (2002) found that engaging in a brief telephone conversation (“schmoozing”) prior to an electronic negotiation fostered rapport and improved negotiation outcomes (see also Drolet & Morris, 2000). Kurtzberg, Dunn-Jensen, and Matsibekker (2003) also examined the importance of relationship building in an electronic negotiation context and found that parties that activated perceptions of similarity or familiarity were better able to reach agreements.

Recent literature has moved beyond simple distinctions of electronic versus face-to-face media and has begun to compare negotiating with different types of electronic types of media, such as e-mail versus instant messaging. For example, Pesendorfer and Koeszegi (2006) examined synchronous (IM) versus asynchronous (e-mail) communication in electronic negotiations. Whereas IM is interactive and negotiators operate roughly on the same timeline, e-mailing is temporally separated and more distant. Results showed that synchronous communication styles were more conducive to “hot” behavioral styles, characterized by competition and intense emotions. In contrast, asynchronous communication was more conducive to “cool” behaviors (such as taking time to reflect and having a calm conversation) and also led to more information exchange and friendly feelings. Different strategies are more or less effective depending on the tempo afforded by the communication medium. For example, Loewenstein et al. (2005) found that detailed messages enabled sellers to claim greater value when negotiating via IM but not e-mail. The authors suggest that individuals faced with detailed arguments in a fast-tempo medium are unable to come up with an adequate rebuttal in time to respond and therefore receive the poorer end of negotiation outcomes.

Recent advances in technology have led to the creation of software capable of supporting negotiators, mediators, and arbitrators (see, e.g., http://www.electroniccourthouse.com/ and http://www.cybersettle.com/), termed “e-negotiation” models (Bichler, Kersten, & Stefan, 2003). Negotiation support tools are designed to aide human negotiators by performing tasks such as gathering information, problem structuring, and generating alternative solutions. In contrast, negotiation software agents replace human negotiators in decision making and communicating during negotiations, hence bypassing human-to-human interaction altogether. Indeed, research has illustrated that computer agents can often outperform humans (Lin, Kraus, Wilkenfeld, & Barry, 2008; Oshrat, Lin, & Kraus, 2009). Finally, e-negotiation media are electronic systems that process and transport data among human negotiators, hence providing a forum in which communication is coordinated through computer agents (Bichler et al., 2003). Research illustrates that technology can have a critical impact on negotiation processes and outcomes, as reviewed above, and can be used as a tool to help negotiators achieve higher gain.

Culture and Gender Context of Negotiation

Last, we consider the culture and gender context of negotiation, each in turn.

Culture. The cultural context, arguably the most macro level of the social context in which negotiations are embedded, is critical to consider in negotiation theory and research (see chap. 23, this volume). Historically, culture was largely ignored in the field (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000), yet there is increasing recognition that it is important to examine negotiation processes beyond Western samples in order to build a global science and practice (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). Extant research indeed reveals that
culture affects many aspects of negotiations, from negotiators' psychological states to interpersonal processes to the impact of the more proximal situation on negotiation dynamics, challenging assumptions regarding the hegemony of negotiation research (for reviews of culture and negotiation, see Brett & Gelfand, 2006; Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Imai & Gelfand, 2009a).

For example, the research on negotiator cognition biases and their consequences reviewed previously comes almost exclusively from studies in the United States and other Western cultures. This naturally raises the question of cultural generalizability: Are the biases documented thus far merely local habits—characteristics of Western or "individualistic" negotiators—rather than invariant, fundamental aspects of human nature? Has negotiation research overlooked other biases that are more prominent in other cultural settings? Research on culture and negotiation has begun to address these questions and has found that there is systematic variability in negotiator cognition across cultures. Gelfand and colleagues (2001) found that both universal and culture-specific perceptual frames of conflict exist among American and Japanese negotiators. Using multidimensional scaling, they found that the dimension of compromise versus win was universal, yet Americans perceived more findings to be about winning (with one party to blame) and Japanese perceived the identical conflicts to be more about compromise (with both parties to blame). Culture-specific frames were also found. Americans perceived conflicts to be concerned with individual rights and autonomy, whereas Japanese perceived the same conflicts to be concerned with violations of duties and obligations (or giri violations, in Japanese terminology). These findings empirically illustrated that the same conflicts may be perceived quite differently across cultures yet make "cultural sense" from both vantage points. From a practical point of view, Gelfand et al. (2001) concluded that in intercultural situations where Americans and Japanese are negotiating, meta-level conflicts—those which arise from very different definitions of the conflict itself—may make it especially difficult to come to agreements.

Several cross-cultural studies have also examined whether negotiators' judgment biases, which have been consistently found in the West, are found in non-Western cultures. Research has found that anchoring biases (e.g., the effect of opening offers on final outcomes) are not necessarily universal. Instead of producing an anchoring effect, Adair, Weingart, and Brett (2007) found, opening offers facilitate information exchange and increase joint gains for Japanese negotiators. The authors attributed the cross-cultural differences to divergence in communication styles. The U.S. negotiators, accustomed to direct communication, see opening offers as a signal of the opponent's strong position stand. In contrast, Japanese negotiators commonly use indirect methods of communication and see opening offers as a subtle way to engage in information exchange.

Culture influences a number of competitive biases in negotiation. Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) found that fixed-pie biases vary across cultures, and argued that the readiness with which American negotiators apply fixed-pie perspectives may be reflective of the emphasis on win–lose competitions (and sports metaphors) emphasized in American culture. They found that American negotiators exhibited more fixed-pie biases (i.e., were less accurate in reporting the priorities of their counterparts) than Greeks in intercultural negotiations, even after the same priority information was exchanged within dyads. Americans, it is interesting to note, were more (over)confident that they understood their counterparts' interests as compared with Greeks. Research has illustrated that Americans are more prone to the fundamental attribution error in negotiations; they tend to make more internal attributions to their counterparts' behavior than negotiators in other cultures such as Korea and Hong Kong (Morris et al., 1999; Valenzuela, Srivastava, & Lee, 2005). Egocentrism biases in negotiation also vary across cultures. Gelfand and colleagues (2002) found that self-serving biases of fairness in negotiation are pronounced in individualistic cultures, where the self is served by focusing on one's positive attributes in order to "stand out" and be better than others, and are less pronounced in collectivistic cultures, where the self is served by focusing on one's negative characteristics in order to "blend in" and maintain interdependence with others (Heine, Lehman, Markus,
& Kitayama, 1999; see also Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002, and Buchan, Croson, & Johnson, 2004, on additional factors that affect fairness judgments across cultures). More generally, these results illustrate that judgment biases in negotiation need not be universal shortcuts but rather can reflect different cultural ideals that negotiators have internalized as part of their self-system.

Research on culture and negotiator cognition, however, remains largely Eurocentric, generally testing whether biases found in the United States are applicable to other cultures. Far less attention has been given to judgment biases that might be more prevalent in negotiations in other cultures. For example, biases may be found more at the group level in collectivist cultures. Given strong in-group/out-group boundaries in collectivist cultures (Triandis, 1995), we might find group-serving biases and group fixed-pie biases are exacerbated, resulting in hypercompetition between groups in negotiation in collectivist cultures. Likewise, attributions of group traits to dispositions, and subsequent misattributions and competition, might be more prevalent in collectivist cultures. Along these lines, Menon, Morris, Chiu, and Hong (1999) found that Asians exhibit stronger dispositional biases when they are explaining an act by a group or an organization as compared with Americans.

Culture also influences experienced emotions as well as the strategic use of emotion in negotiation. Chinese negotiators reported more anxiety and uncertainty than Dutch negotiators, whereas Dutch negotiators reported more irritation and less friendliness than Chinese negotiators (Ulijn, Rutkowski, Kumar, & Zhu, 2005). Kopelman and Rosette (2008) found that compared with Israeli negotiators, East Asian negotiators are more likely to accept an offer from an opponent who displays positive emotion (e.g., smiling, nodding, and appearing cordial) and are less likely to accept an offer from an opponent who displays negative emotion (e.g., appearing intimidating and irritated). The researchers proposed that East Asians value positive emotional display more because of their cultural emphasis on face and respect. For the same reason, negative emotional display is more incongruent with East Asian cultural values than with Israeli cultural values.

Moving beyond the individual level of analysis, a number of studies have examined the dynamics of how parties communicate and sequence their actions when negotiating, and how this varies across cultures. Research has consistently demonstrated that negotiators tend to share information directly (e.g., through questions about preferences) in individualistic, low-context cultures such as the United States, whereas they tend to share information indirectly (through offer behavior) in high-context, collectivist cultures such as Japan, Russia, Hong Kong, and Brazil (Adair et al., 2001, 2004). Moreover, the path to obtaining joint gains in negotiation is culturally contingent. For example, U.S. negotiators achieve higher joint gains when they share information directly, whereas Japanese negotiators achieve higher joint gains when they share information indirectly (Adair et al., 2001). Culture also affects communication sequences. Negotiators from collectivist cultures are better able to use both direct and indirect forms of information exchange, as compared with negotiators from individualistic cultures. In effect, collectivist negotiators are shown to be more flexible in their use of different information exchange tactics, whereas individualistic negotiators are primarily skilled in direct information sharing (Adair et al., 2001; Adair & Brett, 2005).

A key development in culture and negotiation research has been to examine how cultural differences are dynamic and change depending on features of the negotiation context. First, elements of the social context may activate the salience of cultural values and norms and therefore allow the expression of culture (cf. Tett & Burnett, 2003). For example, cultural values and norms are made more salient in situations where one is embedded in dense and multiplex social networks with similar group members. Indeed, research has shown that the nature of the relationship between individuals is a critical determinant of negotiations in collectivist cultures. Chan (1992) found that negotiators in collectivist cultures (e.g., Hong Kong) were much more cooperative with friends and much more competitive with strangers, whereas individualists did not differentiate between strangers and friends as much (see also Chen & Li, 2005; Probst, Carnevale,
& Triandis, 1999; Triandis et al., 2001). Cultural values and norms are also made more salient when negotiators are accountable to constituents. Gelfand and Realo (1999) found that accountability activated competitive construals and behaviors, and resulted in lower negotiation outcomes for individualistic samples. By contrast, among collectivists, accountability activated cooperative construals and behaviors, and resulted in higher negotiation outcomes. These effects were reversed in unaccountable negotiations, when, in effect, negotiators were released from normative pressures to do what is expected. In unaccountable conditions, collectivists were more competitive and achieved lower negotiation outcomes, as compared with individualists, who were more cooperative and achieved higher negotiation outcomes. Similarly, Rosette, Brett, Barsness, and Lytle (2006) found that Hong Kong Chinese were more aggressive in lean media such as e-mail where there is less constraint, as compared with face-to-face negotiations. In all, these results indicate that the same "objective" condition (e.g., relationships, accountability, and technology) can produce very different dynamics in negotiations in different cultures.

Situational factors also exacerbate cultural differences to the extent that they cause individuals to engage in automatic processing and rely on well-learned cultural tendencies. For example, in contexts where there is high cognitive load and/or high time pressure, individuals will utilize cultural knowledge as an easily available cue to guide information processing to a much greater extent than when under low cognitive load and time pressure. Indeed, research has also shown that high NFC amplifies cultural differences (Fu et al., 2007; Morris & Fu, 2001). For example, American disputants who are high in NFC prefer relationally unconnected mediators, whereas Chinese disputants who are high in NFC tend to seek relationally connected mediators, illustrating a positive relationship of NFC with conformity to cultural norms (Fu et al., 2007). Finally, situations in which there is high threat and uncertainty activating strong epistemic needs for group identification will amplify cultural differences. Research has shown that when people face a high degree of threat, they strongly hold on to their cultural identities to reduce anxiety (e.g., terror management theory; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Likewise, in situations of high uncertainty, individuals are more likely to identify with groups as epistemic authorities and conform to group norms (Kruglanski et al., 2005; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mammetti, & De Grada, 2006). In support of this, cultural differences have been found to be exacerbated in situations of high ambiguity (Morris, Leung, & Iyengar, 2004).

Surprisingly, the vast majority of studies on culture and negotiation have been intracultural comparisons of negotiation processes. Much less attention has been given to the dynamics of intercultural negotiations. What evidence does exist, however, suggests that intercultural dyads are less cooperative (Graham, 1985) and achieve lower joint profits as compared with intracultural dyads (Brett & Okumura, 1998; Natlandsmyr & Rognes, 1995). For example, Brett and Okumura (1998) found that joint gains were lower in intercultural negotiations between U.S. and Japanese negotiators than in intracultural negotiations in both cultural groups. This disparity was based in part on less accuracy in understanding of others' priorities and conflicting styles of information exchange in intercultural negotiations (Adair et al., 2001). Gelfand and McCusker (2002) argued that different metaphorical mappings of negotiation (e.g., sports in the United States and the Japanese ka metaphors in Japan) create different goals, scripts, and feelings in negotiation in intercultural contexts, making it difficult to organize social action (Weick, 1979) and arrive at a common understanding of the task. In a laboratory simulation, Gelfand, Nishii, Godfrey, and Raver (2003) found that metaphorical similarity in negotiation (i.e., agreement on the domain to which negotiation was mapped) was indeed an important predictor of joint gains. They suggested that in intercultural negotiations, negotiators need to "negotiate the negotiation"—or come to a common metaphor about the task—prior to negotiating. Others have theorized that cultural incongruence in negotiator scripts leads to high levels of negative affect (George, Jones, & Gonzalez, 1998; Kumar, 1999). Similarly, research suggests that conflicting goals might be a problem in intercultural negotiations. For example, Cai (1998) found that U.S. negotiators focused more on achieving short-term,
instrumental goals, whereas Taiwanese focused on long-term, global goals.

Despite the practical need, there is little research on the factors that predict intercultural negotiation effectiveness. To date, very little research has examined the individual-level characteristics that can be selected upon and/or trained to enhance intercultural negotiation effectiveness. This is a critical issue for diplomats, expatriates, students, and anyone who must negotiate interculturally. In a recent study, Imai and Gelfand (in press) examined the role of cultural intelligence (often called CQ), or a “person’s capability for successful adaptation to new cultural settings” (Earley & Ang, 2003, p. 9), along with other individual-level characteristics (intelligence, the Big Five personality factors, emotional intelligence). They found promising evidence for the role of cultural intelligence to help overcome problems in intercultural negotiations. Dyad-level CQ measured a week prior to negotiations predicted the extent to which negotiators engaged in sequencing of integrative information and cooperative behaviors, in turn allowing them to create mutually beneficial outcomes. CQ also predicted processes and outcomes over and above other personality constructs (i.e., openness, extraversion), other forms of intelligence (e.g., IQ, emotional intelligence), and international travel and living experience. Of interest, the minimum CQ score within the dyad was enough to predict behavioral sequences, showing that it takes only one, not two, high-CQ negotiators in order to become in sync.

Gender. Finally, we consider how gender variation affects negotiation outcomes. Negotiation researchers have long been interested in the effects of gender on negotiation processes and outcomes. As early as 1975, Rubin and Brown (1975) reviewed over 65 studies investigating the role of gender in negotiation and bargaining. Since Rubin and Brown’s review, there have been hundreds of research articles published on gender differences in negotiation (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Indeed, researchers have explored gender differences in many diverse areas in negotiation. Recent studies have tested the effect of negotiator gender on time to reach an agreement (C. Griffith, 1991; Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988); negotiator goals or expectations (Major, Vanderslice, & McFarlin, 1984; C. K. Stevens, Bavetta, & Gist, 1993); preferences for mode of communication (e.g., face-to-face or computer mediated; Wachter, 1999); perceptions of conflicts (e.g., Haferkamp, 1991); propensity to negotiate (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991); satisfaction (Papa & Nattle, 1989); confidence (Watson & Hoffman, 1996); and linguistic styles in negotiation (Smeltzer & Watson, 1986). In addition, a number of studies have reported the effects of opponents’ and constituents’ gender on negotiator expectations or behaviors (Cantrell & Butler, 1997; Ferguson & Schmitt, 1988; Matheson, 1991; Pruitt et al., 1986). By far the greatest number of studies, however, have focused on either differences in males’ and females’ negotiation styles, strategies, or tactics (e.g., Clark, 1983; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Kyl-Heku & Buss, 1996; Lind, Huo, & Tyler, 1994; Maxwell, 1992; Pruitt, Carnevale, Forcey, & Van Slyck, 1986; Putnam & Jones, 1982) or differences in their outcomes (e.g., Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Mesch & Dalton, 1989; Neu et al., 1988; Wachter, 1999; Watson & Hoffman, 1996).

Nevertheless, inconsistency has been the hallmark of research on gender and negotiation. In fact, Rubin and Brown (1975) discovered 21 studies that found males behaved more cooperatively than females in bargaining experiments; 27 studies that concluded females behaved more cooperatively than males; and 20 studies that found no differences between the genders. In a more recent attempt to draw some conclusions from these varied findings, Walters and colleagues conducted meta-analyses of the literature on gender differences in negotiation outcomes (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) and in negotiation behavior—specifically, competitiveness (Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). The former meta-analysis determined that women tended to negotiate lower outcomes than men and that this effect was fairly consistent across the 21 studies analyzed. The effect size of the gender difference, however, was not very large (d = 0.09). The other meta-analysis, by Walters et al. (1998), concluded that overall women tended to bargain more cooperatively than men, although again, the magnitude of
this difference was very small, with gender accounting for less than 1% of the variation in negotiator competitiveness. Moreover, unlike the relative consistency found in the outcome meta-analysis, there was substantial variation between studies in gender effects.

Like the culture research discussed above, recent work has now begun to look at how gender effects are dynamic in negotiation and, in particular, when gender is made salient at the negotiation table. Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn (2005) showed that the roles that are activated, and in particular whether one is negotiating for oneself or on behalf of others, are “triggers” for gender differences. Women who negotiate for others are much more aggressive than when they negotiate for themselves. Kray, Galinsky, and Thompson (2002) showed that gender differences are highly dynamic in negotiation and are contingent on cognitive constructs that are accessible. For example, gender differences have been found to be amplified when masculine stereotypes are activated subtly and women are victim to stereotype threat. However, when stereotypes are activated blatantly, women react against the stereotype and are more aggressive. Small et al. (2007) showed that when women feel empowered, they are much more likely to initiate negotiation and feel less anxious about negotiating. In all, research clearly shows that the social context is a critical moderator of gender effects.

Finally, like research on other organizational roles, female negotiators need to navigate potential backlash. Much previous work (Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001) has demonstrated that women who act in an assertive manner, therefore violating gender stereotypes, are often subject to backlash and harsh evaluations. Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) examined this in a negotiation context. Participants were asked to read interview notes for a female or male job candidate. Half of the candidates made additional requests of the employer (e.g., a bonus, a higher salary), and half did not. Results showed that female candidates who made requests were perceived as more demanding and less nice than male candidates who made the same requests. Given how important negotiation is to financial earnings, research is needed on the factors that reduce backlash at the negotiation table.

MEDIATION

Thus far, we have discussed research on negotiation, and we now turn to another method of conflict resolution: mediation. When disputes cannot be resolved by the parties involved, mediators can be called on to help facilitate an agreement (Rubin & Brown, 1975). In cases of emergent mediation, an interested party emerges from the system in which a dispute has occurred with no formal appointment or role. Contractual mediation, in contrast, takes place in a context of rules and guidelines established by a formal authority (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Mediators serve numerous functions in negotiation. They can facilitate communication between opposing parties, explore alternative opportunities, identify and promote the use of additional resources not initially apparent to the parties, establish and reinforce norms and rules or procedures, and provide opportunities for graceful retreat or saving face (Kerr, 1954; see also D. F. Johnson & Tullar, 1972; Pruitt & Johnson, 1970; C. M. Stevens, 1963). In addition, they can change the structure of a negotiation and deal with difficult constituents (Wall, 1981), handle internal disputes (Lim & Carnevale, 1990), and mediate power differences between parties (Ippolito & Pruitt, 1990). It is important to recognize that mediators do not impose agreements on negotiating parties, unlike arbitrators (Conlon & Meyer, 2004; Elkouri, Elkouri, Goggin, & Volz, 1997; Gerchak, Greenstein, & Weissman, 2004), but rather act as impartial agents to help resolve the dispute.

Mediators employ various tactics to facilitate agreements among conflicting parties, ranging from providing rewards for concessions to the use of threats for failure to cooperate (Bercovitch, 1984, 1989; Carnevale, 1986; Carnevale & Conlon, 1990; Lovell, 1952; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Touval & Zartman, 1985; Wall, 1981; Wall & Lynn, 1993). Kressel and Pruitt (1985) classified interventions into reflexive, contextual, and substantive categories, specifying an assertive–passive dimension that cuts across these three content categories. Reflexive interventions are designed to affect the mediator and involve the establishment of a groundwork upon which the mediator will facilitate future activities. Contextual interventions operate on the environment and refer to the mediator’s attempts to alter the
conditions between parties with the end goal of mutual problem solving. Finally, substantive interventions refer to behaviors the mediator engages in when dealing directly with the issues under discussion. McLaughlin, Carnevale, and Lim (1991) performed multidimensional scaling of several mediator behaviors, identifying three dimensions, substantive–reflexive, affective–cognitive, and forcing–facilitating, thereby demonstrating significant support for Kressel and Pruitt's categorization.

The effects of third-party interventions are often positive. Studies have shown that the mere presence of a third party generates a pressure to agree (D. F. Johnson & Tullar, 1972; Kerr, 1954; Krauss & Deutsch, 1966; Manzini & Mariotti, 2001; Meeker & Shure, 1969; Pruitt, 1971; Vidmar, 1971; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Other work has shown that third parties generate pressures toward agreement by reducing perceived differences between parties (Podell & Knapp, 1969; Pruitt & Johnson, 1970) and helping to overcome reactive devaluation on the part of both negotiating parties (Stillinger, Epelbaum, Keltner, & Ross, 1991). In addition, the cooperation spurred by third-party intervention often makes for a more positive relationship between negotiating parties (W. H. Ross, Conlon, & Lind, 1990). Despite these advantages, comparing mediation to other forms of dispute resolution reveals a number of strengths and weaknesses. For example, mediated agreements are often considered less fair than agreements reached by independent negotiation (Kressel & Pruitt, 1985), perhaps because negotiators perceive less of a voice (Conlon & Meyer, 2004). At the same time, mediation is generally perceived to be more fair than other forms of third-party intervention (e.g., arbitration) (Brett, Barsness, & Goldberg, 1996; Peirce et al., 1993), because participants retain more control over the negotiation process itself (Shapiro & Brett, 1993). Yet mediation doesn’t always produce a settlement whereas arbitration clearly does (Champlin & Bognanno, 1985; Conlon & Meyer, 2004), suggesting the importance of analyzing different criteria when evaluating different forms of dispute resolution (Conlon & Meyer, 2004).

Research on mediation has clearly taken a contingency approach, highlighting several factors influence whether mediation has positive or negative effects. First, the situational conditions surrounding the mediation have an impact on the success of mediation. Mediation is more effective when negotiations are characterized by moderate conflict (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Glasl, 1980; Kochan & Jick, 1978), when parties are highly motivated to reach an agreement and committed to mediation (Hiltrop, 1989; Touval & Zartman, 1985), when parties have a genuinely positive relationship as opposed to a negative relationship (Thompson & Kim, 2000), when both parties jointly acknowledge responsibility (Poitras, 2007), when issues do not involve general principles (Bercovitch, 1989; Pruitt, McGillicuddy, Welton, & Fry, 1989), when negotiating parties are approximately equal in power (Bercovitch, 1989), when negotiating parties are low in self-efficacy (Arnold & O’Connor, 2006), and when arbitration is threatened (Farber & Katz, 1979; McGillicuddy, Welton, & Pruitt, 1987). Other work has shown that mediation leads to better outcomes when third-party agents are in close communication with both parties, as this allows for an improved realization of alternative agreements (Honeyman, Goh, & Kelly, 2004; Kolb & Rubin, 1991; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1983). Mediators’ credibility and their ability to gain trust and confidence among negotiators are critical factors for mediation success (Arnold & O’Connor, 2006; Goldberg & Shaw, 2007; Kressel, 1972; Kressel & Pruitt, 1989). Characteristics such as likability, integrity, and intelligence (Goldberg & Shaw, 2007), as well as authoritativeness and impartiality (Honeyman et al., 2005), also have been deemed important for effectiveness. It is interesting to note that negotiators appear to tolerate third-party bias as long as third-party agents behave evenhandedly during the negotiation itself (Carnevale & Conlon, 1990).

Consistent with a contingency approach, research has shown that mediators adapt to the context and their own goals and choose their tactics accordingly. Carnevale’s (1986) strategic choice model predicts that mediator behavior will vary as a function of both the mediator’s concern for parties’ interests and the mediator’s perception of common ground between two parties. The strategic choice model has received substantial empirical support (Carnevale & Conlon,
Research has also shown that mediator tactics are contingently effective. Though certain tactics tend to be universally related to mediation effectiveness, such as controlling the communication between disputants (Hiltrop, 1985, 1989), structuring the negotiation (Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, & McGillicuddy, 1992), and using a person-oriented approach (W. H. Ross et al., 1990), in general, the types of tactics that lead to high outcomes are contingent on the situational context of the mediation (Carnevale, Lim, & McLaughlin, 1986; Fisher & Keashy, 1988; Kressel, 1972; Kressel & Pruitt, 1989; Lim & Carnevale, 1990; Prein, 1987; Shapiro, Drieghe, & Brett, 1985; Sheppard, Blumenfeld-Jones, & Roth, 1989). For example, pressing tactics are perceived to be positively related to mediation effectiveness when hostility among disputants is high, but are perceived to be negatively related to mediation effectiveness when hostility is low (Lim & Carnevale, 1990). Similarly, tactics designed to foster trust become increasingly effective in improving relationship outcomes as levels of hostility increase (Lim & Carnevale, 1990). In some cases, however, mediators can actually be disruptive when negotiating parties are able to come to an agreement independently (Donohue, 1989; Hiltrop, 1985, 1989; Zubek et al., 1992). In addition, the appropriate time for a third party to intervene is a controversial topic. Whereas some scholars argue that intervention should occur at the first sign of hostility (Donohue, 1989), others activate waiting (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1993).

An interesting new line of research has examined how the technological context of mediation and how “e-mediators” can facilitate or inhibit negotiation agreements. Druckman, Druckman, and Arai (2004) examined a e-mediation program, in which an electronic program served as a mediator between negotiating parties, generating suggestions based on algorithms and other preexisting rules. The use of interactive e-mediation was compared with a condition in which negotiators received advice in paper form. Results showed that individuals who utilized the e-mediation obtained more agreements, although negotiators who received paper advice had more positive perceptions of the negotiation. A subsequent study showed that when both negotiators were able to use the e-mediation technology together, the
integrativeness and number of agreements were comparable to outcomes produced using a live mediator. However, live mediators were perceived more favorably than was the e-mediation program. Currently, this is the only study to have experimentally examined e-mediation, hence illustrating the need for future research on this potentially helpful system.

The cultural context of mediation has received far less attention. Carnevale et al. (2004) argued that culture can both help and hinder negotiation processes depending on several situational factors (Cohen, 1996; Nader & Todd, 1978; Witty, 1980). Research on mediation has revealed some considerable cultural variation (Callister & Wall, 2004; N. Kim, Wall, Sohn, & Kim, 1993; Wall & Blum, 1991; Wall & Callister, 1999). For example, culture affects the decision to mediate. Smith, Peterson, Leung, and Dugan (1998) found that individuals from the United States (a low power distance culture) were unlikely to involve their boss in workplace disputes, whereas James, Chen, and Cropanzano (1996) found that Taiwanese deem the intervention of a high-power third party legitimate. Mediation tactics also vary across cultures. Callister and Wall (2004) found that mediators in Thailand are much more likely to highlight the costs of continued disputes, request that the disputants forgive each other, and make the disputants apologize as compared with U.S. mediators, presumably because these tactics are consistent with cultural values of harmony, collectivism, and face saving. Mediator tactics also vary considerably across different East Asian countries (N. Kim et al., 1993; Wall & Blum, 1999; Wall & Callister, 1999), although more theory and research is needed to understand precisely why and when mediator tactics vary. As well, the types of tactics that are effective given varying situational conditions in different cultures have received scant attention.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As this review attests, research on negotiation and mediation is thriving. As a fundamental basis of human interaction, negotiation and mediation take place on a daily basis, and their successful resolution has critical implications for individuals, groups, organizations, and societies at large. Negotiation theory and research has greatly advanced our understanding of how negotiators think and feel, and how they are motivated to act. Likewise, as the process is socially situated, we have advanced our understanding of how the social context—power, issues, relationships, technology, and culture—dramatically shapes the dynamics and outcomes of negotiation. Almost 15 years ago, Kramer and Messick (1995) commented that few areas have developed as rapidly, and with as much depth and breadth, as negotiation. As seen in this chapter, the trend continues in exponential fashion. This chapter makes clear that the field has much to be proud of, including its theoretical and empirical sophistication and its clear relevance to many processes and contexts. We conclude the chapter with some forecasts of where the field is (or should be) going in the future.

Future research would benefit from linking the negotiation and mediation literature with other core topics in the industrial and organizational psychology and organizational behavior literature. As this review attests, much negotiation research takes place in laboratory settings, largely with student samples and decontextualized role-playing tasks that are arguably laden with sports and game metaphors (Gelfand & McCusker, 2002). Although theory from laboratory research is likely to generalize to organizational settings, laboratory methods are constrained in context and time, and future research needs to ensure that critical variables that are not typically studied in the laboratory are not omitted from negotiation theorizing and research. For example, the role of organizational culture—which is a construct that can be measured in the field or manipulated in the lab—in dyadic and team negotiations is rarely explored, yet this contextual variable likely has an important impact as in other areas of organizational behavior (see Vol. 2, chap. 12, this handbook).

Likewise, perhaps due to the dominance of laboratory methods in the field, negotiation research rarely examines how social networks affect negotiation processes and outcomes. Classic distinctions of network composition (e.g., in terms of the power and organizational positions of members), tie strength among members, and network density (Ibarra, 1993)
are likely to be critical for understanding the initiation of negotiation, negotiation processes, and negotiation outcomes. Initial evidence for the importance of networks and negotiation can be found in a study by Seidel, Polzer, and Stewart (2000), who examined social networks and negotiation in the context of discrimination. The authors examined over 3,000 salary negotiations and found that members of racial minority groups negotiated significantly lower salary increases than did majority members, and that this effect was mediated by social ties to the organization. That is, minority members lacked ties to more powerful members of the organization who could have facilitated salary increases. In another study, Olekalns and Lau (2002) examined trust in social networks, finding that networks composed of trust relationships had a substantial impact on negotiation outcomes. Moreover, they found that networks of distrusted members also had an impact. In other words, knowing whom not to trust is just as important as knowing whom to trust when determining resource allocation. Future work on social networks would enable negotiation research to have a direct link to organizational structure at work.

The future of negotiation research also lies in reaching within the discipline of psychology to forge partnerships on negotiation and other subdisciplines as well as interdisciplinarian partnerships. One direction for future research involves the consideration of biological factors within negotiation behavior. Existing work has already related biological factors such as genes and hormones to organizational constructs such as job satisfaction and type of occupation (Dabbs & Morris, 1990; Ilies, Arvey, & Bouchard, 2005). Negotiators clearly are not immune to hormonal influences, and thus precisely how and when biological factors affect negotiation behavior should be a topic for future investigation. For example, work is currently under way to examine the joint effect of ovulation versus menstruation and negotiation partner gender (Severance & Gelfand, 2009). Like many areas in negotiation, we believe that examining how the social context interacts with hormones to predict negotiation behavior will be a fruitful approach. Along these lines, the emerging areas of social neuroscience (Heatherton, Macrae, & Kelley, 2004) and neuroeconomics (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Zak, 2004), which focus on the use of neuroscience methods to understand human behavior, are ripe for integration with negotiation theory and research. In all, understanding interpersonal processes in negotiation could benefit from numerous subdisciplines in psychology, including attachment theory from developmental psychology, defensive mechanisms and learned helplessness from clinical psychology, and the like.

Future research on negotiation and mediation needs to examine the dynamics and change as it occurs over time in negotiations. Scholars have just begun to study conflict and negotiation-related processes through the lens of dynamical systems theory, an increasingly influential paradigm in many areas of science (cf. S. Johnson, 2001; Nowak & Vallacher, 1998; Schuster, 1984; Strogatz, 2003; Weisbuch, 1992; Vallacher, Read, & Nowak, 2002). A dynamical system is a set of interconnected elements (e.g., beliefs, feelings, and behaviors) that change and evolve over time. The system as a whole evolves and changes as a result of interactions among the individual elements in the system. Applying dynamical modeling to conflict and negotiation situations can provide a number of insights. For example, dynamical modeling suggests that successfully changing any element of a relationship in a negotiation (e.g., level of trust) is a function of the status of the other elements (e.g., each party's motives, attitudes, actions) of this relationship. Another example is that dynamical research can identify basic parameters that account for sudden and dramatic changes in the nature of negotiation relationships (Nowak, 2004). The dynamical systems approach has been suggested as a way to conceptualize and investigate such conflict-related phenomena as emotion (Thagard & Nerb, 2002), attitude change (Nowak, Szamrej, & Latané, 1990), cooperation and competition (Liebowitch et al., 2008; Vallacher, Nowak, Bui-Wrzosinska, & Coleman, 2006), power (Coleman, Bui-Wrzosinska, & Nowak, 2008), and conflict intractability (e.g., Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007), among others.

The dynamical systems approach offers a number of potential contributions to negotiation research. Dynamical systems theory offers a rich array of new metaphors, constructs, and principles, which might
be fruitfully applied to the study of negotiation. Dynamic system constructs such as attractors, emergence, and self-organization can serve as useful metaphors to help understand the dynamic nature of conflict and negotiation (see Vallacher & Nowak, 1994). The dynamical systems approach provides social scientists tools to facilitate mathematical descriptions of the hypothesized mechanisms underlying specific culture and conflict dynamics (for illustrations, see Coleman et al., 2005; Liebovitch et al., 2008). Mathematical models of negotiation and mediation are rare (see Armstrong & Hurley, 2002). Although social science theory is typically expressed verbally, the dynamical systems tools translate these theories into mathematically based computer simulations. This will allow identification of assumptions that are inherent in our theories but difficult to identify when theories are maintained in their visual form. Finally, the dynamical systems approach has implications for the types of empirical methodologies developed and employed in research. Typically, traditional social sciences focus on the central tendency of variables and ignore important dynamics reflected in variables' variances. Further, dynamical systems models and methods push the social sciences to focus on events as they unfold over time (see, e.g., Bui-Wrzosinska, 2005).

Finally, negotiation and mediation research should also develop partnerships with other disciplines, such as computer science. Computer science perspectives will be useful to understand all of the terrain covered in this chapter—from basic social and psychological processes to macro processes such as culture. As noted, research has already begun to show that artificially intelligent agents can negotiate and mediate, sometimes better than humans (Lin et al., 2008; Oshrat et al., 2009). Partnerships between social scientists and computer scientists are already beginning to develop (e.g., Sycara, Gelfand, & Abbe, 2009), and we predict they will continue for the foreseeable future. Indeed, there is no doubt that many of the greatest scientific breakthroughs have been made possible through interdisciplinary research, and negotiation research is no exception. Aply put by Karl Popper (1963), arguably one of the most influential philosophers of science in the 20th century, "We are not students of some subject matter, but students of problems. And problems may cut right across the borders of any subject matter or discipline" (p. 88). Negotiation researchers, as in other areas of study, will accordingly need to "jettison the security of familiar tools, ideas and specialties as they forge new partnerships" (Kafatos & Eisner, 2004, p. 1257). As a multilevel and multidimensional area of inquiry, negotiation research is undoubtedly well situated to the interdisciplinary challenge.

Whatever the future may hold for research on negotiation and mediation, this review illustrates the field is growing exponentially and promises to continue to offer much to help manage conflict globally and locally.

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